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A STRATEGY FOR MERCY
ROBERT L. MISNER*
The criminal justice system has taken on a very cold edge.
The public's determination to view crime as a moral issue rather
than a utilitarian issue1 has caused the debate on punishment to
shift from the rhetoric of utilitarianism and the individuation of
punishment2 to the language of retribution and just deserts.'
* Professor of Law, Willamette University. J.D., University of Chicago, 1971;
B.A., University of San Francisco, 1968.
1.
Even now... many educated people still discuss the drug problem in
almost every way except the right way. They talk about the "costs" of
drug use and the "socioeconomic factors" that shape that use. They rarely
speak plainly-drug use is wrong because it is immoral and it is immoral
because it enslaves the mind and destroys the soul. It is as if it were a
mark of sophistication for us to shun the language of morality in discuss-
ing the problems of mankind.
WILLIAI J. BENNETT, THE INDEX OF LEADING CULTURAL INDICATORS: FACTS AND
FIGURES ON THE STATE OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 42 (1994) (former "drug czar" Bennett
quoting James Q. Wilson of UCLA).
2. "In the course of a decade, perhaps less, the rehabilitative ideal suffered a
precipitous decline in its capacity to influence American penal practice and, more
important, in its potency to define commonly held aspirations in the penal area."
FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND
SOCIAL PURPOSE 1-2 (1981). For a history of the development of the criminal justice
system over the last 25 years with particular emphasis on sentencing, see MICHAEL
TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 6-13 (1996). A key factor to be considered in sentenc-
ing under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) is the need for the sen-
tences "to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment for the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (1994).
3. John Rawls has defined "retribution":
What we may call the retributive view is that punishment is justified on
the grounds that wrongdoing merits punishment. It is morally fitting that
a person who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his wrongdo-
ing... and the severity of the appropriate punishment depends on the
depravity of his act. The state of affairs where a wrongdoer suffers pun-
ishment is morally better than the state of affairs where he does not;
and it is better irrespective of any of the consequences of punishing him.
John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4-5 (1955).
4. The term 'just deserts" is attributed to Immanuel Kant. See IMMANUEL KANT,
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The shift has been more than symbolic: With the overwhelming
support of the electorate, the criminal justice system has em-
braced sentencing guidelines,5 mandatory minimum sentences,6
broader prosecutorial discretion,' public humiliation of certain
offenders,' less tolerance of juvenile crime,9 the demise of pa-
role,1 ° and a renewed dedication to capital punishment." These
changes, which are intended to reflect the public's moral outrage
at crime,12 have resulted iii more persons being incarcerated s for
THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 99-107 (John Ladd trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co.
1965) (1797). For a summary of Kant's position on just deserts, see Paul H. Robin-
son & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 455 (1997).
5. See infra note 51.
6. See infra note 61.
7. See infra note 58.
8. See infra note 60.
9. See infra note 59.
10. See Victoria J. Palacios, Go and Sin No More: Rationality and Release Deci-
sions by Parole Boards, 45 S.C. L. REV. 567, 573-79 (1994) (explaining that despite
the restrictions on parole by mandatory sentencing statutes and sentencing guide-
lines, both intending to create determinate sentencing systems, parole continues to
be the most common means of releasing prisoners).
11. During 1996, 19 states executed 45 prisoners. See KATHLEEN MAGUIRE & ANN L.
PASTORE, U.S. DEPVT OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
1997, at 528 tbl.6.78 (1998) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK]. At the end of 1996, 34 states and
the federal system held 3219 prisoners with death sentences including 1820 whites,
1349 African Americans and 259 individuals of other races. See id. California (454),
Texas (438), and Florida (373) accounted for 39% of all condemned prisoners. See id.
At the end of 1980, 691 prisoners awaited execution; by the end of 1990, that number
had risen to 2356. See id. at 531 tbl.6.82. But see John T. Whitehead, 'Good 01' Boys"
and the Chair: Death Penalty Attitudes of Policy Makers in Tennessee, 44 CRIME &
DELINQ. 245, 245 (1998) (claiming public support for capital punishment is "spurious,"
and that the public is concerned mainly with true incapacitation for murderers).
12. In 1982, when asked the question, "What do you think is the most important
problem facing this country today?," 3% of those polled by The Gallup Report an-
swered that crime or violence was the most important issue. See SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 11, at 100 tbl.2.1. In 1998, public response nominating crime and violence as
the most important problem had increased to 20%. See id. For a discussion of sam-
pling procedures for the public survey sampling used in creating the Sourcebook, see
id. at 580-83. For a historical look at the public view about crime and the
politicization of crime beginning with Barry Goldwater and running through the
Bush-Dulakis presidential campaign, see KATHLYN TAYLOR GAUBATZ, CRIME IN THE
PUBLIC MIND 2-10 (1995).
13. In 1990, the total number of persons held in state or federal prisons or jails
was 1,148,702. See DARRELL K. GILLARD & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEPt OF JUSTICE,
BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 1997, at 2 tbl.1 (1998) [hereinafter PRISONERS]. By June 30,
1997, the number had risen 50% to 1,725,842 persons. See id. From 1990 to 1996,
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longer periods of time1 4 and at very high costs.15
But what if a legislator, whose personal value system stresses
the virtue of mercy, is at odds with his political savvy that tells
him crime will continue to be debated as a moral issue? What if
he were to conclude that the criminal law has gone beyond the
limits needed to respond to legitimate societal concerns about
crime?16 What strategy might a legislator employ, armed with
the harsh data of the criminal justice system,17 to introduce the
there was a 43% increase among males and a 65% increase among females in the
number of sentenced prisoners per 100,000 U.S. residents. See id. at 1. On Decem-
ber 31, 1997, 1 in every 117 male U.S. residents was under the jurisdiction of the
state or federal correctional authorities. See id The trend for incarcerating more
persons continues; in 1997, prison and jail populations had increased 5.2%. See id.
at 3 tbl.2. This increase comes at a time when the FBI Crime Index had decreased
10.5% per 100,000 inhabitants between 1991-95. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES: 1995 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 7 (1996). Much of the growth
of the prison population can be attributed to the effect of sentencing legislation on
prosecutorial discretion and judicial decisions to incarcerate persons who previously
would not have been incarcerated. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMEN-
TAL RELATIONS, THE ROLE OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT ELECTED OFFICIALS IN CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE 10-15 (1993).
14. The U.S. Department of Justice has reported recently that the average time
served for violent crimes has risen from 43 months in 1993 to 49 months in 1997.
See PAULA M. DITrON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN
SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 9 tbl.8 (1999).
15. Direct expenditures for correctional activities of state governments increased
348% from $4.3 billion in 1980 to $19.1 billion in 1993. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 11,
at 11 tbl.1.9. Direct and intergovernmental corrections expenditures for all governments
increased 363% from $6.9 billion in 1980 to $31.9 billion in 1993. See id. at 3 tbl.l.2.
16. Many commentators share this sentiment:
"There is no liberty whenever the laws permit that under certain condi-
tions man ceases to be a person and becomes a thing." I never tire of
repeating this sentence of Cesare Beccaria at every opportunity, because
it seems to me that in these apparently simple words there lies the hope
of mankind and the program of the future.
SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT 255 (1987) (quoting CALMANDREI, PRO-
CEDURE AND DEMOCRACY 103 (1956)). Norval Morris expressed a similar thought:
It is the cardinal defect of those who see desert as defining punishment, as
distinct from defining its proper outer limits, that in their understandable
anxiety to preclude the exercise of discretion in punishment-which has so
frequently in the past been exercised on an unjust racial or class discrim-
inatory basis-they create systems of justice insufficiently responsive to the
compelling need for mercy in all human relationships, but most particu-
larly in the relationship where the social collectivity is imposing punish-
ment on the wrongdoer. If we all get our deserts, who escapes the rack?
NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 155 (1982).
17. For example, 1 of every 117 American men were in prison in 1997. See PRIS-
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virtue of mercy into the debate on crime in order to recapture a
sense of humaneness while respecting the broad public support
for retribution-based punishment?"s Can a legislator, for exam-
ple, convince other legislators that mercy permits the issue of
drug control to focus primarily on treatment while at the same
time acknowledging the general political pressure imposed by
the public to go to the upper limits of punishment?19
The development of any political strategy generally includes a
return to the topical debates of past battles. Because mercy
plays such a prominent role in religion,"0 literature,21 and philos-
ophy,2 one might anticipate that mercy, as it affects the value
systems of the country, would have impacted the public debate
on punishment. Nothing could be further from the truth. Mercy
is discussed rarely in legal literature,23 and mercy as a topic for
public policymakers, such as legislators24 and prosecutors, 25 is
ONERS, supra note 13, at 1. One of every 14 African American men in their twenties
and thirties were in prison in 1996. See id. at 11.
18. In 1996, 78% of respondents believed that their local courts did not deal
harshly enough with criminals. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 11, at 135-36 tbl.2.50.
This figure has remained relatively constant for the past 10 years. See id. at 134-35
tbl.2.50.
19. See MORRIS, supra note 16, at 158.
20. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 68.
22. For a bibliography of sources discussing mercy, see Stephen P. Garvey, 'As the
Gentle Rain from Heaven"." Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989,
991 n.9 (1996); Malla Pollack, The Under Funded Death Penalty: Mercy as Discrimi-
nation in a Rights-Based System of Justice, 66 UMKC L. REV. 513, 555-58 (1998).
23. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 22, at 990 n.8 (citing capital cases in which the
Supreme Court made reference to mercy and concluding that "the Court's members
tend to use the concept of mercy without great care").
24. For a general discussion of religion as a source of inspiration for the legisla-
tor, see Jan M. Broekman, Justice as Equilibrium, 5 LAW & PHIL. 369 (1986).
25. Mercy is tolerated readily in prosecutorial decision making, particularly in
charging decisions. For example, a study commissioned by the Arizona Legislative
Counsel reported on felony sentences for a 12-month period:
1. Approximately 10% of defendants who were eligible in fact for three
of the state mandatory minimum sentencing statutes received the
mandatory sentence;
2: Over 50% of defendants eligible for mandatory sentences under dan-
gerous offender statutes served only probation;
3. Approximately 26% of those eligible for a mandatory life sentence
served probation;
4. Many offenders who did not receive mandatory minimum sentences
committed offenses that were equally serious as those offenses corn-
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virtually nonexistent.26 The development of a strategy for mercy
requires the policymaker go elsewhere.
If one assumes that the various strands of philosophical
thought on retribution and mercy are likely to have counterparts
in the world of public opinion, a legislator can gain valuable
assistance in creating a strategy for mercy by turning to the rich
literature of the philosophy of punishment, supplemented by the
mitted by offenders who received the mandatory minimum.
INSTITUTE FOR RATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY, INC., ARIZONA CRIMINAL CODE AND CORREC-
TIONS STUDY: FINAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL 27-33 (1991). For a dis-
cussion of the unreviewability of prosecutorial decisions, see Robert L. Misner, Re-
casting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 749-50 (1996).
26. There is a large body of legal literature on related areas. Mercy is one of the
President's constitutional powers. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. In Biddle v. Perovich,
274 U.S. 480 (1927), Justice Holmes commented that the Constitution contains the
power to pardon on the grounds that "the public welfare will be better served by
inflicting less than what the judgment fixed." Id. at 486. Much has been written on
the pardoning power of the executive. See, e.g., KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS:
JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1989) (chronicling the history of the
pardon power and concluding that it is necessary to correct judicial errors). The
pardoning power is referred to in the English tradition as the prerogative of mercy.
See, e.g., Sir. Louis Blom-Cooper Q.C., Justice and Mercy in the Caribbean, 1997
CRIM. L. REV. 116, 116-18. In Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884),
the Crown commuted prisoners' sentences from death to six months imprisonment.
See Michael G. Mallin, In Warm Blood: Some Historical and Procedural Aspects of
Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 34 U. CIn. L. REV. 387, 406-07 (1967) (citing TIMES
(London), Dec. 15, 1884, at 6). Much has also been written on the power of the jury
to nullify a criminal statute by refusing to convict the defendant despite the
strength of the prosecutor's case. See, e.g., Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S.
135, 138 (1920) ("[T]he jury has the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both
law and facts."); see also David C. Brody, Sparf and Dougherty Revisited: Why the
Court Should Instruct the Jury of Its Nullification Right, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 89,
89-90 (1995) (reporting that in the first half of 1995 at least 10 states introduced
legislation or sought constitutional amendments that would have required juries to
be instructed on their power to acquit despite the strength of the prosecutor's case);
Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 254 (1996)
("In terms of raw power, nullification has few parallels: rarely can a public entity
make such a critical decision with no obligation to justify its action and with no
recourse for the aggrieved party."). The trial judge can exhibit some degree of mercy
at trial through the authority to acquit or reduce charges. For a controversial deci-
sion in which the trial court reduced a jury verdict from murder to involuntary
manslaughter, see Carey Goldberg, In a Startling Turnabout, Judge Sets Au Pair
Free, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1997, at Al (reporting the judge's decision in the trial of
Louise Woodward). Other processes, such as expungement, might be seen as merciful
if they limit the consequences of conviction. See, e.g., Julian V. Roberts, The Role of
the Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process, 22 CRIME & JUST. 303, 339 (1997)
(exploring the arguments in favor of expungement).
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more limited literature on mercy, to discover what political dan-
gers may be lurking when advocating a strategy for mercy.
Because mercy requires a retributive theory of punishment,"
a strategy for mercy must first contend with the realization that
retribution is more complicated than simply distributing just
deserts to offenders.2" Voters and fellow legislators are likely to
entertain multiple meanings of retribution. Some retributionists
emphasize the emotional aspect of retribution,29 while others
stress the value-setting role that retribution plays.3 0 For some,
retribution confirms that people are fundamentally economic
agents, and punishment is the method society uses to enforce a
theory of mutual burdens and benefits.3 ' Still other retribution-
ists center on punishment as a societal method for reestablishing
the inherent worth of the victim.3 2 Some retributivists blend
retribution and utilitarianism. 3 A strategy for mercy must take
these differences of emphasis into account.
27. See, e.g., Alwynne Smart, Mercy, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 212,
212-27 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969) (explaining that mercy is punishing to a degree less
than that which is deserved to avoid unnecessary punishing).
28. Although it is possible to argue for a purely utilitarian theory of punishment,
it is more likely that a person claiming utilitarian justifications for punishment is
actually professing an inclusive theory of punishment that blends together retribu-
tion and utilitarian justifications. See LIONEL W. FOx, THE ENGLISH PRISON AND
BORSTAL SYSTEMS 15 (1952); JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
308-09 (2d ed. 1960); GORDON HAWINS, THE PRISON: POLICY AND PRACTICE 32-33
(1976); Kent A. Wilson, Vengeance and Mercy: Implications of Psychoanalytic Theory
for the Retributive Theory of Punishment, 60 NEB. L. REv. 276, 277 n.5 (1981). Plato
and Hobbes rejected a purely retributive theory of justice. See ALLEN, supra note 2,
at 119 n.24. Many commentators are skeptical of finding one theory that is totally
satisfactory. See, e.g., RICHARD A. WASSERSTOM, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL ISSUES 146
(1980) (arguing that retributivist theories, at least as currently constructed, are not
"sufficiently sound" to support "general justifiability of punishment"); see also Jean
Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, in CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
494, 494-95 (Jules L. Coleman ed., 1994) (advocating the moral education theory of
punishment, which includes elements of deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution).
29. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
30. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
31. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
32. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
33. See Nathan Brett, Mercy and Criminal Justice: A Plea for Mercy, 5 CAN. J.L.
& JURISPRUDENCE 81, 93-94 (1992) (arguing that once culpability is established, utili-
tarian notions can be considered in the penalty phase); see also Robinson & Darley,
supra note 4, at 498-99 (claiming desert distribution of liability is the distribution
that has the greatest utility). It is a tribute to the centrality of retribution that it
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Second, a strategy for mercy must recognize that mercy is a
concept that contains apparent contradictions. At the heart of
any debate on mercy are the paradoxes of mercy noted by the
eleventh-century philosopher, St. Anselm of Canterbury. 4
Anselm's first paradox captures two thoughts. If justice is pun-
ishment actually deserved, and mercy punishes less than that
which is deserved, then mercy appears to be injustice and there-
fore a vice. 5 Alternatively, if there are merciful factors that
should be taken into account in judgment, mercy is part of jus-
tice and therefore a redundancy."6 Anselm's first paradox, when
discussed with the various strands of retribution, raises strong
political issues of justice from a normative, noncomparative
point of view centering upon justice to a particular person with-
out concern as to punishment afforded others. A strategy for
mercy must contend with the political attraction that claims of
noncomparative justice have for voters.
Anselm's second paradox poses the difficult question whether
mercy, which is undeserved and therefore discretionary, naturally
results in the unequal application of the law."7 The second para-
dox raises the difficulty of discretion in a diverse society and
centers on the fairness of the individuation of punishment from
a comparative point of view. Therefore, a strategy for mercy
must also contend with the political attraction that equal ap-
plication of the law has for voters.
This Article concludes that a strategy for mercy can minimize
public opposition if the strategy recognizes a few guidelines.
First, some objections to mercy in decision making will be less
has survived the hostility of recent times and survived "doubts about the moral autono-
my of humans." ALLEN, supra note 2, at 69.
34. Ansehm, Archbishop of Canterbury, died in 1109 after a life as pastor, abbot,
philosopher, and co-founder of the school of scholastic theology. See F.S. Schmitt,
Saint Anselm of Canterbury, in 1 THE NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 581, 581
(1967). Anselm is best know for Proslogion, in which he set forth his ontological
argument for the existence of God. See id. at 582. In the years following his death,
Anselm's work was overtaken by new methods of thought stimulated by the rise of
Arabic and Aristotelian philosophy. See id. Anselm's ontological argument for the
existence of God favorably influenced Descartes and Hegel but was rejected by oth-
ers such as St. Thomas Aquinas and Kant. See id.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 259-60.
36. See infra text accompanying note 337.
37. See infra text accompanying note 369.
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forceful if mercy is exercised in areas of nonviolent crime that do
not also create strong emotional responses by society against the
offender and in those in which utilitarian concerns of deterrence
and incapacitation are not overwhelming. Likely candidates for
merciful treatment include areas in which the criminal conduct
is fairly widespread so that some ambiguity exists as to the de-
gree of moral culpability of the wrongdoer as well as in those
areas in which issues of poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment
often engender a degree of general compassion.8 Second, some
objections to mercy in decision making will be less forceful if
mercy is extended to offenders whose criminal conduct does not
create particularized victims who have suffered compensable
damages and who can readily compare their cases to similar
cases. The particularization of victims can result in strong,
vengeful reactions that also call into play issues of injustice and
inequality of treatment for both the offender and the injured
person.39 Failure to punish an offender to the fullest may be
seen as an act of indignity and disrespect to the victim. 40 Third,
objections to mercy will be lessened if mercy is shown to offend-
ers who not only fail to gain socially or economically from their
conduct, but rather who, through their conduct, place themselves
in socially disadvantageous positions. In the long run, the exer-
cise of mercy may alter beliefs of some socially estranged offend-
ers who have concluded that they are not likely to share equally
in the benefits of society even if they refrained from illegal con-
duct.41 Fourth, a strategy for mercy must lead to judgments that
do not appear to condone criminal conduct. A strategy might not
forego punishment in its entirety but rather opt for reduced or
alternative punishments to avoid the conclusion that persons
can violate certain laws with impunity.42 Fifth, because mercy is
necessarily a derivative of guilt, a strategy for mercy must be
careful to first respect the procedural rights of the alleged of-
fender.43 Finally, to avoid the appearance of inconsistency with
38. See infra text accompanying note 169.
39. See infra text accompanying note 156.
40. See infra text accompanying note 158.
41. See infra text accompanying note 220.
42. See infra text accompanying note 193.
43. See infra text accompanying note 296.
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justice, a strategy for mercy should focus on those areas of deci-
sion making in which society willingly tolerates "soft
retributivism."" Objections to mercy will be less forceful if the
strategy distances itself from particularized facts of individual
cases and focuses instead upon mercy as a legislative factor
affecting whole categories of crime.45 Because the legislature
stands as the final arbiter of what constitutes a crime and what
factors, if any, will be considered in sentencing, a focus on mercy
at the legislative level also counters any objection that mercy
and justice are simply redundant concepts.46 By centering a
strategy for mercy upon legislative decision making, there is an
opportunity to lessen the most compelling objection to mercy:
that mercy is inconsistent with the equal administration of jus-
tice.4 7
Initially, the challenge facing a strategy for mercy may be to
create a merciful system that avoids showing mercy in the indi-
vidual case,48 thus precluding the appearance of injustice and
44. See infra text accompanying note 268.
45. See infra text accompanying note 394. There are philosophers who would ques-
tion whether action taken by a legislature could be considered "merciful." For them,
"mercy has its most natural home" in the context of judicial decision making with
judgments made about individuals in individual fact patterns. See, e.g., N.E. Sim-
monds, Judgment and Mercy, 13 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 52, 53-55 (1993).
46. See infra text accompanying note 337. On February 3, 1998, the State of Texas
executed Karla Faye Tucker. See Steve Duin, Blinking at Death, PORTLAND OREGO-
NIAN, Feb. 8, 1998, at D1, available in 1998 WL 4180596. Prior to her execution,
nationwide appeals were made by Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell asking Governor
Bush to act mercifully and spare Tucker's life because Tucker had renounced her
prior life and had become a born-again Christian. See id. The call for mercy sparked
a debate on equal justice issues centering upon the fact that 37 men were executed
in Texas in the prior year.
47. See infra text accompanying note 369.
48. Norval Morris illustrates the point in the context of sentencing the mentally
ill:
If sentences are known in advance, adjusted to the severity of the offense
and the criminal record of the accused, and modulated not at all by the
individual personal psychological or social circumstances of the accused,
then there is no room for mercy ... One could thus have a merciful
system, but not the expression of mercy in the individual case.
MORRIS, supra note 16, at 157. Morris opts for a system in which the upper and
lower limits of punishment are set, thus permitting mercy. "I thus find myself forced
to argue against the widely accepted precept that treating like cases alike is a gov-
erning rule of justice." Id. at 160.
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inconsistency given credence by a history of racial and class dis-
crimination in the criminal justice system. It may be that the crim-
inal justice system must rely on a kind of "prospective mercy;"
the legislature anticipates certain conduct, understands the
general profile of offenders, and chooses to act mercifully toward
the whole set of offenders because of comparative justice issues.
In choosing to be overinclusive, some offenders will be treated
mercifully even though they exhibit no traits and can present no
circumstances that otherwise would stimulate the punisher to be
merciful. A strategy for mercy attempts to create a political cli-
mate in which alternatives to incarceration may be explored.
The practical details become relevant only after legislatures,
engaging in mercy, decide to forego the full measure of punish-
ment.
One context into which the infusion of mercy into criminal law
policymaking may result in a more humane system, while re-
taining public support, is in the area of the use of proscribed
drugs. This Article considers numerous factors, particularly utili-
tarian concerns regarding deterrence of future drug crimes, the
widespread experimentation with drugs by the general popu-
lation and the existence of treatment programs for those who
can afford it, the hopelessness and inhumanity of treating drug
addicts within the prison environment, and the fact that drug
crimes often have no immediate victims. This Article ultimately
concludes that legislators should decide a merciful response to
drug addiction is one that relies more on a public health per-
spective of addiction than punishment for punishment's sake.4"
Such an approach can satisfy the various demands of re-
tributivists while confronting the political attraction of Anselm's
paradoxes. This strategy takes heed of the issues of inequality,
injustice, and the fear that mercy may be seen as condoning cer-
tain conduct; it also incorporates the public support for a crimi-
nal law that has de-emphasized the individuality of the offender.
The reassent of retribution over rehabilitation certainly re-
flects the public attitude toward crime, but "[the weakening of
penal rehabilitationism... is an era that has as yet produced
49. See infra notes 397-471 and accompanying text.
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few theoretical innovations."0 Mercy, while still reflecting the
underlying justification of punishment as "just deserts," might
well be an approach to punishment that encourages greater
creativity on the part of policymakers.
I. A FEW ASSUMPTIONS
I have chosen to discuss the role mercy plays in criminal jus-
tice decision making through the views of a hypothetical legisla-
tor. Particularly, my legislator believes, first, that it is time to
reconsider recent trends that have evolved in the criminal law
over the past two decades. My legislator does not want to return
to either indeterminate sentencing or to the standardless sen-
tencing schemes that preceded the movement in the 1970s to-
ward sentencing guidelines. 5' Certainly the decline in reported
50. ALLEN, supra note 2, at 65.
51. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 established the United States Sentencing
Commission, which drafted guidelines to become effective on November 1, 1987. See
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1994)).
The Guidelines have been roundly criticized as unnecessarily harsh and rigid. See,
e.g., KATE STITH & JOSt A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUSTICE 170 (1998) (arguing for a
return to greater judicial discretion). The importance of the Guidelines has generated
much discussion, some of which has occurred in symposia. See, e.g., Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Symposium, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 771 (1992); Symposium, Making
Sense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 563 (1992); Sym-
posium on Federal Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 99 (1992); Symposium, Punish-
ment, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992). Federal judges often have been outspoken in their
criticism of the Guidelines. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY CONBrrrEE 133-43 (1990) (reporting that the great majority
of judges, defense counsel, and probation officers hold views highly critical of the
Guidelines). States have also adopted sentencing reforms to meet criticisms of sen-
tencing disparity. See, e.g., Kay A. Knapp & Denis J. Hauptly, State and Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Apples and Oranges, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 679 (1992) (argu-
ing that state sentencing reforms are more creative and more likely to be successful
than their federal counterpart); A Symposium on Sentencing Reform in the States, 64
U. COLO. L. REV. 645 (1993) (comparing federal and state sentencing reforms). Most
commentators criticize the shift of discretion in sentencing from the court to the
prosecutor. The debate has included lengthy discussions of the role of the prosecutor
in the era of sentencing guidelines. Most commentators believe the sentencing guide-
lines decrease judicial discretion in sentencing. See Albert W. Alschuler, Monarch,
Lackey, or Judge, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 723, 723 (1993) ("[A] policy of restricting
judicial but not prosecutorial discretion is incoherent."); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J.
Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining
Practices under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 502
(1992) ("[Wihen judicial discretion at sentencing is constrained, there is a concomi-
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crime, particularly violent crime,52 is not wholly unrelated to the
enormous national increase in prison populations over the past
twenty years,53 or to the increase in the length of prison sentences
as a factor in reducing crime rates.54 My legislator understands
the pressures that have turned the system away from individua-
tion. Pressing resource issues for the police, prosecutor, defense,
and courts have contributed to a vision of the need for assembly-
line justice.55 Fear of crime, sympathy for victims, and disgust at
a lack of personal accountability all make it fashionable to argue
for summary justice resulting in the quarantine of those convict-
ed.56 But my legislator also sees that the majority of state prison
and jail inmates are serving time for nonviolent crimes.5" He is
worried about the apparent inconsistency in sentencing that
now exists in an undetected way because of the shift of sen-
tant increase in prosecutorial charge bargaining."); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining
in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471, 1506 (1993) (claiming the
decrease in judicial discretion has given the prosecutor greater power in the plea
bargaining process).
52. The crime rate for serious crime has decreased for the past six years. See
Michael J. Sniffen, Serious Crimes Drop for Sixth Straight Year, PORTLAND OREGO-
NIAN, May 18, 1998, at A6, available in 1998 WL 4206758 (reporting Attorney Gen-
eral Janet Reno's release of the FBI Uniform Crime Report statistics).
53. See TRACEY SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1992, at iii (1995) [hereinafter CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS] (report-
ing a 142% increase in the number of adults in jail between 1980 and 1992); PRIS-
ONERS, supra note 13, at 1 (reporting a seven percent average annual growth from
1990 to 1997).
54. It is very difficult to show a causal relationship between increased incarcera-
tion rates and decreased crime rates due to such factors as the aging of the general
prison population and the difference in motivation for crimes. See Fox Butterfield,
Inmate Count Swells as Sentences Lengthen, Report Says, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Jan. 11, 1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL 5309548.
55. In 1993, total justice system expenditures were $97.5 billion, with $44 billion
for police, $21.6 billion for courts, and $31.9 billion for corrections. See SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 11, at 4 tbl.1.3.
56. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 3, 171-72 (1995) (claiming that incapac-
itation is the principal justification for imprisonment although for financial reasons
incapacitation may become more selective as further expansion of prison budgets
becomes more difficult).
57. In 1992, 52.4% of state prisoners were serving prison sentences for nonviolent
offenses. See CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS, supra note 53, at 52 tbl.4.9. The data ac-
count only for the crime under which the prisoner was convicted, but this does not
always reflect whether violence was used.
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tencing discretion from the court to the prosecutor.58 The
explosion of juvenile offenders tried as adults,59 the public
shaming of sex offenders," mandatory minimum sentenc-
58. Three major trends have enhanced prosecutorial power- criminal codes with
broad definitions and overlapping provisions; dependency of the system upon plea
bargaining; and, sentencing reforms that have created sentencing guidelines and
mandatory minimum sentences. See Misner, supra note 25, at 741-59. Sometimes the
expansion of prosecutorial power has come under the guise of increasing victims'
rights. See, e.g., Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 959 P.2d 49, app. at 71-72 (Or. 1998) (stating
that rights given to the victim by Ballot Measure 40 with the purpose "'[tlo ensure
crime victims a meaningful role in the criminal and juvenile justice system!" are to
be exercised by the prosecutor (quoting Ballot Measure 40)).
59. For example, between 1985 and 1994, the number of juvenile cases transferred
from juvenile court to criminal court increased by 71% from 7200 cases annually to
12,300 cases annually. See JEFFREY A. BUTTS, DELINQUENCY CASES WAIVED TO CRIM-
INAL COURT, 1985-1994, at 1 (1997). Cases involving black youth were more likely to
be transferred to criminal court. See id. at 2. For a brief history of the juvenile
court system with an emphasis on the trend in juvenile courts to focus on retribu-
tive justice, see Marygold S. Melli, Juvenile Justice Reform in Context, 1996 WIS. L.
REV. 375, 390-95. For a discussion of current trends in juvenile punishment and the
argument that less severe punishments for juveniles, when compared to adult sen-
tences, can account for most of the increase in the rate of juvenile crime, see Steven
D. Levitt, Juvenile Crime and Punishment, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1156 (1998). For a
discussion of youth violence, see The Unprecedented Epidemic of Youth Violence, in
24 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 27, 35 (1998) ("In 1994, about one
in six arrestees for homicide, rape and aggravated assault were juveniles.").
60. The most widely used alternative to incarceration is probation. In 1994, ap-
proximately 58% of persons sentenced to "custody" of a correctional agency were
sentenced to probation. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 11, at 464 tbl.6.1. It has be-
come more common, in the past ten years, to include "scarlet letter provisions" as a
condition of probation. See, e.g., Leonore H. Tavill, Note, Scarlet Letter Punishment:
Yesterday's Outlawed Penalty Is Today's Probation Condition, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
613 (1988). Sometimes the condition of probation is a "shaming sign," either on
property or on the person who announces the offender's status. Sometimes a sex
offender is required to post a sign warning neighbors that a sex offender lives in
the house. See, e.g., State v. Bateman, 771 P.2d 314 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (dismissing
appeal as moot without reaching the legality of the probation condition). Georgia has
upheld a probation condition requiring a convicted drunk driver to wear a pink
bracelet announcing that he is a "D.U.I. Convict." See Ballenger v. State, 436 S.E.2d
793 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); see also Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986) (upholding sentence provision requiring convicted drunk driver to affix
bumper sticker to his vehicle indicating a D.U.I. conviction). For additional examples
of shaming, see Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI.
L. REV. 733, 734-39 (1988) (explaining how shaming punishments can be found in
two varieties: those that rely on public exposure to shame the offender and those of
a private nature with the intent to educate the offender). For a recent analysis of
modem shame punishment as an alternative to incarceration, see Aaron S. Book,
Note, Shame on You, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 681-86 (1999) (arguing for an
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es, 61 and the use of sentencing guidelines 62 all point to a contin-
ued escalation of punishments.
My legislator lives in the world of the possible, however. He
knows that although retribution is at the heart of the debate on
crime, utilitarian issues of deterrence, incapacitation, and reha-
embrace of shaming as an effective alternative and providing substantive factors for
improving the efficacy of shame punishment).
Sometimes shaming punishments are associated with sex offender registration
statutes and sexual notification laws. In 1994 Congress required all states, at the
risk of losing federal crime-fighting funds, to adopt a sexual offender registration
law. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994) (often referred to as the "Jacob Wetterling Act,"
named after a young'boy who was kidnaped and sexually abused); see also Jessica
R. Ball, Comment, Public Disclosure of 'America's Secret Shame. Child Sex Offender
Community Notification in Illinois, 27 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 401, 409-14 (1996) (examin-
ing types of community notification laws). Sex offender registration often is tied with
state "Megan's Laws," which require local authorities to notify the community that a
convicted sex offender is living in their midst. See, e.g., Michele L. Earl-Hubbard,
The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty Deprivation, and
Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 Nw. U.
L. REv. 788, 861-62 (1996) (concluding that sex offender registration laws give the
community a false sense of security, although one can understand the development
of registration laws due to the highly emotional nature of the underlying crimes);
Kenneth Crimaldi, Note, "Megan's Law": Election-Year Politics and Constitutional
Rights, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 169, 200-04 (1995) (discussing the history of Megan's Law
and arguing for civil commitment or longer sentences as alternatives to community
notification);
61. Mandatory sentences have had some draconian effect. For example, in 1990,
54% of all offenders sentenced to a mandatory minimum punishment had no prior
record. See BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, THE GENERAL EFFECT OF MANDATORY MINI-
MUM PRISON TERMS 14, 29 (1992). For a critique of mandatory sentencing schemes
claiming that mandatory sentences are one cause of prison overcrowding, see LOIS G.
FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF MANDATORY SEN-
TENCING 151-53 (1994). For a critique of Forer's book, see Book Note, Determinate
Sentencing and Judicial Participation in Democratic Punishment, 108 HARV. L. REV.
947 (1995) ("Forer largely ignores the importance of democratic participation in the
administration of criminal justice."); see also Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentenc-
ing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL.
L. REv. 61, 67-73 (1993) (concluding that determinate sentencing reform, which cen-
ters on multiple factors for sentencing, is undercut by mandatory sentences that
often focus on one factor). Most states adopting "three strikes and you're out" stat-
utes in the 1990s have used the statute for sentencing in six cases or less. See
Michelle Boorstein, "Three Strikes" Laws Are Mostly Ignored, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Dec. 11, 1998, at A39, available in 1998 WL 20392148. California has used its stat-
ute more than 40,000 times-of those, 4400 were sentenced for terms between 25
years and life. Georgia has sentenced more than 2000 under its statute. See id. For
a discussion of mandatory sentencing in Arizona, see supra note 25.
62. See supra note 51.
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bilitation are likely to play a role. He remembers the sentencing
inconsistency that preceded the move to sentencing guidelines,
which currently dominate sentencing.63 He worries about equality
in the criminal justice system, particularly in the areas of race
and ethnicity. 4 Finally, he understands that the public is seri-
63. Sentencing disparity was at the heart of the creation of sentencing guidelines.
See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland, A Conversation About Sentencing
Commissions and Guidelines, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 655, 658 (1993) (arguing that un-
controlled judicial discretion in sentencing is "lawlessness"). For a general discussion
of state and federal sentencing guidelines, see supra note 51.
64. Wherever one turns in the criminal justice system, one must be struck by the
number of African Americans who have been involved in the system. For example,
in 1996, 49.4% of all prisoners under state or federal jurisdiction were African Amer-
ican-94% of whom were males. See PRISONERS, supra note 13, at 9 tbl.11. It is
estimated that seven percent of black males in their twenties and thirties were in
prison in 1996. See id. at 11. Of all African American males ages 25 to 29, 8.3%
were in prison, compared to 2.6% of all Hispanic males and 0.8% of all white males.
See id. During the twenty years between 1977 and 1996, 5154 persons entered fed-
eral and state prisons under a sentence of death, among whom 51% were white,
41% African American, 7% were Hispanic, and 1% were other races. See TRACY
SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1996, at 2 (1997). African
American inmates serve longer terms for all kinds of crimes when compared to
white prisoners. See Louise D. Palmer, Federal Prison Sentencing Unequal, Report
Concludes, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, May 10, 1998 at A12, available in 1998 WL
4204824 (citing a University of Georgia study analyzing federal criminal cases). For
drug trafficking, African Americans are sentenced on average to an additional 11.5
more months than whites. See id For bank robbery, Afican Americans are sen-
tenced to an additional 12.3 months. See id. Similar discrepancies exist in state
criminal cases. See Butterfield, supra note 54, at A8 (noting that in state rape cases,
African Americans serve on average 70 months whereas whites serve 56 months). In
juvenile cases, the percentage of African Americans detained prior to juvenile court
disposition is twice that of whites. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 11, at 441 tbl.5.76.
Almost one-third of all young African American men are in prison, on probation or
parole, or awaiting trial. See Paul Butler, (Color) Blind Faith: The Tragedy of Race,
Crime, and the Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1270, 1270-71 (1998) (book review) (citing
MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL Jus-
TICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 3 (1995)). More young African American men are in
prison than are in college. See id. at 1271. For a discussion of the impact of race
upon sentencing, see MICHAEL TONRY & KATHLEEN HATLESTAD, SENTENCING REFORM
IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 217-48 (1997) (collecting short articles on the issue of race
and sentencing). But see Patrick A. Langan, Racism on Trial: New Evidence to Ex-
plain the Racial Composition of Prisons in the United States, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM-
INOLOGY 666, 683 (1985) (concluding that if racism exists in the criminal justice
system, it explains "only a small part of the gap between the 11% black representa-
tion in the United States adult population and the now nearly 50% black represen-
tation among persons entering state prisons each year in the United States" and
that differential involvement has a much greater impact).
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ous in its collective decision to turn away from individualized
treatment of offenders. Therefore, my legislator knows that a
return to broad, judicial individuation of punishment is unlikely
and unwanted.
Second, my legislator has some definite views about mercy.
He believes that the virtue of mercy is an important component
of his own value system. My legislator has been influenced in
this regard by his own beliefs within the Christian tradition,65
but he understands that those who adhere to other traditions
66
might also reach his conclusion about the central role that mercy
plays for all believers.67 Mercy, he believes, is also a part of the
65. Mercy is a central concern in all Christian traditions. In the Book of Sirach
28:1-6, we are asked: "Should a man refuse mercy to his fellows, yet seek pardon
for his own sins?" MICHAEL CROSBY, SPIRITUALITY OF THE BEATITUDES 140 (1981)
(quoting Sirach 28:1-6). Similar thoughts exist in Matthew 18:23-35, Parable of the
Unforgiving Debtor, who refused to free others from debts owed to him, Matthew
18:1-20 (Jerusalem), and in Luke 10:29-37, Parable of the Good Samaritan. The Fifth
Beatitude, in Matthew 5:7, which promises God's mercy for those who show mercy,
see Matthew 5:7, expresses a spirituality that manifests "compassion, concern, and
care for every human being," enabling a person "to become a brother or sister to
everyone in the world in such a way that [they] share God's very blessedness."
CROSBY, supra, at 145. See, e.g., Krister Stendahl, Judgment and Mercy, in ALEXAN-
DER J. MCKELWAY & E. DAVID WILLIS, THE CONTEXT OF CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY
147 (1994). Mercy, at times, is seen as a rather simple part of daily life. See, e.g.,
CROSBY, supra, at 190-91 (arguing that mercy affects the manner in which a person
interacts with all others). Seeking mercy from God is a part of many prayers such
as the "Kyrie Eleison" ("Lord have mercy"), which is the only Greek in the traditional
Latin Mass. Mercy is also a complicated issue that is "organically connected" with
the application of law. Myriam Wijlens, Salus Animarum Suprema Lex: Mercy as a
Legal Principle in the Application of Canon Law?, 54 JURIST 560 (1994). In the
Catholic tradition, "mercy" often refers to "works of mercy," which includes visiting
the imprisoned and feeding the hungry. This reference to mercy is not necessarily
connected to concepts of retribution and desert. See J.M. Perrin,'Works of Mercy, in
9 THE NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 34, at 676, 676-78.
66. See, e.g., Louis E. Newman, The Quality of Mercy: On the Duty to Forgive in
the Judaic Tradition, 15 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 155, 155-72 (1987) (examining how
forgiveness is viewed in classical Judaic sources); Suzanne Last Stone, Justice, Mercy,
and Gender in Rabbinic Thought, 8 CARDOzO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 139 (1996)
(examining rabbinic texts in order to present "alternate visions of justice"); see also
Joshua Dressler, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses
and the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 699-700 n.130 (1988) (referring to
mercy in Genesis).
67. The exact content of "mercy" and its relevance to personal conduct is ulti-
mately an issue of faith. Cf. Broekman, supra note 24, at 369 ("[The question to be
raised here is whether or not justice can be understood without invoking the process
of dogmatization."). The role of religious faith in the public arena has been a source
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Western cultural tradition that has been dominant in the devel-
opment of our country and points to the classics of litera-
ture-the lay scripture-to support his conclusion. 8 Mercy, for
of a great deal of controversy. For example, in a tribute to Professor Harold J.
Berman, Professor Witte summarized Berman's scholarly impact:
Every society, says Berman, needs both law and religion. Law helps to
give society the structure, the order, the harmony, the predictability it
needs to "maintain inner cohesion. Law fights against anarchy." Religion
helps to give society the faith, the vision, the destiny, the telos it needs
"to face the future. Religion fights against -decadence" and malaise. Law
and religion also need each other. Law gives religion its order and stabil-
ity as well as the organization and orthodoxy it needs to survive and
flourish. Religion gives law the spirit and vision as well as the sanctity
and sustenance it needs to command obedience and respect. Without
religion, law tends to decay into empty formalism. Without law, religion
tends to dissolve into shallow spiritualism.
John Witte, Jr., A New Concordance of Discordant Canons: Harold J. Berman on
Law and Religion, 42 EMORY L.J. 523, 529-30 (1993) (footnote omitted). Other com-
mentators warn of religion's "dark side":
This dark side, moreover, has the potential to be a powerfully destructive
political force. It may, for example, harm the process of political
decisionmaking. A believer who sees those who oppose or question her
beliefs as aligned with the "powers of chaos" is likely to treat the public
square as a battleground rather than as a forum for debate. Religion, if
unleashed as a political force, may also lead to a particularly acrimonious
divisiveness among different religions. Those religions that are accused of
representing the powers of chaos are likely to react with similar vehe-
mence in denouncing their attackers. Finally, and most problematically,
religion's participation in the political process can produce dangerous
results: Fervent beliefs fueled by suppressed fear are easily transformed
into movements of intolerance, repression, hate, and persecution. There
are, in short, substantial reasons for exercising caution with respect to
religious involvement in the public square.
William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 859 (1993)
(footnote omitted). For a criticism of Marshall's position that the public square gen-
erally should be off limits to religion, see Sheldon H. Nahmod, The Public Square
and the Jew as Religious Other, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 865, 868 (1993).
68. In the Merchant of Venice, act 4, scene 1, Portia speaks the famous lines re-
garding mercy.
The quality of mercy is not strained;
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
Upon the place beneath. It is twice blested:
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes.
is mightiest in the mightiest; it becomes
The throned monarch better than his crown.
His scepter shows the force of temporal power,
The attribute to awe and majesty,
Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings.
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my legislator, is often more noble than justice;69 and he believes
that justice without discretion can be "an intolerable engine of
tyranny;"v0 yet he knows that the safety of others can be need-
lessly endangered if mercy is used indiscriminately.7 '
But mercy is above this sceptered sway;
It is enthroned in the hearts of kings;
It is an attribute to God himself;
And earthly power doth then show likest God's
When mercy seasons justice.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE 72-73 (David Bevington ed., Ban-
tam Books 1988) (1600). For an interpretation of Portia's speech as an example of
mercy in its proper place in the private sphere, see Ross Harrison, The Equality of
Mercy, in JURISPRUDENCE: CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS 107, 107-09 (Hyman Gross & Ross
Harrison eds., 1992). Many commentators use Shakespeare to make their arguments
regarding mercy. See, e.g., Shael Herman, Legacy and Legend: The Continuity of
Roman and English Regulation of the Jews, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1781, 1837-38 (1992)
(examining oppression of England's Jewry); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Mercy and Legal
Justice, in CRIME AND PUNISHMENT PHILOSOPHIC EXPLORATIONS 454, 455 (Michael J.
Gorr & Sterling Harwood eds., 1995) [hereinafter CRIME AND PUNISHMENT] (explain-
ing that Shakespeare's sentiments regarding mercy "have attained the status of
cliches"); Pollack, supra note 22, at 513-15 (arguing that Portia's speech is grounded
in a duty-based system whereas Western democracies are rights-based systems). For
additional literary resources on mercy, see Paul Whitlock Cobb, Jr., Note, Reviving
Mercy in the Structure of Capital Punishment, 99 YALE L.J. 389, 391 n.10 (1989); see
also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 808-09 (1978) (using Shylock
and Antonio's relationship to distinguish mercy and excuse).
69.
The experience of the past and of our own time demonstrates that justice
alone is not enough, that it can even lead to the negation and destruc-
tion of itself, if that deeper power, which is love, is not allowed to shape
human life in its various dimensions. It has been precisely historical
experience that, among other things, has led to the formulation of the
saying: summum ius, summa iniuria. This statement does not detract
from the value of justice and does not minimize the significance of the
order that is based upon it; it only indicates another aspect, the need to
draw from the powers of the spirit which condition the very order of
justice, powers which are still more profound.
MORRIS, supra note 16, at 156 (citing POPE JOHN PAUL II, DIVES IN MISERiCARDIA
(1980)); see also ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, 5 SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. 1, Q. 21, art. 4
(Thomas Gilby ed., 1967) ("It must be that in every one of God's works justice and
mercy are found."); Lucia Ann Silecchia, On Doing Justice and Walking Humbly with
God. Catholic Social Thought on Law as a Tool for Building Justice, 46 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1163, 1172 (1997) (claiming charity is essential to justice).
70. MORRIS, supra note 16, at 155.
71. See, e.g., HALL, supra note 28, at 307 ("We should not shut our eyes to these
aspects of the problem [elementary needs of survival] and, regardless of social re-
sponsibilities, advocate the substitution of agape for criminal law."); see also J.L.A.
Garcia, Two Concepts of Desert, 5 LAW & PHIL. 219, 230 (1986) ("That a person de-
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My legislator has consulted extensively the philosophical liter-
ature on mercy only to conclude that "the literature is sparse,
and scholars rarely agree." 2 My legislator has found that the
philosophers do not "provide definitional and conceptual clarifi-
cation of the term 'mercy'"73 and, as such, the literature is of
little help to "practical persons."7 4
Just as members of my legislator's community hold a myriad
of views regarding retribution, 5 my legislator understands that
the community holds fast many different conceptions of mercy.
My legislator is cognizant of these views and attempts to find
common ground in the political arena by describing "mercy"
rather than defining it. 6
serves punishment implies no obligation to punish her. Such an obligation might
arise for special external reasons, e.g., a pledge or the public's need to be pro-
tect[e]d.").
72. Stephen J. Morse, Justice, Mercy, and Craziness, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1485, 1507
(1984). It has been noted that some philosophers maintain internally inconsistent
thoughts about mercy. See, e.g., Andrew Brien, Saving Grace, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS,
Winter/Spring 1990, at 52, 56 (concluding that Murphy's private law paradigm,
which admits to a form of "soft retributivism," is unnecessary because "soft
retributivism" itself dissolves the conundrum).
73. Morse, supra note 72, at 1507.
74. Id.; see also R.A. Duff, Review Essay: Justice, Mercy and Forgiveness, CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1990, at 51, 59 (noting philosophical debates on punish-
ment "tend too often to remain at an abstract level utterly divorced from the actual-
ities of our penal practices").
75. For a discussion of the various strands of retribution, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 122-257.
76. It would appear that most philosophers writing in the area of mercy see their
positions as "works in progress." As one commentator writes:
Because my current thinking about external foundational questions is
in such a state of flux, it is with some anxiety that I turn to the "inter-
nal" questions that motivate the present essay, i.e., questions that accept
"our" ordinary framework of evaluation as a given and seek to explore
certain tensions and puzzles within that framework in order to see to
what degree that framework is internally coherent. The goal is to attain,
if possible, that nirvana of moral epistemology that John Rawls calls
"reflective equilibrium." In spite of my increasing skepticism about the
value of reflective equilibrium in foundational moral theory, I am still
inclined to believe (a) that internal coherence is relevant to external
evaluation and (b) that questions of an internal nature, if properly ex-
plored with an appreciation of their limits, can be interesting and impor-
tant in their own right. Thus, I shall temporarily suppress my initial
anxiety and plow ahead on the matter at hand.
Murphy, supra note 68, at 454 (footnotes omitted); see also Pollack, supra note 22,
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Mercy can be described as an autonomous virtue "not reduc-
ible to some other virtue-especially justice."" Mercy is a part of
the larger notion of "charity,"8 which teaches that "justice alone
is not enough." 9 Mercy entails a decision by the injured party
either to forego a right to punish" or to reduce punishment be-
cause of compassion.8 ' Mercy mitigates the punishment that an
offender deserves8 2 and, as such, mercy is dependent upon a
retributive theory of justice.8 3 Mercy is not earned or deserved
but is given freely.
8 4
at 520-21 n.29 (summarizing the many definitions of mercy proffered by Seneca in-
cluding "mercy" defined as "self-control by the mind when it has the power to take
vengeance"). Apparently, Seneca viewed mercy as a subset of justice. See id.
77. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 166 (1990).
The recent debate on mercy can be traced in part to Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean
Hampton. They write alternating chapters that are intended not to be "the final
truth on the matter at hand," id. at 186, but instead to stir readers to reflect on
issues of punishment, retribution, mercy, and forgiveness. Many have accepted Mur-
phy and Hampton's challenge to join the debate. See, e.g., Brett, supra note 33, at
82 (suggesting punishment is not wholly retributive and therefore mercy can be
balanced against justice); Brien, supra note 72, at 57 ("Hard retributive legal jus-
tice . . . is neither feasible nor desirable."); Duff, supra note 74, at 57 (arguing that
mercy is a proper consideration for the sentencing authority); Carla Ann Hage John-
son, Entitled to Clemency: Mercy in the Criminal Law, 10 LAW & PHIL. 109, 111
(1991) (arguing that mercy has always been understood as individuation in criminal
cases); Harrison, supra note 68, at 108 (noting that although individuals may be
merciful, institutions, which are bound by reason, may not); Sterling Harwood, Is
Mercy Inherently Unjust?, in CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 68, at 469 (arguing
that there is a right to punish, not an absolute duty); Herbert Morris, Murphy on
Forgiveness, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1988, at 15, 19 (suggesting that Mur-
phy has put too little emphasis on the benefit of forgiveness to the forgiver, "forgive-
ness is one mark of benignity in the universe, for it is a virtue that benefits both
the giver and the receiver"); Simmonds, supra note 45, at 68 (concluding that the
paradoxes of mercy result from an adherence to the juridical thought of the "unique
particularity"). For other aspects of Murphy's approach to mercy, see Jeffrie G. Mur-
phy, A Rejoinder to Morris, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1988, at 20, 21 (find-
ing sometimes a "pro-occupation with self' is justified); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgive-
ness, Mercy and the Retributive Emotions, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Siummer/Fal 1988, at
3 [hereinafter Murphy, Retributive Emotions] (exploring the retributive emotions).
78. See Claudia Card, On Mercy, 81 PHIL. REV. 182 (1972).
79. Silecchia, supra note 69, at 1172 (quoting Pope John Paul HI, Dives et Miseri-
cordia (Nov. 30, 1980)).
80. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 68, at 455.
81. See, e.g., Brien, supra note 72, at 53; Duff, supra note 74, at 57-58.
82. See, e.g., Duff, supra note 74, at 57-58.
83. See, e.g., Smart, supra note 27, at 224-25 (explaining that a utilitarian looks
only to one value, utility, whereas mercy is "multi-principled").
84. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 77, at 10; see also Brett, supra note 33,
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Likewise, mercy is not simply the decision to mitigate punish-
ment,85 for it requires an attitude that reduces punishment out
of respect for the humanity of the offender.8 6 Because justice is
demanded of everyone, the obligation to do justice does not de-
pend upon the character of the justice giver; however, because
mercy is not an entitlement, the exercise of mercy gives insight
into the underlying character of the mercy giver.8
Mercy is more than simply a character trait, however. The
virtue of mercy directs my legislator to act with mercy.8 9 Mercy
benefits the giver of mercy as well as the recipient.90 It is the act
at 83 ("[Mlercy is not something [that] an offender [can] demand."); Garcia, supra
note 71, at 230-31 (noting that mercy is supererogatory and "belongs to the injured
party to bestow or withhold," and "since it is normally morally permissible to inflict
deserved suffering, declining to inflict it out of benevolent consideration for one who,
in virtue of [his] crimes, has but little right to such consideration is going beyond
one's duty").
85. Mercy requires a judgment and commentators center their attention on the
judgment of the sentencing judge. Judgments regarding punishment are made at
other levels as well: the decision to prosecute, the decision to prosecute for a crime
of a certain severity when other charges are possible, the decision to parole, and the
decision to pardon. The legislature makes the initial judgment regarding punishment
prospectively. The legislative decision is neither individual in nature nor is it respon-
sive to a highly particularized get of facts; nonetheless, it is the community's re-
sponse setting the parameters of punishment. Legislative determinations of punish-
ment do become more particularized if the legislation is rather narrow in its scope.
86. See Eric L. Muller, The Virtue of Mercy in Criminal Sentencing, 24 SETON
HALL L. REV. 288, 298 (1993) ("[Mercy... is a way of acting, not a way of think-
ing or feeling."); see also MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 77, at 167 (noting mercy
requires not only a change in how one feels but requires action as well).
87. The case of Karla Faye Tucker, executed in Texas on February 3, 1998,
brought together persons of all political persuasions seeking mercy from Governor
George W. Bush. See Gustav Niebuhr, Texas Case Might Prompt Christians to Re-
think Views on Death Penalty, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Feb. 5, 1998, at A9, available
in 1998 WL 4179582.
88. See Garvey, supra note 22, at 1015.
89. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 68, at 456. In Catholic catechetics mercy is re-
ferable both to charity and justice. In one's life the virtue of mercy directs a person to
perform corporal works of mercy: to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to
clothe the naked, to harbor the harborless, to visit the sick, to ransom the captive, and
to bury the dead. See generally Perrin, supra note 65, at 676-78 (discussing exam-
ples of mercy). In addition, one is to perform spiritual works of mercy: to instruct the
ignorant, to counsel the doubtful, to admonish sinners, to bear wrongs patiently, to for-
give offenses willingly, to comfort the afflicted, and to pray for the living and the dead.
See i& For a discussion of mercy as a character trait and as a set of principles that
determine how a person should act, see Pollack, supra note 22, at 519 n.21.
90. Shakespeare remarked that:
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of a reduced punishment that distinguishes mercy from forgive-
ness.91 Mercy must also be distinguished from excuse and justifi-
cation.92 Mercy assumes that the offender is in a position of
"powerlessness and need.""
[Mercy] is twice blessed:
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes.
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 68, at 72.
91.
Forgiveness is trickier. [As I have argued above], forgiveness is pri-
marily a matter of changing how one feels with respect to a person who
has done one[selfl an injury... .. It is . . . particularly a matter of over-
coming, on moral[ly] [acceptable] grounds, the resentment a self-respect-
ing person quite properly feels when [he has] suffer[ed] such an injury.
Mercy, though related to forgiveness, is clearly different in at least these
two respects. First, to be merciful to a person requires not merely that
one change how one feels about [the] person but also [requires] a specific
kind of action (or omission)-namely, treating that person less harshly
than, in the absence of the mercy, one would have treated him. Second,
it is not a requirement of my showing mercy that I be an injured party.
All that is required is that I stand in a certain relation to the potential
beneficiary of mercy. This relation-typically established by legal or other
institutional rules-makes it appropriate that I impose some hardship
upon the potential beneficiary of mercy.
MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 77, at 10. For a critique of Murphy's views on for-
giveness, see Cheshire Calhoun, Changing One's Heart, 103 ETHICS 76, 83 (1992)
(stating that the fear of condoning wrongdoing by forgiving the offender is overrated);
Morris, supra note 77, at 19 (espousing that forgiveness is the one mark of benig-
nity in the universe). But see Jeffrie G. Murphy, A Rejoinder to Morris, CRIM. JUST.
ETHICs, Summer-Fall 1988, at 20 (arguing that a person who ignores real moral
injuries may be embracing the vice of servility).
92. See FLETCHER, supra note 68, at 799 ("[E]xcusing conditions . . . preclude an
inference from the act to the actor's character."); Dressier, supra note 66, at 699 ("A
wrongdoer has a moral right to be excused if he does not deserve to be punished.");
Joshua Dressier, Hating Criminals: How Can Something that Feels So Good Be
Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448, 1468 n.82 (1990) (book review) (stating that often it
is difficult to determine whether mercy or justice is involved).
93. Johnson, supra note 77, at 117; see also FLETCHER, supra note 68, at 808
("Mercy is appropriate only when the subservient recipient, viewed in his entirety,
deserves it."). Perhaps the most obvious place of mercy in the criminal justice sys-
tem is in the law of pardons. See MOORE, supra note 26, at 211 (stating that the
pardoning power should be used only when punishment is not justified); Janice Rog-
ers Brown, The Quality of Mercy, 40 UCLA L. REV. 327, 332-37 (1992) (outlining a
personal account of the clemency hearing of Robert Alton Harris in California). In
Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodward, 523 U.S. 272 (1998), a plurality of the
Court, joined by other Justices in the result, concluded that "the defendant in effect
accepts the finality of the death sentence for purposes of adjudication, and appeals
for clemency as a matter of grace." Id& at 282. For a compilation of state law on
pardon, clemency, and commutation, see id. at 293 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring and
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Mercy, for my legislator, is "big mercy;" he views mercy more
than just a means to fine-tune justice,94 limited to the act of a
judge choosing the least restrictive punishment from a limited
choice of options.95 My legislator sees mercy as both a religious96
and humanitarian 97 imperative, and he believes that if he were
behind Rawls's "veil of ignorance," he would opt for a criminal
justice system that valued mercy.98
Not only is my legislator moved by concerns of mercy in his
private life,99 he agrees with Garcia that mercy is an appropriate
dissenting). For a discussion of the English system, see B.V. Harris, Judicial Review
of the Prerogative of Mercy?, 1991 PUB. L. 386, 407, 439 (arguing that there should
be minimal procedural guarantees because of the importance of the individual in-
terests involved, and that the prerogative of mercy is a "safety net" and thus new
machinery to advise the home secretary is required); A.T.H. Smith, The Prerogative
of Mercy, The Power of Pardon and Criminal Justice, 1983 PUB. L. 398, 408-22 (dis-
cussing the scope of pardons in England and their effects); see also Blom-Cooper, su-
pra note 26, at 119-20 (noting that the prerogative of mercy should not be used as
a substitute for due process of law).
94. See Garvey, supra note 22, at 1014 (noting that mercy is not a part of justice
whose purpose it is to ameliorate the strict application of rules); Harrison, supra
note 68, at 120-21 (examining Aristotle's claim that the law must permit exceptions
in order to prevent injustice in the individual case and noting that this requires
flexibility to consider the appropriate facts-facts that should lead to the same deci-
sion if the pattern replicates itself in another case); Smart, supra note 27, at 227
(stating that mercy must not be misconstrued as a vehicle to avoid the results of an
inflexible law). But see Dressier, supra note 66, at 700 ("W~e should retain a sen-
tencing system with sufficient flexibility to allow lenience whether we identify the
lenience as an effort to be just' or 'merciful.').
95. See H. Scott Hestevold, Justice to Mercy, 46 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES.
281, 290-91 (1985) (suggesting "disjunctive desert" hypothesizes that justice permits a
number of acceptable punishments and mercy permits the decision maker to choose
the least severe from the range of possibilities); Pollack, supra note 22, at 529 (argu-
ing that disjunctive desert does not allow for mercy in a rights-based system). But
see MORRIS, supra note 16, at 159 (stating that mercy "can provide the fine-tuning
of sentencing essential to a just system').
96. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Simmonds, supra note 45, at 55 n.5 (presenting a defense of mercy
from a secular perspective).
98. See JOHN RAWiS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971) (finding a just system
is one in which a person ignorant of his own place in society would choose as being
fair).
99. Duff offers an example of mercy in private decision making.
I go to see a friend who has done me down, intent on remonstrating
forcibly with him; he figures in my thought and intentions as one who
has done me wrong who deserves my blame and condemnation. On arriv-
ing, however, I find him distraught with grief at the death of his wife,
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consideration in public decision making as well,'0° and therefore
and this at one drives all thought of the wrong he has done me, and of
remonstrating him, from my mind (or, if it does not do so, I realize that
it should). I see him (I should see him) simply as a friend who is suffer-
ing. It is still true, I suppose, that he "deserves" to be condemned for
what he did to me, but [these] are not the terms in which I should re-
spond to him.
Duff, supra note 74, at 58-59.
100. See Garcia, supra note 71, at 231-32. The debate concerning whether mercy
can be shown by the state or is appropriate only in private disputes is structured in
variant ways. For some commentators, justice requires punishment and therefore the
state must punish; mercy is always inappropriate. See KANT, supra note 4, at 102;
Murphy, supra note 68, at 459 (stating the "job description" of a judge is to do jus-
tice). The rejoinder to Kant's "hard retributivism" is the "soft retributivism" de-
scribed by Brien and Garcia that maintains that retributivism permits but does not
require punishment. See Brien, supra note 72, at 56-57; Garcia, supra note 71, at
230-31.
Other commentators, who would prevent the state from exercising mercy, em-
phasize the inherent difference between public and private decisions. For Harrison,
"we are prepared to grant individuals moral autonomy, permitting them in some
cases, to act irrationally." Harrison, supra note 68, at 116. Because the actions of
states affect other citizens, state action must be "justifiable to its citizens [that is]
the state cannot be allowed pure discretion .... This means that the state is not
allowed an area of play lying beyond any possible justification. It is not allowed
mercy." Id. at 116-17. Card also drew the distinction between personal and institu-
tional justice relegating mercy to "personal justice" and not "social justice." Card,
supra note 78, at 188-93. This approach is related closely to Anselm's second para-
dox. See infra text accompanying note 369.
Other objections to the state exercising mercy center on the question of who is
the victim of crime and what is the proper role of the judge. Murphy maintains that
the victim of crime is the individual and therefore the judge, who represents the
community, could show mercy only if the victims of the crime agreed. See Murphy,
supra note 68, at 459. It is not within the "job description" of the judge to show
mercy. See id.; see also P. Twambley, Mercy and Forgiveness, 36 ANALYSIS 84, 87
(1976) ("[J]udges have no right to be merciful because it is not to them that any
obligation is due."). Many would conclude, however, that crime is an affront to the
community and that it is the role of the judge to represent the community and dis-
pense justice and mercy. See Garcia, supra note 71, at 231. It should also be noted
that "mercy" is often within the job description of the state official. Many jurisdic-
tions give powers of pardon and clemency to the executive branch. See Ohio Adult
Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 276 (1998). In Woodward, the Justices badly
split regarding the applicability of the Due Process Clause to clemency proceedings
for prisoners facing the death penalty. In dissent, Justice Stevens noted the 38
states that have both the death penalty and clemency provisions. See id. at 293 n.4
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Mercy, through the use of concepts such as premeditation,
is apparent in some homicide cases. See, e.g., State v. Schrader, 302 S.E.2d 70, 75
(W. Va. 1982) ("What we have is merely a privilege offered to the jury to find the
lesser degree when the suddenness of the intent, the vehemence of the passion,
seems to call irresistibly for the exercise of mercy." (quoting Benjamin Cardozo,
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he is willing to consider both factors independent of'01 and rele-
vant to0 2 the issues of culpability and punishment. He is aware
What Medicine Can Do For Law, in LAW AND LITERATURE 70, 100 (1931))). In capi-
tal cases, mercy can be shown through the inclusion of a broad range of mitigating
circumstances. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 270 (1998) (discussing
the role of mitigating factors in death penalty statutes).
Similar issues are discussed in regard to Anselm's second paradox. See infra
text accompanying note 369. For a broader discussion of virtue and the public
sphere, see Onora O'Neill, Theories of Justice, Traditions of Virtue, in JURISPRU-
DENCE: CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS, supra note 68, at 55.
101. See, e.g., Brett, supra note 33, at 91. As Brett states:
It is clear that in Anglo-American law, quite a variety of factors not
bearing on the question of culpability actually do play a role in the de-
termination of sentences. Some of these are properly regarded as matters
of mercy. When a defendant is severely injured in committing a crime,
the injury is a factor which the court may use in mitigation. When a
defendant is injured subsequent to an offense, it is also taken into ac-
count. The ill health or advanced age of an offender are other mitigating
factors. So also are factors which show that imprisonment will work a
special hardship on an offender. That an offender shows remorse is
deemed to be highly relevant to the severity of his sentence. The grief of
a convict over the death of his mother is a basis for remission of a nearly
completed prison sentence.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Some of these factors are considered in executive pardons:
Mercy is the quality which ... [is] special to the offender, the convicted
person's character unrelated to the offence or his criminal record, such as
his present state of health that dictates leniency; or some special feature
relevant to reform or rehabilitation which may lead the judge not to pass
the sentence which, without the special circumstances, the criminal mer-
its. The impact of imprisonment upon the offender's wife and children
may be a factor.
Blom-Cooper, supra note 26, at 117.
102. In the past ten years there has been a resurgence in scholarship on the issues
of excuse and justification. For example, Joshua Dressier discusses new conditions
that have been proposed as excuses: "drug and alcohol addiction, brainwashing, 'bat-
tered [spouse],' premenstrual syndrome, post-traumatic stress disorder, genetic abnor-
malities, alien cultural beliefs and 'rotten social background.'" Dressler, supra note
66, at 672-73. Dressler applies his own standard for excusing conduct: "whether the
offender, at the time of the offense, possessed and had a fair chance to apply a
critical attribute of personhood, namely, free choice." Id. at 674-75. On the whole,
Dressler believes that the Model Penal Code has gone about "as far as it should" in
excusing wrongdoers. Id. at 675. Professor Wilson believes that the "abuse excuse"
threatens to undermine the criminal law. See JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT.
DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? 89 (1997). Those in favor
of abuse as a defense attempt to make certain wrongdoers out as attracive victims
and seek to explain, not judge, their conduct. See id. at 109-12. For Wilson, a social
science explanation of conduct should be distinguished from moral judgment. See id.;
see also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: PROTECTING VICTIMS'
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that others may see mercy as a "namby-pamby" concept10 3 that
is, at best, mere sentimentality to be used by persons "in their
private lives with families and pets."' °4
My legislator is particularly moved in his views on mercy by
the Parable of the Prodigal Son."0 5 The prodigal son left home
RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 1-7 (1996) (outlining how the criminal justice system has
failed certain groups). For a critique of Wilson's book and a recall for a thorough
rethinking of the theory of excuse, see Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The
Abuse Excuse and the Resurgence of Judgment in the Criminal Law, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1435 (1998) (book review). For a discussion of the relationship of mercy and
excuse, see FLETCHER, supra note 68, at 807-10. The defendant's ability to control
his conduct can be relevant in considering a downward departure from the Guide-
lines. See United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 548 (3d Cir. 1997). McBroom
differs from the law in other circuits. See Case Comment, Criminal Law: Third Cir-
cuit Holds that Volitional Impairments Can Support a Claim of Diminished Mental
Capacity-United States v. Broom, 124 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 1997), 111 HARV. L. REV.
1122 (1998).
103. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and
Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WIS. L.
REv. 679, 741 ("[Ihe hard-nosed utilitarian objective of crime control achieved
through deterrence and incapacitation . . . is a philosophical pillar of the Guidelines
system."); Morse, supra note 72, at 1507 (criticizing Morris's use of mercy and
Morris's reliance upon a papal encyclical in devising his theory of criminal sentenc-
ing). As Morse states:
Mercy is Norval Morris' "fudge factor," argued for at various stages
of the exposition. It is the most mystifying part of the book because Mor-
ris never tells us what mercy is and under what conditions it should be
granted. He quotes approvingly from a recent papal encyclical that mov-
ingly says, in effect, that justice should be tempered by mercy. When this
sort of pronouncement comes from the Pope, it does not cause any prob-
lems, but when a criminal lawyer asks us to adopt it as a guiding prin-
ciple, we are entitled to ask for more than uplifting sentiments.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
104. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness, Mercy, and the Retributive Emotions, CRIM.
JUST. ETHICS, Summer-Fall 1988, at 3, 12.
105.
A man had two sons. The younger said to his father, "Father, let me
have the share of the estate that would come to me." So the father di-
vided the property between them. A few days later, the younger son got
together everything he had and left for a distant country where he
squandered his money on a life of debauchery.
When he had spent it all, that country experienced a severe famine,
and now he began to feel the pinch, so he hired himself out to one of
the local inhabitants who put him on his farm to feed the pigs. And he
would willingly have filled his belly with the husks the pigs were eating
but no one offered him anything. Then he came to his senses and said,
"how many of my father's paid servants have more food than they want,
and here am I dying of hunger! I will leave this place and go to my
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with his share of his father's estate. 06 The son, who in essence
tells his father that he is better off with his father dead than
alive, squanders his inheritance on a life of debauchery.0 7 The
prodigal son returns to his father's estate only after he finds
himself in a foreign land-hungry, dirty, and in despair." 8 The
father welcomes the son home unconditionally, clothing his son
and ordering a feast in celebration. 10 9 The father acts mercifully
and chooses to forego punishing his son by either banishing the
son or forcing the son to forego his "sonship" and work as a
father and say: Father, I have sinned against heaven and against you; I
no longer deserve to be called your son; treat me as one of your paid
servants." So he left the place and went back to his father.
While he was still a long way off, his father saw him and was
moved with pity. He ran to the boy, clasped him in his arms and kissed
him tenderly. Then his son said, "Father, I have sinned against heaven
and against you. I no longer deserve to be called your son." But the
father said to his servants, "Quick! Bring out the best robe and put it on
him; put a ring on his finger and sandals on his feet. Bring the calf we
have been fattening, and kill it; we are going to have a feast, a celebra-
tion, because this son of mine was dead and has come back to life; he
was lost and is found." And they began to celebrate.
Now the elder son was out in the fields, and on his way back, as he
drew near the house, he could hear music and dancing. Calling one of
the servants he asked what it was all about. "Your brother has come"
replied the servant "and your father has killed the calf we had fattened
because he has got him back safe and sound." He was angry then and
refused to go in, and his father came out to plead with him; but he an-
swered his father, "Look, all these years I have slaved for you and never
oAce disobeyed your orders, yet you never offered me so much as a kid
for me to celebrate with my friends. But, for this son of yours, when he
comes back after swallowing up your property-you kill the calf we had
been fattening."
The father said, "My son, you are with me always and all I have is
yours. But it was only right we should celebrate and rejoice, because
your brother here was dead and has come to life; he was lost and is
found."
Luke 15:1i-32 (Jerusalem Bible 1969). Preceding the Parable of the Prodigal Son are
two parables meant to show the depth of God's mercy: The Parable of the Lost
Sheep, see Luke 16:4-7, and the Parable of the Lost Drachma, see Luke 15:8-10. For
a discussion of the Parable of the Prodigal Son and the lessons parables have in
analyzing constitutional issues, see Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and the
Teaching of Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 467-71 (1984). For other parables related to
mercy, see CROSBY, supra note 65, at 140-58.
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slave.1 ' My legislator recognizes that the parable contains
threads of comparative 1. and noncomparative justice, retribu-
tion, mercy, and the apparent condonation of unacceptable con-
duct; he looks to the parable for guidance as he confronts all fac-
ets of mercy. Other accounts such as the Death of the Good
Thief" and the Parable of the Merciless Official" convince my
legislator that mercy is at the core of community living."
110. See id.
111. The elder brother is not of a like mind. The elder son cannot punish his
brother and therefore mercy is not at issue. However, the elder son appears to re-
fuse to forgive his brother even when asked to do so by his father. The parable
leaves the reader not knowing whether the elder son eventually relented and joined
in the celebration.
112.
One of the criminals hanging there abused him. "Are you not the
Christ?" he said. "Save yourself and us as well!"
But the other spoke up and rebuked him "Have you no fear of
God?" he said. "You got the same sentence as he did, but in our case we de-
served it: we are paying for what we did. But this man has done nothing
wrong. Jesus, "he said "remember me when you come in your kingdom."
"Indeed I promise you," he replied "today you will be with me in
Paradise."
Luke 23:39-43 (Jerusalem Bible 1969).
113.
And so the Kingdom of heaven may be compared to a King who decided
to settle his accounts with his servants. When the reckoning began, they
brought him a man who owed ten thousand talents; but he had no
means of paying, so his master gave order that he should be sold, to-
gether with his wife and children and all his possessions, to meet the
debt. At this, the servant threw himself down at his master's feet. "Give
me time," he said, "and I will pay the whole sum." And the servants
master felt so sorry for him that he let him go and cancelled the debt.
Now as this servant went out, he happened to meet a fellow servant who
owed him one hundred denarii; and he seized him by the throat and
began to throttle him. "Pay what you owe me," he said. His fellow ser-
vant fell at his feet and implored him, saying, "Give me time and I will
pay you." But the other would not agree; on the contrary, he had him
thrown into prison till he should pay the debt. His fellow servants were
deeply distressed when they saw what had happened, and they went to
their master and reported the whole affair to him. Then the master sent
for him. 'You wicked servant," he said. "I cancelled all that debt of yours
when you appealed to me. Were you not bound, then, to have pity on
your fellow servant just as I had pity on you?" And in his anger the
master handed him over to the torturers till he should pay all his debt.
And that is how my heavenly Father will deal with you unless you each
forgive your brother from your heart.
Matthew 18:23-35 (Jerusalem Bible 1969).
114. See CROSBY, supra note 65, at 141 (citing Matthew: 18 to show that mercy is
A STRATEGY FOR MERCY
Although my legislator concludes that mercy is consistent
with justice, he struggles with the comparative fairness issues
raised by those who believe that in a rights-based criminal jus-
tice system, mercy becomes an injustice.11 My legislator worries
about the potential for abuse under a system of mercyl 6 -mercy
consciously or unconsciously extended to one race or group to the
exclusion of others.
117
Finally, my legislator knows that although it is extraordinarily
helpful for the policymaker to turn to the philosophers for assis-
tance in setting public policy, the debate for the philosopher on
punishment, retribution, and mercy is not the same debate for
the public policymaker. For the philosopher, the punishment
debate is an opportunity to test ideas that enable her to develop
a unified explanation whether the debate is on foundational
issues, or whether it assumes a certain framework, and seeks to
determine whether the framework leads to consistency" 8-the
"reflective equilibrium" of Rawls." 9 For the policymaker, the
punishment debate is a source of insight into the beliefs about
punishment that are likely to be entertained by segments of her
constituencies or by policymakers with different constituencies.
The philosopher has the luxury of staking out the one particular
viewpoint that seems to make the most sense in the most in-
essential to spiritual life). God's mercy and human mercy are different. For example,
God is always aware of all facts, and there can be no confusing mercy and justice.
For humans, what appears to be mercy may well be a determination that the trier
of fact is unsure as to guilt and acquits out of justice.
115. See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 22, at 515 (concluding that mercy is inappropri-
ate in a rights-based system and appropriate in a duty-based system); see also infra
note 371.
116. See Brett, supra note 33, at 89 (suggesting the temptation is to abuse mercy
and convert it to favoritism).
117. Professor Garvey summarizes one objection to integrating mercy into the pen-
alty phase of a capital case: "Arbitrary grants of mercy are morally tolerable; dis-
criminatory ones are not." Garvey, supra note 22, at 1041. Garvey rejects this argu-
ment and concludes that the introduction of mercy reconfigures already-existing jury
discretion. See id. But see Ernest van den Haag, Refuting Reiman and Nathanson,
14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 165, 174 (1985) (noting that "[no murderer becomes less
guilty, or less deserving of punishment, because another murderer was punished
leniently, or escaped punishment altogether," because the unfairness is not in pun-
ishing the guilty but in permitting other guilty people to escape punishment).
118. See Murphy, supra note 68, at 454.
119. See RAWLS, supra note 98, at 48-51.
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stances. In contrast, the public policymaker has the luxury of
not staking out one particular viewpoint; instead, he has the
concomitant need to distill core themes from the various views
held in society from which the multitude of opinions derive.
Although the philosopher may argue for the justification of pun-
ishment to be contained in one thought-oftentimes, it seems, a
very long thought-the policymaker must weave together a policy
that may appear to have conflicting elements of retribution,
deterrence, rehabilitation, and isolation.12 The policymaker
needs the philosopher to assist in defining the problem and of-
fering insights into possible solutions so that the policymaker
can seek a policy that can best account for the diversity of opin-
ions within her community.12 Legislative decisions, unlike the
decisions of philosophers, are group decisions, which often repre-
sent a common end and not necessarily a common purpose. The
policymaker is interested more in addressing all the issues
raised in the debate in order to reach a practical consensus than
in finding a solution that flows necessarily from a neatly con-
structed framework.
II. RETRIBUTION
Mercy itself assumes a system of punishment in which pun-
ishment is deserved. 22 Consequently, a legislator, who believes
that the public justifies punishment primarily from a retributive
point of view, must understand the various forms retribution
might take before he can devise a strategy of mercy. Often, the
120. "For the principle [of retribution], we have argued, is a requirement of justice,
whereas deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation are essentially strategies of
controlling crime." ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 75 (1976).
121. It is beyond the scope of this Article to argue in favor of a particular legisla-
tive philosophy. Other scholars, however, provide insight into legislative choice. See
generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991)
(discussing the principles of public choice theory); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups
in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985) (discussing the effect factions
have on the law).
122. See, e.g., MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 77, at 20 ("To be merciful is to
treat a person less harshly than, given certain rules, one has a right to treat that
person."); KLG. Armstrong, The Retributivist Hits Back, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT
19, 36 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1972) ("It is only the retributive idea that makes mercy
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claim is made that the 1970s marked the demise of rehabilita-
tion' and the revival of retribution as the justification for pun-
ishing criminal offenders.' 2' Indeed, during the 1950s and 1960s
the retributive theory of punishment had fallen so far from grace
that C.S. Lewis could not find a European publisher for his
works on retribution.125 The fashionable language of rehabilita-
possible, because to be merciful is to let someone off all or part of a penalty which he is
recognized as having deserved."); Smart, supra note 27, at 358 ("We regard mercy as
deciding, solely through benevolence, to impose less than the deserved punishment on an
offender."). But see Brett, supra note 33, at 82 ("I will argue that a more plausible
account of punishment which is not wholly retributive makes sense of the traditional
view that justice must sometimes be balanced against mercy.").
123. "Rehabilitation," like retribution, contains many different thoughts. For some,
rehabilitation centers on training the offender for return to the community.
We are dealing with persons who have to return to the life of a free
community after a period which is seldom very long, and in most cases,
is only a few weeks ahead. Our object, therefore, must be to restore
them to ordinary standards of citizenship, so far as this can be achieved
in the time at our disposal.
FOX, supra note 28, at 70. For others, rehabilitation connotes a modification of the
offender's value system. See RuPERr CROSS, PUNISHMENT, PRISON AND THE PUBLIC
48-50 (1971). For others, rehabilitation is simply a politically expedient way to argue
for humanitarian treatment of offenders while they are incarcerated. See MICHAEL
SHERimN & GORDON HAWKINS, ImPRISONMENT IN AMERICA 124 (1981) ("he defining
purpose of imprisonment .. . should in most cases be incapacitation. But the reha-
bilitative ideal must constrain the punishment inflicted on the offender."). At least
one cornmentor has worried that the rehabilitative ideal gave politicians the ability
to claim that "something is being done." ALLEN, supra note 2, at 79.
124. See ALLEN, supra note 2, at 5. Allen recognizes the dominance of the rehabili-
tative ideal and that "[rietribution is no longer the dominant objective of the crimi-
nal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of
criminal jurisprudence." Id. at 5. By 1975, the California legislature had declared
that the purpose of imprisonment was not rehabilitation but punishment. See id. at
8. "What is most significant about the 1970s, and what distinguishes it from the
past, is the degree to which the rehabilitative ideal has suffered defections, not only
from politicians, editorial writers, and the larger public, but also from scholars and
professionals in criminology, penology, and the law." Id. at 8-9; see also WILSON, su-
pra note 102, at 78-79 (describing how the last twenty years have seen a pro-
nounced resurgence of interest in retribution). The shift from rehabilitation to retri-
bution may have occurred for a number of reasons, including the view of the "new
retributivists" that utilitarianism is an affront to human dignity. Id. at 76-77. The
public, however, may have been affected by a different view: The public came to be-
lieve that offenders were incorrigibly dangerous and in need of incapacitation. See
JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILLIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 125 (1990).
125. See Armstrong, supra note 122, at 19 (citing C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian
Theory of Punishment, in TWENTIETH CENTURY (1949)).
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tion of the 1960s 126 gave way to the language of retribution as
the public demanded that offenders receive their "just
deserts."27 One may wonder whether there was ever a serious
attempt to implement the idea of rehabilitation 128 or whether
rehabilitation could ever justify punishment, 129 but at the very
126. See supra text accompanying note 123.
127. See supra note 4.
128. See CROSS, supra note 123, at 108 ("We suspect that it passes the wit of man
to contrive a prison which shall not be gravely injurious to the minds of the vast
majority of prisoners . . . '" (quoting SYDNEY AND BEATRICE WEBB, ENGLISH PRISONS
UNDER LOCAL GOVERNMENT 248 (1922)).
129. See, e.g., D.J.B. Hawkins, Punishment and Moral Responsibility, in THEORIES
OF PUNISHMENT, supra note 122, at 13, 18 ("[O]n a superficial view it seems kinder
to think of reformation alone and to forget about retribution, but in the end this is
to forget moral responsibility and to incur the danger of looking upon men in the
same light as animals to be trained to any pattern which appears desirable."); C.S.
Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT, supra
note 122, at 301, 302 (contending that rehabilitation, "merciful though it appears,
really means that each one of us, from the moment he breaks the law, is deprived
of the rights of a human being . . . [because] the concept of Desert is the only con-
necting link between punishment and justice"). A scathing report issued by the
American Friends Service Committee condemned the rehabilitative ideal as a method
of repression. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE
147 (1971) ("[The law should only deal with a narrow aspect of the individual, his
criminal act or acts . . . [wihenever the law considers the whole person it is more
likely that it considers factors irrelevant to the purpose of delivering punishment.").
The Report concluded that prison administrators supported the rehabilitative ideal as
a means to increase their power over inmates. See id. Rehabilitation was just a way
to force cultural assimilation. See id. at 34-47. The report noted the irony that
Pennsylvania Quakers were largely responsible for the acceptance of the rehabilita-
tive ideal: "This two-hundred-year-old experiment has failed." Id. at v.
Rehabilitation's most obvious effect was to increase the length of prison sentences.
See SHERMAN & HAWKINS, supra note 123, at 71-72. For this reason and others,
Rupert Cross found rehabilitation unacceptable as a justification for punishment. See
CROSS, supra note 123, at 98-101. George Fletcher believes that criminals are not
"diseased" and we have no "cures": "The goal of rehabilitation is particularly insidi-
ous because the coercive power of the state is cloaked by benevolent motives; if the
suspect is 'sick' and in need of treatment, it seems totally irrelevant whether on a
particular occasion he 'happened' to commit a crime." FLETCHER, supra note 68, at
415. Doubt is cast on the possibility of there being real reformation save in the
most exceptional cases, and it is even suggested that the belief that prison could be
reformative has had a baneful influence. See CROSS, supra note 123, at 86. Because
prisons are "cold storage depots" and not therapeutic communities, "the main aim of
prison reform should be the prevention of prisoners' deterioration." Id. at 85-86.
One of the early calls for a return to retribution came from the Committee on
the Study of Incarceration, which was established to respond to the prison riots of
the early 1970s. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 120, at XV-XXI. The Committee rejected
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least, in the past twenty-five years the rhetoric of punishment is
no longer the language of rehabilitation 3 but is one of retribu-
tion.'31 The policymaker who does not acknowledge the centrality
of retribution, and the attraction that retribution has for the
general public, does so at her own risk. Those who politically
oppose rehabilitation and also embrace retribution founded on a
political philosophy that expresses a desire to create a vigorous
and disciplined search for moral consensus have been very suc-
cessful over the past twenty-five years. 32 As Cohen warns, re-
tributive theory "contains an element of truth which only sen-
timental foolishness can ignore."
133
But retribution, anchored in the notion of just deserts and
having its focus on what has occurred and not on some future
goal,' 3 is a concept with many different strands of emphasis. It
is within the woven strands of retribution'3 5 that we find subtle
rehabilitation as a proper justification for punishment, see id. at 11-18, and opted for
a sentencing system that attempted to limit discrepancy, see id. at 97-140.
130. Some commentators have called for the abolition of rehabilitation as the justi-
fying purpose of punishment and renewed emphasis on incapacitation. See, e.g.,
NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 58 (1974); see also ZIMEING &
HAWKINS, supra note 56, at 157-58.
131. There are many critics of modem retributivism. See, e.g., Nigel Walker, Mod-
ern Retributivism, in JURISPRUDENCE: CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS, supra note 68, at 73, 73-
94 (stating that modern retributivism is not intellectually supportable and is "a
disillusioned reaction from utilitarianism").
132. See ALLEN, supra note 2, at 62-64 (arguing that often the language of criminal
justice has become filled with the terminology of war).
133. Morris R. Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49" YALE L.J. 987, 1011
(1940).
134. See WASSERSTROM, supra note 28, at 112 (stating that retribution is backward-
looking in its emphasis).
135. Commentators have organized subcategories of retribution in myriad ways. For
example, Dressler divides retribution into negative retribution, which requires just
deserts as a necessary condition for punishment, and positive retribution, which
demands that a guilty person be punished. See Dressler, supra note 92, at 1451-52.
Positive retributivism is either assaultive, which concludes that it is morally right to
hate a criminal, or protective, which concludes that criminals have a right to be
punished based upon a principle of reciprocal benefits and burdens. See id. For
H.LA. Hart, discussion of retribution was best organized into discussion of retribu-
tion as a general justifying aim, including concepts such as "espiation" and "reproba-
tion," and retribution directed to the question of distribution of punishment. See
H.L. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBITY 8-11 (1968). Garvey believes the
discussion of punishment can best be organized into two dimensions: expressive and
justificatory. See Garvey, supra note 60, at 740-43. For Wilson, retribution can be
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policy implications for a strategy of mercy."'
A. A Strand of Emotion: Vengeance and Expiation
"Vengeance" is described often as a natural and, therefore,
expected public and private response to a criminal act. 37 Addi-
tionally, the notion that it is a good, or at least an expected re-
sponse, to hate the offender, strikes a strong chord for many
persons.13 8 This "pre-philosophical intuition" 39 to respond on an
emotional level finds its way into the retributive theories of
Kant'4 ° and Hegel.' St. Augustine attempted to channel the
viewed at the individual or psychological level as a desire for personal vengeance in
response to the loss of an object or a relationship; at the historical level as a pro-
cess that moved from retribution as an issue of individual right and duty to the
realm of state action; and at the philosophical level as a process of restoring societal
balance. See WILSON, supra note 102, at 84-85. For a discussion of the breadth of
the concept of retribution, see John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q.
238 (1979).
136. See HART, supra note 135, at 2-3 (explaining that one obstacle to assessing
the institution of criminal law is the temptation to underestimate the complexity of
punishment).
137. For a history of the evolution of punishment, see HANS VON HENTIG, PUNISH-
MENT. ITS ORIGIN, PURPOSE AND PSYCHOLOGY 17-116 (1973).
138. It would appear that a broad consensus of Americans believe that courts are
"not harsh enough" with criminals. GAUBATZ, supra note 12, at 2-3.
139. Duff, supra note 74, at 52 (predicting that the recent discussions of
retributivism will be seen by some as "futile attempts to rationalize intuitions or
feelings which we should rather and finally dismiss as irrational, disreputable, or at
least irrelevant to the proper concerns of the state"). For others who "have more re-
spect for our pre-philosophical intuitions," the new approaches to retributivism will
be welcome attempts "to uncover and explicate the moral understandings which
those intuitions and feelings may (imperfectly) express." Id. at 53. Although Duff
sees this intuition to punish as "natural or deep-rooted," he does not believe this
intuition can justify a system of criminal punishment. See RA DUFF, TRIALS AND
PuNIsHMENTS 197-99 (1986). For Duff, the difficulty is bridging "[tihe gap between
'the guilty deserve to suffer' and 'it is right for us to impose the suffering.'" Id. at
200. In his attempt to justify punishment with respect for the autonomy of the indi-
vidual, Duff centers on punishment as restoring the balance disrupted by crime, see
id. at 205-32, and punishment as enabling the criminal to expiate or atone for
crime, see id. at 233-66. Reluctantly, Duff concludes that our imperfect legal system
is incapable of addressing "the criminal as an autonomous moral agent whose con-
sent and repentance we seek." Id. at 295. Because the system will not stop punish-
ing until the behavior is reformed, punishment must be justified as a deterrent. See
id. at 298.
140.
When, however, someone who delights in annoying and vexing peace-loving
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natural emotion away from a hatred of the offender toward a
hatred of the offense. 42 It is Stephen, however, who has given
voice to the emotional draw of retribution:
I think it highly desirable that criminals should be hated,
that the punishments inflicted upon them should be so con-
trived as to give expression to that hatred, and to justify it so
far as the public provision of means for expressing and grati-
fying a healthy natural sentiment can justify and encourage
it.
143
Stephen's emphasis on moral indignation and hatred of the
criminal was part of his general denunciatory theory of criminal
punishment,144 a theory supported in more recent times by such
notables as Lord Denning 45 In Hart's words, it is a "natural"
folk receives at last a right good beating, . .. everyone approves of it
and considers it as good in itself even if nothing further results from it;
nay, even he who gets the beating must acknowledge in his reason, that
justice has been done to him, because he sees the proportion between
welfare and well-doing.
IIVIANUEL KANT, Critique of Practical Reason, in CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON
AND OTHER WRITINGS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 118, 170 (Lewis White Beck ed. &
trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1949) (1797).
141. For Hegel, punishment was necessary to annul the crime. See GEORGE WIL-
HELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 220 (T.M. Knox trans., 1952). The
offender had a right to be punished. See id. at 70. For a criticism of Hegel, see TED
HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 47-51 (1969); see also
D.J.B. Hawkins, Punishment and Moral Responsibility, 7 MODERN L. REV. 205, 207-
08 (1944) (distinguishing the retributive theory of Plato and Thomas Aquinas from
Kant and Hegel).
142. SAINT AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL 123 (Anna S. Benjamin &
L.H. Hackstaff eds. & trans., 1985) ("[Tlhe ugliness of sin is never without the beau-
ty of punishment."). However, Augustine, at least in the context of the "household"
saw punishment as rehabilitative: punishment allows the offender to "be readjusted
to the family peace from which he had broken away." ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF
GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS Bk. 19, Ch. 16 (Elizabeth Clark trans., 1984). Similarly,
Thomas Aquinas found "fraternal correction" to be an act of charity. See AQUINAS,
supra note 69, at 2-2, Q.33, A.1.
143. SIR JAMES FITJAMES STEPHEN, 2 A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENG-
LAND 81-82 (1883).
144. See id. at 81. For a criticism of Stephen, see HART, supra note 135, at 170-73
(including his observation that in a pluralistic society one may not necessarily find a
single, homogeneous social morality).
145. See THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, Cmd. 8E32, % 53, cited
in HART, supra note 135, at 170.
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view that leads English judges to claim that the judiciary is "the
mouthpiece of the moral sentiments of society."'
Stephen believed crime creates visceral reactions that simply
cannot be sublimated,'47 a view held by others as well.' 4 Some
commentators have agreed with Stephen, emphasizing their
belief that the visceral reaction to crime is such an integral part
of human nature that the emotional reaction to crime is not
likely to dissipate, even as our understanding of the causes of
crime become more sophisticated:
Scientific insight will sooner be thrown overboard than the
gratification of an emotional drive. A better understanding of
the criminal [law] may in a number of cases change the na-
ture of the general sense of justice, but it will not remove the
emotional demand that crime must be expiated.149
Many have written on the danger of falling prey to this "retribu-
tive emotion,"1 50 arguing the barbarism of such an approach.' 5'
146. HART, supra note 135, at 170. Similarly, Professor Kahan points out that
those who argue for alternatives to incarceration often miss the social meaning of
punishment. See Dan M. Kahan, Punishment Incommensurability, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 691, 693-94 (1998). "The message of condemnation is very clear when society
sentences an offender to prison," id. at 693, but the same social message is not as
strong when alternatives to incarceration are used: not all punishments are "com-
mensurable."
147. See JAMES F. STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 152 (1991) (stating
that the "feeling of hatred and the desire [for] vengeance ... are important ele-
ments of human nature which ought . . . to be satisfied in a regular and legal man-
ner").
148. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308. (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)
("The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man."). For the contrary argu-
ment that retribution cannot justify the death penalty, see id. at 231 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). This view should be distinguished from "revenge utilitarianism," which
justifies punishment on the ground that if the state did not punish, private individu-
als might take it upon themselves, thereby leading to disorder. See MICHAEL S.
MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 23343 (1984).
149. FRANz ALEXANDER & HUGO STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE, AND THE PUB-
LIC 211 (1931). Some have viewed expiation in a different manner: an offender must
atone for his own acts but the offender also is a vicarious expiator; "[i]n paying his
debt to society, the [offender] is also ... atoning for society's failure to provide a
milieu in which crime is not. . . rewarded." John F. Else & Keith D. Stephenson,
Vicarious Expiation: A Theory of Prison and Social Reform, 20 CRIME & DELINQ.
359, 359 (1974).
150. The term is used by Murphy to describe "institutionalized vengeance." See
MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 77, at 2-3.
151. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 102, at 193 (admitting that his view that prisons
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Some have seen revenge-based retribution as an unworthy justi-
fication for punishment: punishment can no more be identified
with revenge "than love can be identified with lust."152 Others
have countered the barbarian argument by noting that ven-
geance is a natural response that follows the "deprivation of a
cathected object."153 Still others have seen retribution as the only
justification that respects the autonomy of the individual."
Anyone who has been a victim of crime (especially a violent
crime), however, or who has attended a sentencing hearing when
evidence from the victim's family has been introduced,'55 can
are intended to punish would "strike many enlightened readers today as cruel, even
barbaric"); see also David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1623, 1650 (1992) (arguing that retribution conflicts with the need to respect all
persons including the offender). But see Jeffrie G. Murphy, Getting Even: The Role of
the Victim, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POLY 209, 210 (1990) (discussing the assumption that
revenge in the criminal law is "either unambiguously evil or unambiguously sick"
and proving no basis has ever been given for that assumption).
152. FLETCHER, supra note 68, at 417.
153. WILSON, supra note 102, at 292.
154. This is Duffs position, but a position that he reluctantly concludes is untena-
ble currently because there is not the existence of a genuine community within
which the criminal has his place, and from which crime threatens to exclude him.
See DUFF, supra note 139, at 295. Without a community, there cannot be "an au-
thentic system of communicative and redemptive punishments." Id.
155. The often devastating impact of victim and victim-family testimony initially
caused the Supreme Court to limit the admissibility of that testimony in capital
cases. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810-11 (1989); Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 508 (1987). In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), the
Court overruled both Gathers and Booth, finding it unfair for the victim to remain
"a faceless stranger" while the defendant was afforded the opportunity to humanize
himself. See id. at 825 (quoting Gathers, 490 U.S. at 821 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
For a summary of the debate that followed Payne, see Garvey, supra note 22, at
1018-22. For a discussion that advocates the broad use of victim narrative in crim-
inal trials, see Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs at the Criminal Trial, 90 NW. U.
L. REV. 863 (1996). For a criticism of the role of victims in sentencing, see, e.g.,
Robert C. Black, Forgotten Penological Purposes: A Critique of Victim Participation in
Sentencing, 39 AM. J. JURIS. 225, 240 (1994) (arguing that victims should be provided
necessary "services," not new "rights").
For a discussion of possible reforms in the criminal justice system to produce a
greater role for victims, see FLETCHER, supra note 102, at 180-201, 247-50. But see
Lynne Henderson, Whose Justice? Which Victims?, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1596, 1601-04
(1996) (book review) (criticizing Fletcher's view of the history and breadth of the
victim's rights movement); cf PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL
REPORT 76 (1982) (recommending financial assistance from the federal government to
the states for victim compensation and assistance programs).
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testify to the instinctive emotions that crime elicits. 56 Indeed,
the central role the victim has occupied in American politics in
the last three decades is mirrored by the expanded role the vic-
tim has attained in the philosophical rethinking of retribution,
particularly by those who would nudge the debate on retribution
away from an economic model back in the direction of retribu-
tion as a moral response to an immoral act. 57 Jeffrie Murphy,
for example, justifies the resentment that a crime victim feels on
the ground that a proper respect for "the moral value incarnate
in my own person" requires a response to the crime, 5 ' although
Murphy retains a possible role for forgiveness of the offender by
the victim.'59 Jean Hampton elaborates on the role resentment
plays in the victim's mental reaffirmation of her proper rank
and value. 6 ' For Hampton, indignation at wrongs done to myself
and others is a natural and acceptable response to crime.16' Re-
sentment and hatred are also natural responses to the victim's
fears that the offender's act demeans the value of the victim
herself and may be a true appraisal of the victim's worth.'62
The community's desire for emotional satisfaction has found
its way into the political fabric of our country in other ways
related to victim-centered issues. Emotion-laden crimes such as
drunk driving163 and child abuse have spawned national orga-
156. See Murphy, supra note 151, at 209-10 (asserting that victims' complaints
often come in areas of criminal law where compensation seems inadequate). But see
Julian V. Roberts, American Attitudes About Punishment: Myth and Reality, in
TONRY & HATLESTAD,. supra note 64, at 250-55 (arguing that most Americans, when
asked their opinion in a nonsimplistic way, will choose alternatives to incarceration).
157. See Duff, supra note 74, at 52.
158. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 77, at 18. Mercy for the offender can be
offset by victim impact statements. See Murphy, supra note 151, at 221.
159. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 77, at 23-25.
160. See id. at 60-61.
161. See id.
162. See id. However, Hampton urges victims to overcome resentment and hatred
through forgiveness by separating the victim's act from the offender's inherent decency.
See id. at 86-89. For criticism of Hampton's analysis of wrongdoing as inherently
involving a demeaning of a victim, see Duff, supra note 74, at 54-55.
163. For a description of the national organization, Mothers Against Drunk Driving,
see MADD: Mothers Against Drunk Driving (visited Feb. 28, 2000) <http'J/www.
madd.org>.
164. See generally Earl-Hubbard, supra note 60, at 794-814 (discussing the sex
abuse cases of children such as Jacob Wetterling and Megan Kanka and the result-
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nizations that have made certain that their cases remain in
public view.'65 Increased leverage of the prosecutor in plea bar-
gaining, due to the implementation of sentencing guidelines in
particular, seems, at least in. part, to make punishment of the
offender more certain and more expeditious even if doubt exists
as to whether the changes are likely to result in more reliable
judgments. 66 There is the overriding public concern that protec-
tion for defendants' rights has come at the cost of either delay-
ing or denying the public's right to punish offenders. There
seems to be a widespread view that the criminal justice system
prefers defendants over victims. 167 Yet, with the public emphasis
on vengeance, one may ask legitimately where is the public dis-
cussion on mercy and forgiveness that are "the popularly con-
ceived antitheses of vengeance?" 68
Any attempt to create a strategy for mercy must be made
knowing that unpunished or underpunished crime may not sat-
isfy the societal requirement for emotional catharsis. Whether
the attention on revenge is a natural response or whether the
attention on revenge as retribution comes by default from skep-
ticism of utilitarian justifications of deterrence, rehabilitation,
and incapacitation, a strategy for mercy must account for this
strand of retributivism. Consequently, a successful strategy for
mercy must find areas of criminal conduct that do not create
strong emotional responses against the offender. Areas of crime
in which offenders exhibit the effect of such nonretributive fac-
tors such as poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment, or any other
factor that engenders a degree of general compassion, are candi-
dates of merciful treatment. Therefore, crimes of violence and
crimes with particularized victims are not primary candidates.'69
ing development of federal and state registration statutes).
165. See, e.g., MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRiVING, CBBB PHLANTHROPIC AnVISORY
REPORT 3 (1997) (stating that all national MADD chapters combine to spend $48
million each year to prevent drunk driving).
166. See, e.g., Misner, supra note 25, at 759-63 (detailing the shift of power to the
office of the prosecutor and away from the courts).
167. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 68, at 416-17 (arguing that criminal trials
have become politically influenced proceedings at the expense of the victim).
168. WILSON, supra note 102, at 293.
169. See id. at 301 ("If one is willing to assess the extent of an injury in order to
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B. A Strand of Moral Outrage: Social Order and Denunciation
Theory
Often it is difficult to distinguish the visceral reaction to
crime from its better-dressed, intellectual cousin that claims
that retribution is necessary for social organization.
[Without a sense of retribution we may lose our sense of
wrong. Retribution in punishment is an expression of the
community's disapproval of crime, and if this retribution is
not given recognition then the disapproval may also disap-
pear. A community which is too ready to forgive the wrongdoer
may end by condoning the crime. °
The plurality decision in Furman v. Georgia 7' embodied this
sense of retribution. After noting the instinctiveness of retribu-
tion, Justice Stewart concluded that retribution "serves an im-
portant purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed
by law." 17 2 Similarly for Durkheim, the passionate and nonreflec-
tive reaction to crime served the useful role of maintaining so-
cial cohesion; retributive punishment guards against the
breakdown of social solidarity that crime threatens. 17' For Kant,
retribution is a "categorical imperative."'74 Retribution conserves
fix punishments, one should also be willing to assess the possible non-existence of
an injury in order to negate the need for punishment."). These factors also relate to
the wisdom of criminalizing the conduct.
170. A.L. GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAw 93 (1953). For a criticism
of Goodhart's view that "law serves simultaneously as external authority and inter-
nalized norm," see Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, The Politics of Virtue, Ani-
mals, Theology & Abortion, 25 GA. L. REV. 923, 972 (1991).
171. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
172. Id. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart continued with his de-
scription of retribution to include utilitarian concerns as well: "When people begin to
believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offend-
ers the punishment they 'deserve,' then there are sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-
help, vigilante justice, and lynch law." Id. (Stewart, J., concurring); see also MOORE,
supra note 148, at 233-43 (reviewing arguments for punishment and retributivism).
173. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SocIETY 108 (George
Simpson trans., 1933) ("It is necessary, then, that [the collective conscience] be af-
firmed forcibly at the very moment when it is contradicted, and the only means of
affirming it is to express the unanimous aversion which the crime continues to in-
spire, by an authentic act which can consist only in suffering inflicted upon the
agent.").
174. As Kant noted:
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the moral conscience, maintains respect for law and, in the
words of Lord Denning, "[plunishment is the way in which soci-
ety expresses its denunciation of wrongdoing."175 Other commen-
tators have used different terminology. For Hyman Gross, the
need to prevent impunity justifies law enforcement.176 The crimi-
nal law is enforced "because we cannot tolerate letting people
get away with their crimes."177 Others have labeled the societal
revulsion to crime a "disgust" that is claimed not to be "an in-
stinctive and unthinking aversion but rather is classified as a
thought-pervaded evaluative sentiment" that embodies a judg-
ment that the object of disgust will "compromise our own status"
unless the community responds.178 In Stephen's words, "the sen-
tence of the law is to moral sentiment of the public in relation to
any offence what a seal is to hot wax."
179
Those who emphasize "the interdependence and interpenetra-
tion of law and morals"' 80 are not without their critics. Retribu-
tion in the sense of a denunciation theory, H.L.A. Hart concluded,
may result in stultifying the advance of morals in the community
because present values take on a sacrosanct character.18' Hart
The law concerning punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe to
him who rummages around in the winding paths of a theory of happi-
ness looking for some advantage to be gained by releasing the criminal
from punishment or by reducing the amount of it-in keeping with the
Pharisaic motto: "It is better that one man should die than the whole
people should perish." If legal justice perishes, then it is no longer worth
while for men to remain alive on this earth.
KANT, supra note 4, at 100.
175. Lord Justice Denning, Royal Commission on Capital Punishment: Minutes of
Evidence, Ninth Day, Dec. 1, 1949, in SANFORD KADISH & STEPHEN SCHULHOFER,
CRnIMNAL LAW 140-41 (1995).
176. See Hyman Gross, Preventing Impunity, in JURISPRUDENCE: CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS,
supra note 68, at 95, 95 (arguing that "preventing impunity" is the only reason to
enforce law-the "possibility of being allowed to get away with it" is what really
matters).
177. Id. at 95. Gross finds other forms of retributivism, such as making the perpe-
trator pay for his crime and forcing the offender to give up ill-gotten gains, to be
insufficient. See id. at 98-101.
178. Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV.
1621, 1656 (1998) (book review) (reviewing WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF
DISGUST (1997)).
179. STEPHEN, supra note 143, at 81.
180. HART, supra note 135, at 169.
181. See id. at 170-71.
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also criticized that denunciation fosters the naive view that
there exists in society "a single homogeneous social morality."'82
Finally, he believed that denunciation, particularly after a rise
in the frequency of a particular crime, can justify a harsher than
normal sentence and violate the principle of fairness that like
cases should be treated alike. 183
Andrew von Hirsh's criticism of retribution to preserve "intact
the collective conscience "1 centers on the use of the offender as
a means to achieve a social order. This type of utilitarian justifi-
cation for the contemporary retributivist is inherently unfair
because the offender does not receive that which he deserves,
but rather that which is useful for the whole society.'85 Other
criticisms of the denunciatory theory of retribution challenge it
as an outdated theory overly concerned with enforcing "a crimi-
nal law that is highly religious in content"'86 and too willing to
punish conduct that is not harmful in itself and is not likely to
cause harm.' 87 Despite his criticism of the denunciatory theory,
Hart concluded that denunciation is a view "likely to commend
itself to most English judges."'88
Denunciation seems to be equally attractive to the American
legal and political systems as well. This is not surprising to
Francis Allen:
The theories of just punishment strongly reaffirm the reality
of moral values at a time when much in contemporary
thought appears to challenge the conception of moral as well
as legal responsibility; when the modern anarchy of values
breeds feelings of loss and anomie; and when dwindling confi-
dence in the future is obviously related to the erosion of the
moral verities of the past.'89
182. Id. at 171.
183. See id. at 172.
184. RALPH D. ELLIS & CAROL S. ELLIS, THEORIES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 61 (1989).
For a summary of criticism of the denunciatory theory, see id. at 60-66.
185. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 120, at 46.
186. ELLIS & ELLIS, supra note 184, at 61.
187. See id. at 60-66. Often those critical of the denunciatory theory find them-
selves in the company of Rawls and others centered on fairness and supporting a
"non-utilitarian, yet systematic and philosophical theory of ethics." Id. at 60.
188. HART, supra note 135, at 170.
189. ALLEN, supra note 2, at 67; see Joseph R. Gusfield, On Legislating Morals:
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A denunciatory approach to retribution is politically popular
because it affirms the beliefs of those who believe themselves to
be in the majority or those who conclude that their beliefs
should be in the majority. The fact that the denunciatory theory
can be seen as utilitarian in nature is precisely why the theory
may be attractive to some voters who subscribe to an inclusive
theory of punishment, here blending retribution and deter-
rence.190 A strategy for mercy must account for the attractive-
The Symbolic Process of Designating Deviance, 56 CAL. L. ItEV. 54, 57 (1968) ("Law
is not only a means of social control but also symbolizes the public affirmation of
social ideals and norms.").
190. In his classic article, Johannes Andenaes summarizes the relationship of deter-
rence and the moralizing effect of punishment generally:
The effect of the criminal law and its enforcement may be mere
deterrence. Because of the hazards involved, a person who contemplates a
punishable offense might not act. But it is not correct to regard general
prevention and deterrence as one and the same thing. The concept of
general prevention also includes the moral or socio-pedagogical influence
of punishment. The "messages" sent by law and the legal processes con-
tain factual information about what would be risked by disobedience, but
they also contain proclamations specifying that it is wrong to dis-
obey...
The moral influence of the criminal law may take various forms. It
seems to be quite generally accepted among the members of society that
the law should be obeyed even though one is dissatisfied with it and
wants it changed. If this is true, we may conclude that the law as an
institution itself to some extent creates conformity. But more important
than this formal respect for the law is respect for the values which the
law seeks to protect. It may be said that from law and the legal machin-
ery there emanates a flow of propaganda which favors such respect. Pun-
ishment is a means of expressing social disapproval. In this way the
criminal law and its enforcement supplement and enhance the moral
influence acquired through education and other non-legal processes. Stated
negatively, the penalty neutralizes the demoralizing consequences that
arise when people witness crimes being perpetrated.
Deterrence and moral influence may both operate on the conscious
level. The potential criminal may deliberate about the hazards involved,
or he may be influenced by a conscious desire to behave lawfully. However,
with fear and moral influence as an intermediate link, it is possible to
create unconscious inhibitions against crime, and .. ., illegal actions will
not present themselves consciously as real alternatives to conformity,
even in situations where the potential criminal would run no risk what-
soever of being caught.
Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventative Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L.
REV. 949, 950-51 (1966).
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ness of the denunciation theory. If an offender is seen to act
with impunity when he is treated mercifully, and if the criminal
law is seen as the glue that binds society, mercy will be seen as
undermining social cohesion.' 9 '
Yet there is another dimension of the social cohesion argu-
ment. Social cohesion is also likely to suffer if denounced con-
duct is pervasive and the decision to prosecute a subset of offen-
ders appears to be made on factors such as race, ethnicity or
class. For example, in the federal prosecution for cocaine posses-
sion, offenders who possessed even very small amounts of crack
cocaine were treated much more harshly than those who pos-
sessed powder cocaine. Those prosecuted for crack cocaine pos-
session, and therefore prosecuted most severely, were almost
exclusively African Americans.'92 Exhibiting mercy to all persons
191. The denunciatory theory may be one reason why the so-called "abuse excuses,"
such as post-trauma syndrome, that tend to deflect personal responsibility away from
the offender have been so controversial. See FLETCHER, supra note 102, at 140-46.
Certainly the denunciatory theory conflicts with the Marxist view that in a properly
designed society, all criminality would be a problem "for the physician rather than
the judge." Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217,
242 (1973) (citing William Bonger, a Marxist criminologist).
192. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, and the Guidelines promulgated in 1987 set
quantity thresholds that would trigger mandatory minimum sentences. The sentenc-
ing threshold for powder cocaine was set at one hundred times the threshold
amounts for crack cocaine. Over 90% of all federal crack defendants in 1992 were
African American. See David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47
STAN. L. REv. 1283, 1286-90 (1995). Some argued that heightened penalties for crack
cocaine benefitted the African American community. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, The
State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1255, 1269 (1994) (stating that "blacks as a class may be helped by measures rea-
sonably thought to discourage" crack dealing and use). Resistance to the 100:1 ratio
was expressed by prosecutors, juries and even Justice Kennedy. One federal judge
resigned from the bench rather than apply the Guidelines. See William Spade, Jr.,
Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1233, 1279-83 (1996). Eventually, the Guidelines were amended. In 1995, the
Sentencing Commission adopted an amendment to the Guidelines that equalized pen-
alties for similar amounts of powder cocaine and crack cocaine. See 60 Fed. Reg.
25,074, 25,076 (1995). The change came, in part, because of the "high percentage of
blacks convicted of crack cocaine offenses." See United States Sentencing Commis-
sion, Special Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 162 (Feb.
1995). See generally David H. Angell, A "Second Look" at Crack Cocaine Sentencing
Policies: One More Try for Federal Equal Protection, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1211
(1997) (arguing for a reconsideration of crack cocaine cases from a heightened equal
protection awareness).
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possessing all forms of cocaine may be seen as a means of cor-
recting a form of racial discrimination and thereby promoting,
not splintering, social cohesion.
No strategy for mercy can ignore the fact that a large segment
of society places strong emphasis on incarceration as the pre-
mier method of expressing community condemnation of certain
conduct. 9 3 Yet an analysis of the demographics of the current
prison population certainly should give any policymaker pause
to consider the role that race and economic status play in the
decision to incarcerate.'" In the search for classes of crime to
introduce a strategy for mercy, a policymaker may seek an area
of conduct in which society can seek to show its disapproval
without the need to incarcerate for long periods of time, or per-
haps to incarcerate at all. A strategy for mercy may seek an
area of criminal conduct whereby exhibiting mercy can affect
social cohesion positively by altering past prosecutorial stra-
tegies that have had disparate racial effects. In this way, the
centripetal force to coalesce society through the enforcement of
the criminal law also accounts for "the centrifugal forces of a
pluralistic society which produce widely differing estimates within
the community of the blameworthiness of behavior and the seri-
ousness of the harms committed."195
A strategy for mercy concerned with issues of social cohesion
must also recognize the ascendancy of judicial minimalism as
193. There is always the risk that the public will view any alternative sanction to
prison as insufficient punishment. Even though short terms of imprisonment do not
appear to deter more effectively than fines or community service, the public does not
see incarceration and alternatives to incarceration as being commensurable:
Punishment is not just a way to make offenders suffer; it is a special
social convention that expresses moral condemnation. Not all modes of
suffering express condemnation or express it in the same way. The mes-
sage of condemnation is very clear when society sentences an offender to
prison. But when it merely fines him for the same act, the message is
likely to be different: you may do what you have done, but must pay for
the privilege. Because community service penalties involve activities that
conventionally entitle someone to respect and admiration, they also fail to
express condemnation in an unambiguous way.
Kahan, supra note 146, at 693-94.
194. See supra note 64.
195. ALLEN, supra note 2, at 70.
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evidenced in such cases as Romer v. Evans' and Vacco v.
Quill,197 which means that it is likely that the arena in which
majority and minority rights are resolved will be the legislature
rather than the courts. " ' For the legislative policymaker, pun-
ishment as denunciation ultimately must face questions of
fairness, including aspects of the classical problems of major-
itarian rule.
C. A Strand of Fairness: Mutual Benefit and Distribution
Modem retributivists, who oftentimes are disillusioned refu-
gees from utilitarianism,9 9 have coalesced around the belief that
punishment can be justified only under a nonutilitarian, but
highly sophisticated concept of fairness.2°° In an attempt to dis-
tinguish this justification for punishment from earlier justifica-
tions of revenge20' and denunciation,2 2 some commentators have
insisted on jettisoning the term "retribution" and substituting
the language of "desert."203 Modem retributivists have been in-
fluenced by the writings of John Rawls, particularly his empha-
sis on liberty centered on a policy of noninterference 2 ° and also
by his rejection of punishment based on utilitarian, conse-
205quentialist reasons. The fairness aspect of retribution does not
enjoy the same identifiable popular attraction as revenge-based
or value-affirming retribution. Yet the nuances of fairness do
shed light on additional problems inherent in devising a strategy
for mercy.
196. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
197. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
198. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REv.
6, 7 (1996).
199. See Walker, supra note 131, at 73.
200. For a general discussion of the variations of modem retributivism, see ELLIS
& ELLIS, supra note 184, at 55-66.
201. See supra text accompanying note 137.
202. See supra text accompanying note 170.
203. See ELLIS & ELLIS, supra note 184, at 60.
204. See RAWLS, supra note 98, 195-257.
205. See ELLIS & ELLIS, supra note 184, at 58; see also FLETCHER, supra note 68,
at 417.
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1. Issues of Mutual Benefit
For some retributivists, justification for punishment can be
found by analyzing the way in which communities are formed
and maintained. If one is to live in a society free of violence and
deception, then all individuals must be deemed to have accepted
a burden of exercising self-restraint over certain inclinations. As
Herbert Morris concluded:
If a person fails to exercise self-restraint even though he
might have and gives in to such inclinations, he renounces a
burden which others have voluntarily assumed and thus
gains an advantage which others, who have restrained them-
selves, do not possess. This system, then, is one in which the
rules establish a mutuality of benefit and burden and in
which the benefits of non-interference are conditional upon
the assumption of burdens.06
Fairness dictates that benefits and burdens are distributed
equally and any person gaining an unfair advantage must have
the advantage "in some way erased," thus restoring a sense of
equilibrium,"' or, in Kants terminology, "rectifying the balance"
skewed by criminal conduct.0 8 The advantage gained by the of-
fender is not the "consequential profit" of the armed robbery but
rather the "avoidance of the burden of self-restraint."2 9 Punish-
ment imposes "an extra burden on the criminal, [and] restores
the balance which her crime disturbed."210
R.A. Duff contrasts this form of "legal retributivism" of the
1970s with Stephen's morality based retributivism:
The picture is not that of moral beings whose wrongdoings
rightly attract the forceful condemnation of their community,
but of rational economic agents whose social relations are
structured by social contract; the law's penal provisions are
the penalty clauses in that contract.
21
'
206. Morris, supra note 77, at 33.
207. Duff, supra note 74, at 51.
208. Kant's position can be compared to Hegel's notion that right, because it is an
absolute, cannot be negated by crime, and it is "therefore obligatory that the nullity
created by crime be annulled." WILSON, supra note 102, at 282.
209. DUFF, supra note 139, at 207.
210. Id.
211. Duff, supra note 74, at 52.
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The "exact nature of the imbalance created by a criminal act"2'
is unclear; the imbalance may be one between the offender and
the victim 13 or between the offender and society. 14
Critics of the mutual benefits theory target their criticism on
the confusion of the concepts of "retribution" and "restitution."215
They also challenge proponents to detail the proper way to rectify
the imbalance caused by crime in areas such as homicide, rape,
and arson. 21 6 The metaphor of a debt owed to society fails with
regard to the notion of inchoate crime. 217 As George Fletcher
points out, all of society is burdened when violent crimes oc-
cur.218 Correspondingly, criminal law prosecutions are brought in
the name of the community and not in the name of the particu-
larized victim.
An additional criticism of the mutual benefits theory is more
telling in our attempt to develop a strategy for mercy. Ultimately,
the policymaker must face the issue whether all members of
society share in the mutuality of benefit and burden-the issue
of what to do with the concept of just deserts in an unjust soci-
ety.2 9 Duff eloquently summarizes the criticism:
For my obligation to obey the law is an obligation of justice; I
owe it to my fellow-citizens to pay by my self-restraint and
obedience for the benefits which I receive from their self-
restraining obedience to the law. But insofar as I do not re-
ceive a fair share of the benefits and burdens in question, I
212. WILSON, supra note 102, at 283.
213. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. V, ch. IV at v. 120-23 (Ostwald
trans. 1962).
214. See MORRIS, supra note 130, at 77.
215. See, e.g., ELLIS & ELLIS, supra note 184, at 60.
216. See, e.g., HONDERICH, supra note 141, at 47 ("Marriages, considered as con-
tracts, can be annulled. Crimes cannot be, in any ordinary sense. My death or im-
prisonment, after I have killed a man, does not make things what they were be-
fore."); Walker, supra note 131, at 88 ("Certainly in the case of theft or criminal
damage it is usually possible for restitution to undo virtually all the harm, if one
ignores fear and outrage; but nobody can be unmurdered, unraped, or unmugged.").
For a discussion of the difficulty with using the metaphor of "debt" in regard to
retribution, see id. at 88-90.
217. See Walker, supra note 131, at 88.
218. See FLETCHER, supra note 68, at 417-18.
219. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 120, at 143.
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cannot owe this debt of obedience to my fellows; and insofar
as my crime is motivated by a need which itself results from
my unjustly disadvantaged position, or by a greed which is it-
self instilled and fostered in me by the very structures of my
society, I cannot be accused of wilfully seizing an unfair ad-
vantage for myself in breaking the law. My punishment is
then unjustified: it does not deprive me of a profit which I
have unfairly gained, or restore a fair balance of benefits and
burdens; and the state which treats me unfairly cannot claim
the right to punish me in the name of fairness.220
Murphy phrases the same fundamental criticism in terms more
likely to be heard in the political arena. As Murphy notes, retri-
bution from a reciprocity perspective supposes a "picture of an
evil person who, of his own free will, intentionally acts against
those just rules of society which he knows, as a rational man,
benefit everyone including himself."22' But, for Murphy, the
"paying debt to society" perspective fails if we think of the of-
fender as sometimes being
an impoverished black whose whole life has been one of frus-
trating alienation from the prevailing socio-economic
structure-no job, no transportation if he could get a job,
substandard education for his children, terrible housing and
inadequate health care for his whole family, condescend-
ing-tardy-inadequate welfare payments, harassment by the
police but no real protection by them against the dangers in
his community, and near total exclusion from the political
process.2
220. DUFF, supra note 139, at 209. Ultimately, Duff rejects retribution as an ac-
ceptable justification for punishment because of a lack of community respect for the
autonomy of all individuals. See id. at 295; see also VON HIRSCH, supra note 120, at
143-49 (noting difficult issues that arise when one considers social justice); Walker,
supra note 131, at 87-88 (making the related point that even for Christian theolo-
gians, who justify punishment as a means to promote spiritual improvement, im-
provement is unlikely unless the person accepts the justice of his suffering). Few
commentators would take their thought as far as Michael Foucault who argued that
a bourgeois society creates crime as a tool to stifle political dissent. See MICHAEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT 24-26 (1977). For a criticism of modem
political interpretations of criminal justice, see ALLEN, supra note 2, at 37-41.
221. Murphy, supra note 191, at 242.
222. Id.
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Certainly, neither Duff nor Murphy believes that all offenders
are socially or economically disadvantaged; but one need only
look to the demographics of America's prisons to know that the
issue of mutual benefits and unequal benefits is a real one.23
The policymaker who looks to justify punishment on the grounds
of reciprocity of benefits and burdens faces a complication of the
real nature of society. A strategy for mercy may attempt to look
for areas of crime in which offenders are less likely to share in
the benefits and more likely to assume the burdens of society.
22
This approach is reinforced by another side of the mutual bene-
fits theory--concern for the personal autonomy of the offender.
In balance restoration there is a danger for the retributivist to
justify punishment on the consequentialist ground that failure to
punish may lead those who are law-abiding to lose their alle-
giance. 5 For the retributivist, this rationale does not give the
state the right to impose punishment on the individual offender.226
Harkening back to the writings of Kant,227 Hegel,2
28 Rawls,229
and Morris,23' Duff hypothesizes that a rational observer "would
opt for a system.., which secures and preserves a fair distribu-
tion of benefits and burdens by punishing criminals; and in
opting for-in willing-such a system she wills her own pun-
ishment should she break the law."23 ' The state has the right to
punish the offender and the offender has the right to be pun-
ished;23 2 failure to punish the offender may indicate a lack of re-
223. See supra note 64.
224. This point inevitably leads into Anselm's first paradox, which questions whether
mercy is an autonomous virtue or whether merciful factors are a part of justice. See
infra notes 259-367 and accompanying text.
225. See DUFF, supra note 139, at 208.
226. See id
227. See id. at 202.
228. See G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 70, 92-100 (T.M. Knox trans., 1942),
cited in DUFF, supra note 139, at 203. For a discussion of Hegel's views on annul-
ment, see HONDERICH, supra note 141, at 47-51.
229. See DUFF, supra note 139, at 208.
230. See Morris, supra note 77, at 80 ("[T]here is some plausibility in the exagger-
ated claim that in choosing to do an act violative of the rules that an individual has
chosen to be punished.").
231. DUFF, supra note 139, at 208.
232. Morris notes that this position is not one that people would immediately con-
sider:
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spect for the offender's rational autonomy. Punishment shows
respect for the choices made by the offender" 3 and "affirms the
bond between the offender and the punishing authority."2" Pun-
ishment expresses repentance by the offender and allows the
offender "to regain a proper concern for the law and his proper
place in the community."
23 5
The bind in which we place the criminal justice system is
obvious. To punish an offender shows respect for the person. To
punish on the basis of balance restoration, where there has been
an imbalance to begin with, seems unfair.3 6 Certainly a strategy
The immediate reaction to the claim that there is such a right is puzzle-
ment. And the" reasons for this are apparent. People do not normally
value pain and suffering. Punishment is associated with pain and suffer-
ing. When we think about punishment we naturally think of the strong
desire most persons have to avoid it, to accept, for example, acquittal of
a criminal charge with relief and eagerly, if convicted, to hope for a par-
don or probation. Adding, of course, to the paradoxical character of the
claim of such a right is difficulty in imagining circumstances in which it
would be denied one. When would one rightly demand punishment and
meet with any threat of the claim being denied?
Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT, supra note
122, at 77.
233. See id. at 85.
234. FLETCHER, supra note 68, at 417 n.24.
235. DUFF, supra note 139, at 234; see also Walker, supra note 131, at 87-88
("Some Christian theologians justify punishment on the ground that it may promote
spiritual improvement. This is not necessarily Benthamist utilitarianism: it is the
offender's immortal soul they have in mind, not his temporal future. Yet spiritual
improvement is highly improbable unless he accepts or can be brought to accept the
justice of his suffering.").
236.
But insofar as the society in which the offender lives does not constitute
a genuine community, united by shared values and mutual concern and
respect; insofar as the laws which claim to bind her cannot be adequately
justified to her: neither her crime nor her punishment can have the
meaning which this account ascribes to them. If the social relationships
and shared concerns which constitute a community do not exist, or are
not reflected in the law, then her crime cannot be destructive of those
relationships, and her punishment cannot restore them. And it is surely
true that our own society falls far short of constituting such a moral
community: we do not, and this includes both law-abiding and criminal
citizens, have the kind of concern for each other which the idea of a
community requires; and our laws too often cannot be plausibly justified
by reference to a genuinely common good.
DUFF, supra note 139, at 292-93.
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for mercy will avoid economic crimes in which criminal conduct
results in an obviously unfair allocation of burdens and bene-
fits."' Additionally, however, a strategy for mercy might well
gravitate to areas of crime in which one has serious doubts that
offenders have shared fairly in benefits and burdens. A strategy
for mercy might seek out those areas in which an offender,
through his crime, creates additional burdens on himself. Within
this context, a strategy for mercy may be able to prepare an of-
fender to participate more fully in society and to accept more
readily its burdens and rejoice in its benefits, thereby not re-
gaining his place in the community but perhaps gaining that
place for perhaps the first time.238
2. Issues of Distribution
In traditional discussions of punishment, retribution as just
deserts is seen as a justification for punishment and also as a
limitation upon the power of the state."9 Retribution permits the
237. For a retributivist, restitution that results in the status quo ante is insuffi-
cient. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 122, at 32.
238. Whenever a state intervenes into an individual's life "for the good of the indi-
vidual" there is the risk that the intervention will be used to manipulate the indi-
vidual and take more control over the individual than otherwise would be justified.
See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMIrEE, supra note 129, at 39-40. As Duff con-
cludes, however, we seem to be directed toward very pessimistic conclusions at every
turn in the justification of punishment. For Duff, the dilemma is what to do if we
conclude that we cannot justify punishment until society accepts the criminal "as an
autonomous moral agent whose consent and repentance we seek," DUFF, supra note
139, at 295, and there exists "a genuine community within which the criminal has
his place," id., yet "to forswear punishment would therefore be disastrous for our
very survival," id. at 296. Although some would conclude that all values must be
interpreted consequentially, and the price of attaining justice may be to maintain
institutions which are now unjust, see id. at 297, Duff concludes that he is driven
back to a deterrent theory to justify punishment even though previously he had
rejected deterrence as "improperly manipulative." Id. at 299. Nigel Walker reaches a
similar conclusion. See Walker, supra note 131, at 93.
239. Hart distinguishes retribution as a "General Justifying Aim" from retribution
in "Distribution":
Much confusing shadow-fighting between utilitarians and their opponents
may be avoided if it is recognized that it is perfectly consistent to assert
both that the General Justifying Aim of the practice of punishment is its
beneficial consequences and that the pursuit of this General Aim should
be qualified or restricted out of deference to principles of Distribution
which require that punishment should be only of an offender for an of-
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state to punish only those who deserve to be punished240 and the
state may only punish in a manner that is proportional to the
harm caused." 1 As a requirement of justice, retribution is seen
as a check upon tyranny. 2
In the political sphere, the concept that only those who de-
serve punishment should be punished is not controversial and
should not detain us in our development of a strategy for mercy.2'
fence. Conversely it does not in the least follow from the admission of
the latter principle of retribution in Distribution that the General Justi-
fying Aim of punishment is Retribution though of course Retribution in
General Aim entails retribution in Distribution.
HART, supra note 135, at 9.
240. See id. at 11. The strength of retribution in this distributive sense is apparent
in many common law concepts such as the common law preference for mens rea
over strict liability and the defenses of insanity and lack of capacity due to age. See
ALLEN, supra note 2, at 68. The assumption exists that the offender is a responsible
moral agent, and that without personal culpability, a person cannot be used as an
example to benefit the larger societal interests in crime prevention. See HART, supra
note 135, at 160.
241. Although rehabilitation may justify an indeterminate sentence until the offender
is "cured" and deterrence may justify whatever sentence may have the desired effect,
retribution requires that "punishments for different crimes should be 'proportionate'
to the relative wickedness or seriousness of the crime." HART, supra note 135, at
162. This equivalence principle is not without practical problems, such as how one
measures equivalence. Wilson has summarized neatly a few of the approaches to
equivalence:
Aristotle would seek to equate the punishment with the "gain" accrued
by the offender; Morris would seek to remove the "advantage" gained;
Hegel would have the evil 'annulled;" Kant would require repayment
"like with like;" Stephen would seek 'satisfactions" sufficient to placate
the victim's grievance.
WILSON, supra note 102, at 284. Hegel saw the impossibility of trying to determine
whether an offender deserved 39 or 40 lashes and concluded that, within limits, the
most important thing was that "something be actually done." HEGEL, supra note 141,
at 3. Although Kant argued that all murderers should be executed, he was less clear
as to the equivalent punishment for rape, or even how execution is the equivalent
punishment for a provoked homicide. See Hawkins, supra note 129, at 15-16;
HONDEREICH, supra note 141, at 49-50 (arguing that crime, in any ordinary sense of
the word, cannot be "annulled"). Thomas Aquinas considered wrongdoing as. a misuse
of a power that was created to permit a person to attain good. See Hawkins, supra
note 129, at 17.
242. This distributive principle is not necessarily a principle to be claimed only by
retributivists. See HART, supra note 135, at 11 ("[T]hat restriction of punishment to
offenders is a simple consequence of whatever principles (Retributive or Utilitarian)
constitute the Justifying Aim of punishment.").
243. See Walker, supra note 131, at 91. From time to time this concept does seem
to be eroded. For example, in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the de-
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Twin aspects of distribution are more problematic: the nature of
conduct that deserves to be punished and the attempt to relate
the degree of punishment to the degree of harm caused.
A recapitulation of the debate on the nature of punishable
conduct is beyond the scope of this Article.2" Hopefully it will
suffice to acknowledge that we may not be certain just how we
conclude that punishment is due. Certainly there is con-
duct-whether an affirmative act or an omission-that histori-
cally has called for punishment and that claims to punish merely
because of the harm caused by the act itself.24 Yet as Fletcher
points out, we also seem willing to punish for character traits as
well. 2" For example, we punish for murder, but we punish less
for provoked murders and more for premeditated ones. In devel-
fendant sought postconviction relief on the ground that he pleaded guilty to avoid
the death penalty and that he was, in fact, innocent of the crime. See id. at 29. The
Supreme Court held that as long as there was a factual basis for the plea, the trial
judge did not err in accepting Alford's plea despite Alford's protestations at the time
of the plea that he did not commit the crime. See id. at 38.
244. See generally HART, supra note 135, at 6-8; Walker, supra note 131, at 86-88
(discussing what conduct deserves blame and punishment).
245. See Walker, supra note 131, at 86-88.
246.
An inference from the wrongful act to the actor's character is essen-
tial to a retributive theory of punishment. A fuller statement of the argu-
ment would go like this: (1) punishing wrongful conduct is just only if
punishment is measured by the desert of the offender, (2) the desert of
an offender is gauged by his character-i.e., the kind of person he is, (3)
and therefore, a judgment about character is essential to the just distri-
bution of punishment....
If we accept this legalistic limitation on the inquiry, then the ques-
tion becomes whether a particular wrongful act is attributable either to
the actor's character or to the circumstances that overwhelmed his capac-
ity for choice.... We begin to interweave the two when we argue, for
example, that the defendant's background of deprivation excuses his
wrongdoing. It goes without saying that a person's life experience may
shape his character. Yet if we excuse on the ground of prolonged social
deprivation, the theory of excuses would begin to absorb the entire crimi-
nal law. If we seriously believe that disadvantage causes crime, then we
should have to argue that excessive advantage-witness Loeb & Leopold,
Mitchell & Ehrlichman-also induces criminal behavior. The argument
leads us into the cul-de-sac of environmental determinism. Now it may
be the case that all human conduct is compelled by circumstances; but if
it is, we should have to abandon the whole process of blame and punish-
ment and turn to other forms of social protection.
FLETCHER, supra note 68, at 800-01 (footnote omitted).
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oping a strategy for mercy, we must face the character issue. If
character evidence mitigates punishment, is the result one of
justice or mercy? This leads us into Anselm's first paradox.' If
character can aggravate punishment, is this done out of justice or
cruelty? Must we determine for purposes of denunciation theory
or because of notions of expiation, what are the causes of the
character flaw? Again, are we in the realm of justice or of mercy?
The second problematic aspect of distribution is the issue of
proportionality of punishment. Within the philosophical sphere,
the debate on proportionality has centered on the definition of
"punishment,"24 8 the appropriateness of certain types of punish-
ments,249 and the difficulty in measuring whether the punish-
ment to be inflicted is commensurate with the harm associated
with the crime.25 0 In the political sphere, distribution issues are
different. As to types of acceptable punishments, legislatures
generally have limited punishments to incarceration, fines, com-
munity service, release with restrictive conditions, and death in
a restricted range of crimes; by these self-imposed limitations,
controversy has been avoided. 2 1' Even the ambiguous meaning of
punishment itself is of little concern to the Supreme Court. In-
deed, the Court has found the legislature's decision as to whether
a sanction is a criminal punishment or a civil sanction to be
virtually conclusive. 2
247. See ST. ANSELM, PROSLOGION 125, 127 (M.J. Charlesworth trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 1965); infra text accompanying note 259.
248. See, e.g., HONDEREICH, supra note 141, at 108-16 (linking punishment and
freedom); see also HART, supra note 135, at 72 ("'[Tlheories' of punishment are moral
claims as to what justifies the practice of punishment.").
249. See supra note 60 (citing articles discussing the appropriateness of sex offender
registration).
250. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 131, at 83-85.
251. Recent developments in sentencing, such as shaming of sex offenders, are
controversial. See supra note 60 (citing articles discussing appropriateness of sex of-
fender registration laws).
252. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) ("We must initially
ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish 'civil' proceedings. If
so, we ordinarily defer to the legislature's stated intent."); see also Mary M. Cheh,
Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives:
Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 1325, 1348-64 (1991) (explaining why courts must defer to the legislative deter-
mination of whether a proceeding is "criminal" or "civil").
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Equivalently balancing the crime and the punishment poses
an obstacle to any mercy strategy. The problem stems from the
fact that courts have been extraordinarily reluctant to second-
guess legislative criminal punishment determinations; only in a
modest number of situations have courts used such legal vehi-
cles as the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the
Eighth Amendment to strike down a particular punishment as
disproportional and therefore unconstitutional,1 3 even though
the methodology shared by the Federal Sentencing Commis-
sion2" and the Model Penal Code,255 which groups crimes by
comparative seriousness, could lend itself to such an approach.
The great majority of courts also have approved legislative at-
tempts to limit judicial sentencing discretion through sentencing
guidelines and mandatory sentences.256 When the public becomes
involved in setting punishments through the initiative process,
generally more severe penalties result than those prescribed by
the legislature.257
253. In Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), the Supreme Court indicated that
challenges to the length of sentences under the Eighth Amendment were not likely
to succeed. See id. at 284-85. In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), the Court
seemed to broaden proportionality review by adopting a three-prong objective test
that linked the constitutionality of a particular prison sentence to the gravity of the
offense and harshness of the penalty, sentences imposed on criminals in the same
jurisdiction, and sentences imposed on criminals in other jurisdictions. See id. at
290-92. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), the Court, in a number of
separate opinions, limited the potential impact of Solem. See, e.g., id. at 966-75
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that Solem was incorrect in deciding that the cruel
and unusual punishment provision embodies a right to be free from disproportionate
punishment); id. at 996-1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (limiting the application of
Solem to provide proportionality oversight only rarely in noncapital cases). For a
discussion of proportionality review, see Garvey, supra note 22, at 1009-12; Steven
Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme Court's Tortured
Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 KY. L.J. 107 (1996).
254. For a discussion of the theory behind the goals of the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission, see U.S. SENTENCING CoMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A
(1999) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES].
255. MODEL PENAL CODE, arts. 6 & 7, introduction at 1-30 (1985).
256. See, e.g., State ex rel. Huddleston v. Sawyer, 932 P.2d 1145, 1152-64 (Or.
1997) (upholding Oregon's sentencing statutes against federal and state constitutional
challenges).
257. See, e.g., Kevin Mannix, Measure 11 Reduces Crime, 1 OREGON'S FUTURE 15,
25 (1998) (highlighting that backers of an initiative measure, that increased penal-
ties for certain violent crimes claimed that the measure would prevent 11,000 violent
crimes per year).
A STRATEGY FOR MERCY
For the policymaker, judicial reluctance to oversee equivalence
decisions and the tendency for public opinion to tolerate harsh
punishments seemingly is good news. The broad discretion re-
tained for the policymaker enables him to decide that certain
subsets of crime should be treated in a very serious manner
whereas other conduct should no longer be considered criminal.
The difficulty with this position in developing a strategy for
mercy is obvious: If a legislature is virtually free to impose any
sentence it wishes on whatever crime it deems fit to create, is it
not possible to say that a legislature acts mercifully whenever it
imposes a sentence on a crime that is less than life imprison-
ment? As we will see in the next section, mercy requires discre-
tion, but mercy is not simply an act; mercy requires a particular
attitude. So a legislature that sets a low penalty for a criminal
act because of a lack of prison space is not acting out of mercy
but out of straightforward utilitarian concerns. The legislature
that sets low penalties for drug use because the legislature un-
derstands the allure that drugs may have for certain persons,
may be said to exhibit mercy. Beyond the issue of motive, how-
ever, equivalency of punishment to "wickedness" of the conduct
goes beyond merely a legal notion of equivalency and rests finally
on a moral judgment of equivalency. Even though a court per-
mits a legislature extraordinary discretion in setting the sen-
tence guidelines, acts of the legislature are still guided by exter-
nal moral constraints.
III. THE PARADOXES OF MERCY AND LESSONS FOR THE
POLICYMAKER
The first task of the legislator seeking to develop a strategy
for mercy is to understand that the disagreements surrounding
the content and role of retribution are not limited to philosophi-
cal scholarship, but are likely to be reflected in the beliefs of the
community as well. If a legislator could cease his philosophical
analysis of retribution, and move directly into developing a con-
crete program for mercy, he would enjoy wide-ranging options.
Yet, it is not that simple. The legislator must go beyond the
retributive justification for punishment and investigate the
philosophical underpinnings of mercy within the context of retri-
bution. Therefore, a second task of the legislator is to under-
stand that mercy may be an attractive notion for some; but for
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others, mercy may be in conflict with justice as well as with
notions of equal application of the law. These objections are
reflected in Anselm's two paradoxes of mercy and the responding
philosophical commentary. Anselm's timeless lessons for the
policymaker permit the legislator to anticipate, and minimize
public objections, thereby allowing the legislator to find a path
that advocates mercy in selected areas of criminal justice deci-
sion making, while maintaining constituent confidence. The
policymaker is well-advised to heed Simmonds's advice: "A di-
lemma may sometimes be more significant than the solution,
serving to remind us that our own thought is a historical project:
poised, conditional, and perpetually incomplete."258
This Part first discusses Anselm's paradoxes and then contin-
ues the process begun in Part II, highlighting certain factors
that a legislator might use to identify appropriate areas in
which mercy might be incorporated.
A. Anselm's First Paradox
St. Anselm's first paradox of mercy arose in the context of the
nature of God:
[Wihat kind of justice is it to give everlasting life to him who
merits eternal death? How then, 0 good God, good to the
good and to the wicked, how do You save the wicked if that is
not just and You do not do anything which is not just? 9
Murphy rephrases St. Anselm's first paradox and alerts us to
the two-part nature of the first paradox:
If mercy requires a tempering of justice, [then] there is a
sense in which mercy may require a departure from jus-
tice.... Thus, mercy must not be a virtue, but a vice-a
product of morally dangerous sentimentality.... If we simply
use the term "mercy" to refer to certain of the demands of
justice (e.g. the demand for individuation), then mercy ceases
to be an autonomous virtue and instead becomes a part of (is
reducible to a part of) justice .... In short: mercy is either a
vice (injustice) or redundant (a part of justice)."'
258. Sinmonds, supra note 45, at 54.
259. ST. ANSELM, supra note 247, at 125, 127.
260. Murphy, supra note 68, at 456-57.
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Unlike Anselm, who ultimately resolves his first paradox by
reference to the nature of God, many scholars conclude that
justice and mercy indeed are inconsistent concepts, at least as to
public justice and public mercy. The debate on mercy as an in-
justice examines the nature of retribution, the role of the victim
in the criminal justice system, and the perceived requirement
that the state act only in a reasoned manner. All three perspec-
tives on mercy and injustice add valuable insights into the cre-
ation of a strategy for mercy.
1. "Hard" v. "Soft" Retributivism
For some, the dilemma posed in the first prong of the paradox
is created by an insistence on "hard retributivism," that is,
society's duty to punish each offender to an equivalent measure
of the harm caused.26' For Kant, "a judge who pardons is quite
unthinkable."26 2 Assuming a constant moral obligation to punish
offenders, 261 even a society about to disband is required to exe-
cute its last prisoner "so that the blood-guilt thereof will not be
fixed on the people."2 " Kant's hard retributivism seems to leave
no room for mercy. Hard retributivism, whether justified from
the perspective of vengeance, denunciation, or rectifying the bal-
ance skewed by criminal conduct, finds mercy to be a vice, not a
virtue.265 Punishment is obligatory; society demands nothing
less.
For many philosophers, a justice system without mercy is
unacceptable. 266 For them, Kant's view of justice leads "to the
bizarre conclusion that mercy as it is ordinarily understood not
261. See, e.g., Brien, supra note 72, at 53-57; Garcia, supra note 71, at 224-26;
Harwood, supra note 77, at 464-65.
262. IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY 127 (Allen W. Wood
& Gertrude M. Clark trans., 1978). For a criticism of Kant's strict view of
retributivism, see Harwood, supra note 77, at 466-67 (arguing that there is only a
prima facie duty to punish, not the absolute duty Kant advocated).
263. See Garcia, supra note 71, at 225-26.
264. KANT, supra note 4, at 102.
265. See Retributive Emotions, supra note 77, at 10; see also VON HIRSCH, supra
note 120, at 51-55 (justifying punishment in spite of the resultant increase in human
suffering).
266. See Garcia, supra note 71, at 228-30.
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only is not virtuous, as the Western tradition has long held, but
is somehow immoral."2 7 Because Kant's view of mercy is depen-
dant upon hard retributivism, those who attempt to resolve the
first prong of Anselm's first paradox do so by positing the alter-
native of "soft retributivism":
"Soft retributivism" is the view that it is permissible to pun-
ish a criminal up to a certain level but that there is no jus-
tice-based requirement or obligation to do so.... The guilty
need not be punished, and it is not wrong not to punish
them.
26 8
Garcia reaches this same conclusion by comparing positive and
negative deserts: A person acquires a right to a positive desert,
such as the return of stolen goods, but there is no right to a
negative desert.2 19 "The insistence that the criminal deserves to
be punished is not likely to come, as a rights claim... from the
criminal's side;... [iut comes from the side of the punishers in
order to rebut the charge that there would be injustice in pun-
ishing."27 ' Punishment is a negative desert that is not obliga-
tory.271 As a result, "mercy always belongs to the injured party
to bestow or withhold and here it is not the official but the com-
munity that the criminal has injured."272 Understood in this
way, there is no necessary conflict between justice and mercy. 73
Soft retributivism answers Anselm's first paradox by recogniz-
ing that a "determination of what is due a person on the basis of
rights and deserts is not logically affected by what others may
deserve or have a right to."274 Feinberg refers to this as "non-
comparative justice;"275 however, there is no noncomparative in-
267. Id. at 228-29.
268. Brien, supra note 72, at 56.
269. See Garcia, supra note 71, at 227.
270. Id. at 225.
271. Some may argue, however, that an obligation to punish may arise from an
external reason, such as a utilitarian need to protect society from the offender.
272. Id. at 231.
273. This traditional view of the criminal justice system is one that relegates the
injured party to the civil courts for a private remedy. The injured party is simply a
witness-just a member of the victimized society who felt the brunt of the crime in
a particularized and personal way. The prosecutor is society's elected representative
who makes the decision as to the role that the injured party will play.
274. Carla Johnson, Essay, Seasoning Justice, 99 ETHICS 553, 554 (1989).
275. Joel Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, 83 PHIL. REV. 298 (1974) (defining
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justice when a person is treated "better than he deserves."27" For
Andrew Brien, soft retributivism not only "dissolves" Anselm's
conundrum2. but permits the criminal law to be "more condu-
cive to the greatest degree of moral justice."27
Another response to Kant's hard retributivism can be found in
H. Scott Hestevold's works that resolve Anselm's first paradox
by converging mercy and justice into a system of disjunctive
punishments. 79 Hestevold urges that judges be given a choice of
sentences;8. for example, a judge is authorized to sentence a
defendant for a particular crime to one year or two years in
prison. In this way, a judge may impose the lesser sentence but
is not obliged to do so. Some critics of Hestevold claim that a
punishment that is sufficient cannot at the same time be too
much.281 For others, Hestevold's concept of mercy is vastly
underinclusive.282 The majority of Hestevold's critics, however,
have complained that this attempt to reconcile mercy and justice
is little more than an acceptance of de minimis variations in
judgments among judges and, perhaps, is better viewed as an
attempt to assure due process by recognizing that no two cases
are identical."a
One certainly cannot dismiss out-of-hand Hestevold's resolu-
tion-a limited amount ofjudicial discretion currently is reflected
noncomparative justice as giving a person his "due," determined independently of
other people).
276. Id. at 306; see also Brett, supra note 33, at 92 ("Considerations of mercy
which might lessen the sentence of the offender have no bearing on the question of
what is deserved.").
277. See Brien, supra note 72, at 56.
278. Id. at 57. Brien also notes that soft retributivism is found in many of the
world's legal systems and is the model most easily implemented. See id.
279. See H. Scott Hestevold, Disjunctive Desert, 20 AM. PHIL. Q. 357, 360-62 (1983).
Hestevold would seem to be comfortable with many current sentencing statutes that
permit the sentencer t choose from a range of options.
280. See id. at 360.
281. See Steven Sverdlik, Justice and Mercy, 16 J. SOC. PHIL. 36 (1985).
282. See Harwood, supra note 77, at 465.
283. See generally WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES 127
(1987) (discussing racial prejudice in death penalty sentencing and clemency hear-
ings). For a criticism of this notion of unique particularity as an empty abstraction,
see Simmonds, supra note 45, at 52 ("The idea of a moral persona that is prior to
and irreducible to all general categories is wholly dependent upon the abstract form
of juridical thought; it therefore provides no point of leverage from which an anti-
nomian critique might be mounted.").
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in the sentencing schemes of most states. Remember, however,
that once one adopts soft retributivism, one does not need
Hestevold's "disjunctive desert" concept to resolve Anselm's first
paradox.2'
Sterling Harwood suggests one additional middle ground be-
tween hard and soft retributivism. Harwood reconciles mercy
and justice by concluding that there is only a prima facie duty to
punish, and that this duty can be overcome by strong "moral
factors."
285
Whether one sides with Kant 286 or Garcia" on the nature of
retribution, or whether one attempts to find a middle ground as
Hestevold has done,288 there are lessons to be learned for the
policymaker seeking a strategy for mercy. First, society seems to
be of two minds regarding the nature of retribution. On the one
hand, as society has awakened to the full emotional experience
that crime imposes on the victim, the victim's family, and to the
community itself, the public has called for "harder" retributivism
when the court is the actor-punisher.289 Sentencing guidelines
290
and mandatory sentencing statutes 291 have been the primary
means to limit the range of acceptable judicial responses during
sentencing. 92 Certainly, one might add to this list sex offender
notification and registration statutes, which impose additional
punishment for certain offenders through public humiliation. 93
284. See Garcia, supra note 71, at 229-30. We will return to the issue of sentencing
options within the context of Anselm's second paradox. See infra text accompanying
notes 381-82.
285. Harwood, supra note 77, at 466.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 262-64.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 266-72.
288. See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 163-66 (pointing out that sometimes leg-
islation has resulted from the efforts of victims' organizations).
290. See supra note 51 (discussing sentencing guidelines and their effect on judicial
discretion).
291. See supra note 61 (discussing the harsh impact of mandatory sentencing).
292. Sometimes the limitation of judicial discretion has come through the initiative
process or a state constitutional amendment. See, e.g., State v. McCoy, 486 P.2d 247,
251 (Idaho 1971) (holding that a legislative act mandating minimum sentences vio-
lated state constitutional provisions on separation of powers). In 1978, Idaho voters
adopted an amendment to the Idaho Constitution that expressly provided for manda-
tory minimum sentences. See 1978 Idaho Sess. Laws 1032-33.
293. See supra note 60.
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At least as to judicial decision making, the public is suspicious
as to the individuation of punishment; even in a noncomparative
way, mercy maybe seen as inconsistent with justice. On the other
hand, the public has been very tolerant of softer retribution in
the day-to-day operations of the prosecutor's office. For example,
attempts to curb plea bargaining have been sporadic and mostly
ineffective. 294 Although the public has required the courts to
increase punishments under "three strikes and you're out" legis-
lation, the public seems unconcerned that such legislation, out-
side of California and Georgia, has largely been unenforced by
prosecutors.295 The public, either through expediency or convic-
tion, is content with a system that has very few controls over
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.296 The strategic lesson for
the policymaker is that the public appears more obliged to toler-
ate discretion when discretion is lodged in decision makers other
than the court.
Second, the debate whether retribution is hard or soft raises
issues of procedural fairness. There is always the fear, as ex-
pressed by Justice Marshall in Powell v. Texas,297 that merciful
treatment may be seen to justify fewer procedural guarantees.298
Whether retribution is hard or soft, any system of retribution
requires that the person deserves to be punished.299 A push for
mercy cannot justify a relaxed attitude toward the need to prove
that this person deserves to be punished for specific acts that he
has committed."' 0 In addition, one must recall that an accep-
294. See, e.g., Misner, supra note 25, at 750-55.
295. See supra note 61.
296. See, e.g., CANDACE MCCOY, PoLITICs AND PLEA BARGAINING: VICTIMS' RIGHTS
IN CALIFoRNIA 89-128 (1993) (discussing the futile attempt by California voters to
limit plea bargaining).
297. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
298. See i& at 529 (1968) ("Thus we run the grave risk that nothing will be ac-
complished beyond the hanging of a new sign-reading 'hospital'-over one wing of
the jailhouse.").
299. See supra note 122.
300. The risk of diminished procedural guarantees is real. Under current law, the
clear message from the public is that the community is not interested in the proce-
dural plight of the offender. For example, often citizen initiatives have attempted to
curtail defendants rights. See, e.g., Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 959 P.2d 49, 70-72 (Or.
1998) (striking down an initiative that sought to limit certain defendants' rights in-
cluding the right to a jury trial and the right to be free from illegal searches and
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tance of any form of soft retributivism does not in itself answer
objections when justice is viewed in a comparative way-when
issues of equal application of the law come to the fore.
2. Victims and Mercy
Some philosophers, while rejecting Kant's view of hard
retributivism, also believe mercy is inconsistent with justice
because it ignores the need to punish an offender in order to
reaffirm the dignity of the crime victim."°1 Murphy accepts the
distinction between the permissive and obligatory aspect of jus-
tice, but concludes that judges should not exercise mercy be-
cause mercy is appropriate only to victims whose rights have
been violated."0 2 For Murphy, a judge may not act on her emo-
tions:
A judge in a criminal case has an obligation to do jus-
tice-which means, at a minimum, an obligation to uphold
the rule of law. Thus, if he is moved, even by love or compas-
sion, to act contrary to the rule of law-to the rules of jus-
tice-he acts wrongly (because he violates an obligation) and
manifests a vice rather than a virtue. A criminal judge, in
short, has an obligation to impose the just punishment; and
all of his discretion within the rules is to be used to secure
greater justice (e.g., more careful individuation). No rational
society would write any other "job description" for such an
important institutional role.03
seizures). Another example is the ability of a defendant to "sell" his rights in a plea
bargain, often in a situation in which the defendant's lawyer has a strong, personal
incentive to terminate the case as soon as possible and even when the defendant
has maintained his innocence. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as
Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1988-90 (1992) (maintaining that defense counsel have
strong personal incentives to avoid trial).
301. Hegel seemed to bridge the gap between Kant's hard retributivism and the
emphasis by others on the side of the victim. For Hegel, the offender had a right to
be punished. See GEORGE WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT I
100, at 37 (T.M. Knox trans., 1952). Duff reluctantly finds that retribution is an
unacceptable justification for punishment because of the failure of society to respect
the autonomy of all its citizens. See DUFF, supra note 139, at 295.
302. See Murphy, supra note 104, at 13. But see Simmonds, supra note 45, at 54-
56 (criticizing Murphy's resolution).
303. Murphy, supra note 68, at 459.
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For Murphy, mercy is an autonomous virtue only in the private
paradigm where an individual, with an enforceable right, may
forego that right out of compassion because there is no obliga-
tion for a private party to enforce her right."' The lesson, in
Murphy's view, to be learned from the private law paradigm is
that a judge in the criminal law may not be merciful in her own
right but can be merciful only if
it can be shown that such an official is acting, not merely on
[her] own sentiments, but as a vehicle for expressing the
sentiments of all those who have been victimized by the
criminal and who, given those sentiments, wish to waive the
right that each has that the criminal be punished.0 5
If this condition is not met, judges should "keep their sentimen-
tality to themselves for use in their private lives with their fami-
lies and pets."06
Hampton generally agrees with Murphy that judges must re-
confirm the victim's dignity.37 Hampton, like Murphy, would
permit a victim to waive the right to exact a certain level of
punishment if the victim concluded that she did not require
punishment in order to defeat the criminal's false claim of supe-
riority.3 08 Whereas Murphy would not allow mercy without the
agreement of all victims, Hampton would permit a judge to
weigh the competing claims of justice and mercy should there be
conflict.0 9 For Hampton, generally justice will trump mercy:
mercy is appropriate if the punishment would be "highly dam-
aging to the criminal." 10 The centrality of the injured party in
Murphy's and Hampton's discussion of punishment reflects some
304. See id. For a criticism of Murphy's private law paradigm, see Brien, supra
note 72, at 54-57.
305. MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 77, at 179-80 (emphasis added).
306. Murphy, supra note 68, at 458. At this point, Murphy's argument begins to
blend with the argument that the state may only act in a reasoned way. At most,
the state may act as the agent of the victim. For an additional perspective, see
Brien, supra note 72, at 54.
307. See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 77, at 114-17.
308. See id. at 125.
309. See id. at 160; Duff, supra note 74, at 59.
310. MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 77, at 160. For a critique of Hampton's view,
see Duff, supra note 74, at 59.
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of the same values found in the victims' rights movement of the
past twenty years.3 1'
There are those who are critical of Murphy's insistence in
defining the judge's role to exclude love and compassion. By
claiming that "[n]o rational society"3' would include these fac-
tors for consideration by the sentencing judge, Murphy seems to
claim that a judge can represent the community in certain is-
sues when the premium is on reason but cannot represent the
community when the premium is on compassion. 13 In fact, many
jurisdictions-all "rational" societies-permit the sentencer to
consider factors of compassion.314 Certainly, sentencing statutes
that permit a sentencer to consider all factors-including merci-
ful factors-would be deemed to pass federal constitutional mus-
ter.
31 5
Others criticize Murphy's insistence that the injured party is
the victim of criminal conduct. Traditionally, the state has been
seen as the aggrieved party and decisions regarding prosecution,
trial, and sentencing, have been made by the state's representa-
tive. '6 The particular victim is relegated to the civil law for
311. See supra text accompanying notes 155-62.
312. Murphy, supra note 68, at 459.
313. See id. Duff criticizes Murphy's conclusion:
Such an official [judge] will of course need to act not merely on the basis
of her own private feelings but a 'vehicle" for the community's views or
wishes. But if state officials can ever rightly act, not on the basis of
what the members of the community actually want, but rather on the
basis of what they should want or of what accords with the community's
fimdamental values, this will be as true in the exercise of mercy as of
any other situation.
Duff, supra note 74, at 59. Simmonds concludes that Murphy's attempt to detach
mercy from judgment contradicts the Christian view of God's mercy where God is a
judge and not one who waives certain rights. See Simmonds, supra note 45, at 54-
55. For Simmonds, Murphy may be avoiding the paradox, but in doing so, has al-
tered the definition of "mercy." See id.
314. Canadian courts emphasize that imprisonment is a "last resort," and to make
that determination, courts look to many factors beyond the culpability factors included
within the definition of the crime itself. See CURT T. GRIFrrHS & SIMON N.
VERDUN-JONES, CANADIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 405-57 (1989). For proposed changes in
the Canadian sentencing process, see Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch, Statu-
tory Sentencing Reform: The Purpose and Principles of Sentencing, 37 CRIM. L.Q. 220
(1995).
315. For a discussion of the constitutionality of considering individualized facts in
capital sentencing, see Garvey, supra note 22, at 995-1009; see also supra note 100.
316. Even in jurisdictions that have chosen to emphasize victims' rights, control of
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compensation. In this traditional view of the criminal justice
system, a judge can be merciful in the same way that a private
party may be merciful in Murphy's private law paradigm. Mur-
phy, for some critics, resolves Anselm's paradox through his use
of the private law paradigm only by fundamentally altering
what historically has been defined as "mercy." 17
The objection that mercy denigrates victims reinforces the
lessons suggested in the earlier discussion of retribution as
vengeance. 38 There is a general public perception that the crimi-
nal justice system prefers defendants over victims.3 19 For some,
this perception is reinforced by the constitutional restrictions
upon police conduct, expensive prosecutions, "country club" pris-
ons, and court-appointed attorneys. The public seems unwilling
to view the offender as the victim and any sympathy generated
for an offender is easily overborne by the sufferings of the crime
victim. Again, a strategy for mercy should avoid those crimes in
which there is an easily identified victim. If one chooses a crime
with an identifiable victim, one should choose an area where the
denigration of the individual is not the primary motive for the
crime.
Two other strategic points are clarified by the victim-objection
to mercy. First, until the guilt of the offender is proven, there
should seem to be no conflict between the offender and the vic-
tim. Included in some victims' rights bills is the unstated belief
the prosecution remains in the hands of the prosecutor. See, e.g., Armatta v.
Kitzhaber, 959 P.2d 49, 72 (Or. 1998) (illustrating a victims' rights initiative that
seemed to give some control of the prosecution of the case to crime victims, but in
fact preserved prosecutorial discretion by authorizing the prosecutor to assert various
rights on behalf of the victim).
317. See Brien, supra note 72, at 56 (reasoning that because Murphy adopts a form
of soft retributivism, he "does not need to rewrite the relationship between the of-
fender . . . the victim, society, and the judge" in order to resolve Anselm's first par-
adox); see also Simmonds, supra note 45, at 53-54 (noting Murphy's shift from a
focus of the position of the judge to a focus on the role of the victim to solve
Anselm's paradox).
318. See supra text accompanying note 137.
319. See, e.g., Michael Ira Oberlander, Note, The Payne of Allowing Victim Impact
Statements at Capital Sentencing Hearings, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1621, 1622 (1992)
("Today's criminal justice system focuses on the defendant and on the criminal act
against society... .Not surprisingly, victims of criminal acts have expressed dissat-
isfaction with the criminal justice system, which they perceive as inequitably focus-
ing on the defendant.").
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that a defendant's procedural rights come at the cost of the
victim's rights; if only it were easier to convict an offender, vic-
tims would feel that the system were more in their favor. 20
Whether punishment is viewed as merciful to the benefit of the
offender or harsh to the benefit of the victim, a punishment sys-
tem based on retribution requires procedural guarantees so that
we can conclude safely and with confidence that the person to be
punished deserves to be punished.32' Second, although an early
strategy for mercy should avoid victim-dominated crimes, later
strategies may not so easily avoid the issue. Later strategies
may require an explanation of the traditional view that society
is the victim of crime and sometimes the individual interest of
the injured party must be sublimated to the larger good. At this
point, it may be necessary to make further financial accommoda-
tions for victims.
3. State as a Reasoned Actor
For the third group, the dilemma posed by the first prong of
Anselm's first paradox is created by the supererogatory nature
of mercy. We permit individuals to act randomly in their private
lives because of the emphasis we place on individual autonomy.
An individual, in most areas of life, has no need to justify her
acts. States, however, must not be permitted to act randomly.322
"All acts of state should be justifiable; that is, should be such
that they can be supported by reason." 3 Justice, defined in this
320. See, e.g., Armatta, 959 P.2d at 71-72 (detailing the victims' rights initiative
and equating victims' rights with a narrowing of defendants' pretrial and trial
rights). Fletcher advocates giving victims a veto power in plea bargaining. See
FLETCHER, supra note 102, at 247-48; see also Robert P. Mosteller, Popular Justice,
109 HARv. L. REv. 487, 492-95 (1995) (reviewing GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUS-
TICE FOR SOME: VIcTIM's RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (1995)) (arguing that the cur-
rent practice to consult victims during the plea bargaining is sufficient participation
for victims).
321. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
322. See Harrison, supra note 68, at 115-17 (positing that a person may bet on a
longshot in a race and we may conclude that his decision is wholly irrational, yet
we permit the individual to make the bet, and concluding that although we are
willing to allow "whim, discretion, [and] play" for individuals, we should not tolerate
such action by government).
323. Id. at 107.
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way, does not permit the state or its agents to be merciful: "Only
by forgoing mercy can we enable the state ... to behave like a
rational entity, accountable for all its actions to the people over
whom it has power."3" Mercy belongs to the realm of "personal
justice," not social or institutional justice which is defined by
rules which delineate rights. 25 Justice demands an impartiality
that mercy cannot provide.2
The response to this criticism of mercy relies on two related
points. First, from a practical and historical point of view, we
have come to expect our judges to reflect the community's funda-
mental values, including mercy.3 21 Second, and perhaps more
telling, a merciful decision is not necessarily a decision that is
unexplainable. As Harwood notes, because mercy is supereroga-
tory, the criminal may never claim a right to mercy, nor can a
case be seen to require mercy; but "[slome criminals are more
deserving of mercy than others."" In a similar vein, a judge
who has a range of punishments from which to choose and who
always metes out the severest punishment permitted by statute
can be said to be "merciless" even though there is nothing im-
moral in the judge's action. 9
The objections to mercy from this noncomparative justice per-
spective appear weak. By treating a person better than he de-
serves, the justice system has created no noncomparative object
of injustice" unless one is not worried about specific instances
of injustice and sees an act of mercy as an instance of a "cosmic
324. Id. at 118.
325. See id. at 112; see also Murphy, supra note 104, at 12 (describing mercy as a
sentimentality to be used only in one's private life).
326. See Harrison, supra note 68, 115-17.
327. See, e.g., Dressier, supra note 92, at 1471 ("It strikes me as at least plausible
that people can, do, and should delegate to government officials the power to act
mercifully, even at the expense of justice, at least in those cases where the majority
believe that justice should be subordinated to mercy."); Duff, supra note 74, at 59
(arguing that it is to be expected that judges will reflect the underlying values of
the society she represents). A judge out of step with community values might be
voted out of office,
328. Harwood, supra note 77, at 466.
329. See Garcia, supra note 71, at 230-31.
330. See Feinberg, supra note 275, at 306.
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injustice." 3 ' These objections to mercy seem to add nothing to
the debate not already broached by the discussion of the hard or
soft nature of retribution 32-the risk that mercy will be seen as
condoning the underlying act 3'--and the discussion that less-
ened punishment may have an impact on such pragmatic issues
as deterrence."v For the policymaker, however, the objection
that mercy is an act beyond government and reserved for private
decisions precedes what is the strongest objection to mercy; mercy
is likely to offend our strong predilection to treat like cases in a
like manner.335 As discussed below, the comparative justice con-
cerns about mercy go to the heart of the rules of government,3 6
and it is the strength of these comparative justice concerns that
strongly shapes the strategy for mercy.
4. Mercy as Redundant to Justice
The dilemma posed in the second part of Anselm's first para-
dox implicates both noncomparative and comparative aspects of
justice by questioning whether mercy is an autonomous virtue at
all. Murphy argues that mercy is a redundant call for justice.
A basic demand of justice is that like cases be treated alike
and that morally relevant differences between persons be no-
ticed and that our treatment of those persons be affected by
those differences. This demand for individuation-a tailoring
of our retributive response to the individual natures of the
persons with whom we are dealing-is part of what we mean
by taking persons seriously as persons and is thus a basic
demand of justice.... Judges or lawmakers who are unmind-
ful of the importance of an individualized response are not
lacking in mercy; they are lacking a sense of justice.33s
331. Id. at 309.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 261-300.
333. See Johnson, supra note 274, at 562 ("For showing mercy when a debt is truly
owed or a punishment truly deserved might be thought to deny the rightness of that
punishment or debt.").
334. See supra note 28.
335. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 373.
336. See Harrison, supra note 68, at 112-13 (explaining that the impartiality re-
quired of the state is a demand of a rights-based system).
337. Murphy, supra note 104, at 12; see also KADISH, supra note 16, at 252-53
(arguing that consideration of the particular defendant and the particular crime are
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Murphy argues further that he has yet to find one case in the
criminal law of "genuine mercy as an autonomous virtue."
318
Cases that appear to be merciful really are poignant examples of
justice being overridden by utilitarian concerns, 3 9 that is, "un-
justified sentimentality."M4° Respect for the individual imposes
the noncomparative requirement that justice be "sensitiv[e] to
the particular case," and reason imposes the comparative re-
quirement that justice be "sensitive to the possible implications
of that judgment on other cases."34 For Harrison, "it is reason
which squeezes out mercy, not rules."342 For Murphy, it is only
within the private law paradigm that mercy is possible without
offending justice.3
Comparative justice concerns will be considered in the discus-
sion of Anselm's second paradox.' Until then, attention remains
on the noncomparative justice issues. Responses to the objection
that mercy is a redundancy have a number of themes. Some
commentators conclude that Murphy's approach to mercy is
mostly an issue of semantics. What Murphy calls "individua-
tion,"3 history has called "mercy."46 Others have responded to
necessary for justice).
338. Id.
339. See id. Murphy is responding to hypotheticals created by Alwynne Smart. See
Smart, supra note 27, at 215-16. For Murphy, the fact that a person convicted of
vehicular homicide of his own child is a morally relevant factor that justice requires
be considered. Similarly, the young age of a criminal and the reformation of a crimi-
nal after years of incarceration are matters for justice. See id. at 11-12.
340. Id. Again responding to Alwynne Smarts hypotheticals, Murphy concludes that
punishing a criminal less than deserved because of the unacceptable impact to the
criminal's family or because there will be serious civil unrest if the criminal is pun-
ished, represents a utilitarian departure from defendant-centered mercy. See id. at
12.
341. Harrison, supra note 68, at 122. For Murphy, the redundancy argument merges
with the argument that the state may only act in a reasoned manner. See Murphy,
supra note 104, at 13-14.
342. Harrison, supra note 68, at 122.
343. See Murphy, supra note 104, at 13-14.
344. See infra text accompanying note 369.
345. See Murphy, supra note 68, at 457-58.
346. See Garcia, supra note 71, at 228-29. This is particularly clear in homicide
cases in which the concept of "premeditation" permits the trier of fact to exhibit
mercy. See, e.g., State v. Schrader, 302 S.E.2d 70, 75 (W. Va. 1982) (citing Cardozo
for the proposition that through the doctrine of "premeditation" a jury is offered the
ability to be merciful). It is also clear in the sentencing phase of a capital case. See,
13732000]
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Murphy by harkening back to Aristotle's observations about the
futility of attempting an impersonal and universal response to
misbehavior.347 Every punishment system must allow some dis-
cretion to the sentencing judge in order to recognize the unique-
ness of all human events.348 Duff responds in a third way, be-
lieving that a victim, whether an individual or a community, is
interested not only in the wrong that the offender committed,
but also by the suffering that the offender has undergone: "I
may forgive someone who has wronged me because 'he has suf-
fered enough."3 49 Duff uses the example of a friend who has
wronged him. When he goes to confront his friend with the
wrong, he finds out that his friend's wife has died. 5'
"I see him... as a friend who is suffering" and respond to
him on those terms. This private model for mercy is one that
the criminal law should follow. But if a criminal is suffering
seriously (if he is grievously ill, perhaps, or recently be-
reaved-the suffering need not itself be a result of his crime),
we might, and perhaps should, come to see him from the
perspective of compassion and mercy rather than from that of
retributive justice. What we see and respond to is not his
criminal desert but his suffering. If such a shift of perspec-
tive can be appropriate for us as individual citizens, should
we not make room for it in the criminal law by empowering
judges, or some other official, to show mercy to criminals?351
e.g., Dressier, supra note 92, at 1471 n.89; Garvey, supra note 22, at 1009-12.
347. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 213, at 133-36.
348. Dressler makes the observation:
If sentencing provisions deny judges the ability to mitigate punishment
on compassionate grounds, pressure will increase to load the substantive
penal code with new full and partial excuses. Yet, if issues of nondesert
have a place in the criminal justice system, as I assert that they do,
such issues ought to arise after responsibility-guilt or innocence-has
been determined. Commingling factors of desert and mercy in the guilt
phase not only confuses the purpose of the guilt determination, but such
front-loading of penal codes would inefficiently require juries to consider
claims more easily treated during the less formal sentencing hearing.
Dressler, supra note 66, at 701 n.136; see also Johnson, supra note 77, at 116
("[Llegal justice may fall short of moral justice in . .. [distinguishing] between rela-
tively different cases.").
349. Duff, supra note 74, at 58.
350. See id. at 58-59.
351. Id. at 59.
A STRATEGY FOR MERCY
It is not clear what Murphy's response would be to the Duff
hypothetical. In response to a related hypothetical by Alwynne
Smart in which a father was convicted of the vehicular homicide
of his child,352 Murphy concluded that by punishing the father,
the state would have inflicted more punishment on the father
than the father deserved.3 3 It is justice, and not mercy, that
requires this result.354 In the Duff hypothetical, however, the
suffering of the wrongdoer is unrelated to the cause of his suffer-
ing. The wrongdoer is a pathetic figure because of an extrinsic
event, just as the wrongdoer might be a pathetic character be-
cause of a myriad of other factors, including parental influence
and the collapse of social status. Murphy's private law paradigm
would permit the wronged friend to forego punishment, but it
may be that Murphy would only allow the state to do likewise
with the wronged friend's concurrence.3 5
Whether one finds more satisfaction in the redundancy argu-
ment or the responses to that argument, practical issues over-
shadow the debate. Under Murphy's account, justice demands
that all morally relevant factors be considered. 6 Judges must
uphold the rule of law by which Murphy means "upholding legal
rules that meet certain standards of justice," not just enforcing
legal rules without concern for how unjust those rules may be.357
If the rules the judge must enforce are highly unjust, the judge
must resign or disobey the unjust rules.358 In practice, however,
it is the legislature that initially determines what relevant fac-
tors may be taken into account on issues surrounding both ques-
tions of guilt and questions of punishment. It is the legislature
that defines whether a particular crime requires a mental state
of intent, knowledge, recklessness, negligence, or no mental
state at all. 59 It is the legislature that determines what justifi-
352. See Smart, supra note 27, at 215-16.
353. See Murphy, supra note 68, at 457.
354. See id.
355. See id. at 458-59.
356. See id. at 457-58.
357. Id. at 461 n.8.
358. See id. at 462 n.8.
359. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(11)-(15) cmt. at 210-11 (1985); see also Paul H.
Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J.
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cations and excuses can be argued by a defendant. 60
In recent times, the legislature has limited severely what
morally relevant factors may be considered by a sentencing
judge. Mandatory sentencing laws say, in essence, that there are
some crimes for which there are no relevant factors that justify
a sentence below a prescribed level," 1 whereas sentencing guide-
lines restrict the impact that any articulated relevant factors
may have in a particular case. 62 Duff may say that the legis-
lature has constrained the ability of the court to exercise mercy;
in contrast, Murphy would conclude that the legislature has pre-
vented the court from doing justice.
815, 852 (1980) (arguing that legislatures may authorize certain distinctions in crimi-
nal behavior that may result in the mitigation of punishment). In his criticism of
the redundancy of mercy, Murphy makes this point, albeit sarcastically: "One might
as well protest strict criminal liability offences by saying that they are unmerciful."
Murphy, supra note 104, at 12.
360. Dressler warns that it is often difficult to determine whether justice or mercy
is involved in a decision. See Dressler, supra note 92, at 1468 n.82. For example, if
a judge sentences a young offender less severely than the judge would sentence an
adult offender because the judge believes that the age of the offender "renders him
less deserving of punishment," this is justice, not mercy. Id. The issue becomes more
complicated if the legislature permits the court to consider extenuating circumstances
such as the choice of evils defense of the MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962), or when the court is Instructed by a mandatory sentencing
statute that no extenuating circumstances may be considered. See supra note 61. For
a discussion of the role of justification and excuse in the criminal law, see, e.g.,
FLETCHER, supra note 68, at 759-69; Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Con-
cept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and Re-
thinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61, 65-66 (1984).
361. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991) ('here can be no
serious contention, then, that a sentence which is not otherwise cruel and unusual
becomes so simply because it is 'mandatory.'"). See generally Lowenthal, supra note
61, at 67-73 (indicating that determinate sentencing reform, which centers on mul-
tiple factors for sentencing, is undercut by mandating sentences that often focus on
one factor).
362. The Guidelines are constitutional. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 412 (1989). But cf. Ira Bloom, The Aftermath of Mistretta: The Demonstrated
Incompatibility of the United States Sentencing Commission and Separation of Powers
Principles, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1996) (arguing that the sentencing Reform Act
threatens the federal balance of power by removing from the judiciary its discretion
in sentencing, as granted under Article HI of the Constitution). For a discussion of
state sentencing guidelines, see generally Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guide-
lines: Still Going Strong, 78 JUDICATURE 173, 173-77 (1995) (offering a comparison of
22 state sentencing guidelines); Kevin R. Reits, Sentencing Reform in the States: An
Overview of the Colorado Law Review Symposium, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 645 (1993)
(presenting examples of state sentencing guidelines over the last fifteen years).
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Once the legislature has codified criminal conduct and identi-
fied any additional relevant factors, the decision regarding indi-
vidualized justice or mercy does not fall on the court but rather
on the prosecutor. It is the prosecutor who determines who will
be prosecuted at which level of seriousness. It is the prosecutor
through the charging decision, who determines, in great mea-
sure, the amount of discretion the sentencing judge will have. It
is the prosecutor, through plea bargaining, who often determines
whether the court will participate effectively in the sentencing
decision at all.
Simply put, although the injustice prong of Anselm's first
paradox teaches us that a strategy for mercy must account for
the public's commitment to various strands of retribution, the
redundancy prong teaches us more of a lesson in strategic pro-
cess. Whether Murphy is correct in understanding justice to
require the consideration of individual factors that some may
refer to as mercy,314 or whether Duff is correct in believing that
a society should consider all aspects of the offender's life out of
mercy,6 5 the practical conclusion is that the public has regis-
tered its belief, manifested by mandatory sentencing and sen-
tencing guidelines, that the courts cannot always be trusted
with individuation. The movements toward less judicial discre-
tion in sentencing were prompted by the public's belief that
attempts at individuation of punishment resulted in sentencing
disparities and lenient sentences that did not respond to the
public outcry against crime. 66
The lesson from the redundancy argument is that a successful
strategy for mercy must be directed initially at the legislative
role in the criminal justice system. The public is not prepared to
reinstitute the old regime of broad judicial discretion. At the
same time, there is no indication that either the legislature or
363. The depth of prosecutorial prerogative is seen in the "hands-off" attitude that
courts take toward prosecutorial discretion. See Misner, supra note 25, at 743-55
(noting that most prosecutorial decisions such as charging and plea bargaining are
unreviewable). This policy continues despite the fact that only 12% of prosecutors'
offices in 1992 had written criteria governing negotiations, see id. at 736, and that
91% of those found guilty in 1990 had pled guilty, see id. at 723.
364. See supra text accompanying note 337.
365. See Duff, supra note 74, at 59.
366. See supra note 51.
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the judiciary is anxious to regulate prosecutorial decision mak-
ing.36
7
B. Anselm's Second Paradox
St. Anselm's second paradox, which shifts from a noncompar-
ative to a comparative perspective on justice, has been called the
"equal protection" paradox:36 8
But if it can in some way be grasped why You can will to
save the wicked, it certainly cannot be understood by any
reason why from those who are alike in wickedness You save
some rather than others through Your supreme goodness,
and damn some rather than others through Your supreme
justice.369
At the core of the second paradox lie the same difficult concerns
encountered in the first paradox-the nature of punishment, the
concern for victims, the state as a reasoned actor, and mercy as
a redundancy. In the case of the second paradox, however, the
focus is on the practical issue of the equal administration of
justice, encompassing the knotty issue of race and ethnicity in
the criminal law, which will determine, to a great degree, the
strategy for mercy.
Murphy updates the language of Anselm's key inquiry:
If God (or any other rational being) shows mercy, then the
mercy must not be arbitrary or capricious, but must rather
rest upon some good reason-some morally relevant feature
of the situation that made the mercy seem appropriate....
And does not the Principle of Sufficient Reason require that
if I, as a rational being, showed mercy to Jones because of
characteristic C, then it is presumably required of me ...
that I show comparable mercy to C-bearing Smith?370
Shifting to the comparative justice perspective is critical. For
example, in a noncomparative justice universe, we may agree
with Garcia that an offender should not be heard to complain
367. See Misner, supra note 25, at 741-55.
368. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 68, at 460.
369. ST. ANSELM, supra note 247, at X
370. Murphy, supra note 68, at 460.
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that he has received deserved punishment or has even received
a lesser punishment than deserved." 1 In a comparative justice
world, it is not enough to conclude that the offender received no
more than what he was due. 72 There is the additional require-
ment that the offender be treated in a like manner to those
similarly situated and that the state be able to explain why one
case is unlike another 7  In a noncomparative universe, it may
be sufficient to tell the crime victim that his personal feelings
must be subordinated to the rights of the community as a
whole. 4 In a comparative justice world, not only may the crime
victim feel as if society is uninterested in reestablishing his dig-
nity when his offender is treated mercifully, but the crime victim
may feel revictimized when he learns that society is even less in-
terested in him than it is in other victims whose offenders were
not shown mercy. In this way, Anselm's first and second para-
doxes are cumulative in their political importance. Not only will
the particular offender and the particular victim measure justice
in a comparative way, but other offenders, other victims and the
general public will view justice as requiring consistency. It is not
enough, from a political perspective, to agree with Stephen
Garvey that although "[airbitrary grants of mercy are morally
tolerable; discriminatory ones are not."7 5
371. See Garcia, supra note 71, at 230-32; Brien, supra note 72, at 56-57. But see
Pollack, supra note 22, at 515 (arguing that mercy is inappropriate in a rights-based
system unless exercised as a component of justice).
372. Professor White has argued that mercy should first and foremost assure that
due process exists before concerning itself with issues of justice. See WHITE, supra
note 283, at 115-28.
373. Even though every case is in some way idiosyncratic, for the comparativist
"this does not mean that reasons should not be used in reaching these answers ....
So the decision, if correct, should fit in with other decisions." Harrison, supra note
68, at 121.
374. See supra text accompanying note 314.
375. Garvey, supra note 22, at 1041. For example, in January, 1999, Pope John
Paul H visited Missouri where he preached his opposition to capital punishment. See
Gustav Niebuhr, Pope's Appeal Saves Killer in Missouri, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan.
29, 1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL 5315052. When the governor of Missouri, Mel
Carnahan, met the Pope, the Pope asked the governor to commute the death sen-
tence of Darrell Mease who was to be executed in a few weeks time. See id. The
Governor commuted the death sentence. See idt The Governor received accolades and
criticisms for his action. See id. Some criticized him on a noncomparative justice
perspective--the Governor failed to do justice. See id The most compelling compara-
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Although philosophers and commentators may argue how
central consistency in punishment should be to a system of jus-
tice,376 the public and the courts have elevated equality of treat-
ment above most other concerns. 377 The frustration of the general
public with inconsistency in sentencing was a major impetus for
the sentencing guideline movement in both federal and state
jurisdictions.378 The general concern for consistency, however,
was complicated by the reality that the criminal justice system
has never engendered great confidence that the system can
function on a race-neutral basis. 9 The fear was that certain
tive justice argument came from James Edward Rodden-the next Missouri prisoner
in line to be executed. Rodden did not complain that the Governor treated Mease
unjustly. His comment centered on why Mease would be spared and not him: "I
think if you do it for one person, you should do it for all... I'm happy for
[Mease], but I think I'm just as good a person." Missouri Killer Doesn't Expect Pope's
Aid, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan. 30, 1999, at A2, available in WL 5315267.
376. See Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36
UCLA L. REV. 447, 452 (1989) (noting that a "person ordinarily has the right to de-
mand a plausible, nontautological explanation for why she has been treated differ-
ently from another ... or for why she has been treated the same as another whom
she believes is different"); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A
Reply to Professor Weston, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575, 589 (1983) (discussing the link be-
tween equality and rationality). But see MICHAEL DAVIS, To MAKE THE PUNISHMENT
FIT THE CRIME 90-92 (1992) (positing that retribution is only appropriate at the guilt
or innocence stage of proceedings and not at the sentencing stage); HART, supra note
135, at 172-73 (positing a more "modest place" for the notion of fairness between
different offenders); MORRIS, supra note 16, at 158 ("The data we now have would
seem to support the proposition that the black street criminal is slightly more se-
verely treated .... But if we are to move to a system of fixed sentences, without
room for mercy in the individual case, it is certainly true that even if one could
achieve relative balance between white and black criminals, black offenders would be
treated very much more severely than they now are.").
377. See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 2, at 68 ("There is no circumstance of American
life in the past two decades more striking than the ascendancy of the value of
equality in contemporary thought and political movements."). As noted by Philip
Kurland, the new frontier of the Warren Court came largely in the "development of
the concept of equality as a constitutional standard." PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 98 (1970). As Allen notes, equality also
served as a starting point for the influential work of John Rawls. See ALLEN, supra
note 2, at 118 n.22.
378. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM*N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 17-19 (1991)
[herinafter MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 102ND
CONG., THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE
GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF
INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING (1991).
379. See supra note 64; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Three Cheers (and Two Quib-
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characteristics of the defendant-wealth, race, citizenship, age,
and gender-coupled with the personal and political philosophy
of the judge and the quality of legal representation, had resulted
in sentences that could not be reconciled with one another.8 0
With the advent of sentencing guidelines came mandatory sen-
tencing,8 ' limitations on probation eligibility,8 2 and changes to
the juvenile justice system, 3 all of which were intended to lessen
judicial discretion and promote consistency,"' and implemented
with the full awareness that the court's ability to individualize
punishment would be curtailed.8 ' The public disapproval of in-
consistency, when coupled with its belief that lenient sentences
bles) for Professor Kennedy, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1256, 1257 (1998) (book review) (re-
viewing RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND LAW (1997) ("Even today, judges allow
race to be used as a proxy for criminal suspiciousness in various cases.").
380. The United States Sentencing Commission in its Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) section
5H1.10 (1999) dictates that gender, race, and national origin are not relevant to sen-
tencing. Section 5H1.6 (1998) also asserts the general inappropriateness of considering
"[flamily ties and responsibilities" in sentencing. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra
note 254. For a view that these provisions make no sense in the real world, Jack B.
Weinstein, The Effect of Sentencing on Women, Men, the Family, and the Community,
5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 169, 181 (1996). The Guidelines do, however, permit the
sentencing judge to consider certain characteristics of the defendant. For example,
U.S.S.G. section 5H1.4 (1999) permits a judge to consider the "extraordinary physical
impairment" of the offender but not "[dirug or alcohol dependence or abuse." For an
example of a proposed extraordinary physical impairment, see James C. MacGillis,
Note, The Dilemma of Disparity: Applying the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to
Downward Departures Based on H1V Infection, 81 MINN. L. REV. 229, 260-61 (1996).
381. See supra note 61.
382. See id.
383. See supra note 59.
384. See, e.g., Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United
States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a
Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 185, 189 (1993)
(demonstrating congressional rejection of more discretionary sentencing guidelines);
MORRIS, supra note 16, at 155 ("If we all get our deserts, who escapes the rack? A
system of criminal justice that is not infused with . .. clemency. .. creates an
intolerable engine of tyranny. Discretion in quantifying punishment may well be
highly susceptible to abuse, but it cannot be exorcized.").
385. See FORER, supra note 61, at 56-57 (suggesting that society can be protected
while treating offenders in an individualistic, humane manner). Apparently, Murphy
does not believe that individualized justice is beyond the ken of judges. See Murphy,
supra note 104, at 12. In contrast, it appears that Duff questions whether judges
can appreciate fully the lack of fairness for all members of society, and doubts that
they can take into account the reality that all persons do not have an equal chance
to be crime-free. See DUFF, supra note 139, at 295.
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were contributing to a high crime rate, resulted in lengthier
sentences for all offenders. 86 Sentencing guidelines were intend-
ed to produce sentences that were harsh, yet consistent."7
Public concern for equality of treatment, however, has not
exhibited itself in a wholly consistent manner. Although judges
have lost discretion in sentencing, and parole prison officials
have been constrained in early release decisions, there have
been no similar constraints on prosecutorial discretion. For ex-
ample, in order for mandatory sentences to be applicable, a pros-
ecutor must charge a crime for which there is a mandatory sen-
tence. For a sentence to be enhanced in many jurisdictions on
the grounds that the defendant is a career criminal, often the
prosecutor must choose to plead prior convictions.88 Generally,
there are few restrictions upon prosecutorial conduct in plea
bargaining.389 Similarly, there have been no constraints placed
upon legislative discretion. Courts have rejected arguments that
would require proportionality review of sentences and have al-
lowed the legislature to authorize very lengthy sentences for
what appears to be very minimal harm.3 90
The attraction of comparative justice may be the most influen-
tial factor affecting a strategy for mercy. Just as the redundancy
concern in the discussion of Anselm's first paradox led to a stra-
tegic choice to introduce mercy at the level of legislative or pros-
ecutorial decision making,3 91 the same conclusion is dictated by
similar concerns for equal justice under Anselm's second para-
dox. Assuming every individual criminal case will be viewed by
the defendant and the injured party as sui generis,92 and also
assuming that the public is unlikely to broaden judicial
386. See supra note 14.
387. See, e.g., MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 378, at 17.
388. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (1998) (offering enhancement of a
sentence if the defendant's prior felony convictions "have been pled and proved").
389. See Misner, supra note 25, at 743-44 (demonstrating that a prosecutor's discre-
tion to prosecute is virtually unreviewable).
390. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (upholding a life sentence
without parole for possession of approximately 650 grams of cocaine).
391. See supra text accompanying note 367.
392. See KANT, supra note 4, at ix.
1382
A STRATEGY FOR MERCY
discretion,393 it makes sense to pinpoint a strategy for mercy at a
locus of discretion where personalized judgments need not be
made. Legislative decisions determining what conduct is crimi-
nal and what penalties are permitted are less likely to engender
issues regarding equality of justice than are decisions giving
broad discretion to sentencing judges or parole boards. A legisla-
ture might make decisions regarding the merciful treatment of a
cognizable class of offenders at the legislative stage without the
usual worry that its decisions are likely to be suspect on racial
or ethnic grounds. There must be vigilance even in this strategy,
however, because certain crimes, such as crack cocaine use, have
disparate racial effects. 94
IV. SUMMARY OF THE HALLMARKS FOR A STRATEGY FOR MERCY
The literature on retribution and mercy has convinced my
legislator that mercy can be introduced as a legitimate concern
for the criminal justice system. Mercy can be politically accept-
able if legislators are careful to choose areas of criminal conduct
as candidates for mercy that have certain hallmarks.
A. Nature of the Prohibited Conduct
Conduct is a candidate for mercy if it is nonviolent, and there-
fore generates a lessened emotional response, and is conduct
about which society has an equivocal moral commitment. Con-
duct that may be clearly related to such factors as poverty and
unemployment, and thereby generates a degree of compassion
for the offender, may also recommend itself to a legislator. Mercy
may be most appropriate in areas of conduct where society has
serious doubts on whether criminalization has positive utilitarian
effects and in areas where society concludes that criminalization
actually promotes additional criminal conduct; in both areas, the
costs of mercy are low.
393. See supra note 377-87 and accompanying text.
394. See infra note 471.
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B. Victim Impact
Criminal conduct that has no particularized victim is also an
important consideration for the legislator. The existence of a
particularized victim can result in a stronger emotional response
by society and create a cause around which to rally for political
gain. Society may be less willing to be merciful where there is
an obvious indignity inflicted upon a victim that is readily com-
parable to the indignities suffered by similarly situated victims.
C. Impact of the Illegal Conduct upon the Offender
Mercy may be more acceptable in those areas of conduct
where the offender has not clearly gained an economic or social
benefit by his conduct. If the criminal conduct actually disadvan-
tages the offender over the long haul, mercy may be politically
acceptable. Indeed, to show mercy in certain situations does not
break down social cohesion by failing to punish; instead, mercy
under these circumstances can be seen as a catalyst for greater
social cohesion by signaling to an offender that society cares for
all of its members, including those who find themselves in lives
with limited opportunities.
D. Nature of Society's Response
Mercy may be- politically unacceptable if mercy is equated
with impunity. Where a crime has been committed, many in
society follow Kant's vision and demand a proportionate re-
sponse.395 A strategy for mercy must look for areas of conduct in
which punishment of some degree can stave off the conclusion
that the offender is getting away with something.
E. Proof of Underlying Conduct.
Mercy is inappropriate unless punishment is deserved.3 96 At-
tempts at reform should not lead to a lessening of the procedural
rights of the offender under even the well-intentioned guise of
helping the offender. Because mercy bears on the subject of pun-
395. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
396. See supra note 27.
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ishment as opposed to culpability, guilt must be established
before mercy comes into play.
F. Position of the Mercy Giver
Most jurisdictions have moved to constrain the authority of
the sentencing judge. Issues such as sentencing disparity have
caused criminal justice systems to relocate discretion from the
judge to the prosecutor, the legislature, and the police. A strategy
for mercy must consider in whom the discretion necessary for
mercy should reside. A strategy for mercy must also consider
which decision maker is most trusted to exercise mercy in a
manner unaffected by race, ethnicity, or other unacceptable fac-
tors.
V. MERCY AND DRUG LAWS
For more than thirty years, the American criminal justice
system has been fighting its "war on drugs." 97 Despite the bil-
lions of dollars allocated for drug interdiction and prosecution,
incarceration and treatment of drug offenders,9 ' there is an
397. Although militaristic language has been associated with crime control for many
years, the term "war on drugs" is most closely associated with the Reagan presidency.
In 1988, President Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. (1988)),
repealed by 21 U.S.CA §§ 1501-08 (West Supp. 1999). The Act established the Of-
fice of National Drug Control Policy, which was given the task of developing a na-
tional drug strategy. See id. § 1003. For a discussion of drug policy in the United
States during the latter part of the century, see DAN BAUM, SMOKE AND MIRRORS:
THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE POLrrIcs OF FAILURE 206-91 (1996); Michael Tonry,
Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U. Cmi. LEGAL F. 25, 25 (stating that the war-
time slogan of "Itlake no prisoners'" has its equivalent in the war on drugs: "'make
them all prisoners'"). But see John P. Walters, Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U.
Cm. LEGAL F. 107, 119-34 (arguing that the Bush Administration's drug policy was
a success). For the case that prosecutors should be forbidden from using the phrase
"war on drugs," see Mark S. Davies, Note, Enlisting the Jury in the 'War on Drugs":"
A Proposed Ban on Prosecutors' Use of "War on Drugs" Rhetoric During Opening and
Closing Argument of a Narcotics Trial, 1994 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 395, 406-12.
398. The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) within the Executive Of-
fice of the President reported that the federal drug control budget increased from
$1.5 billion in 1981 to $17 billion in 1999. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Drug and Crime Facts 1999 (visited Mar. 1, 2000) <http://www.
ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dcf/dcb.html> [hereinafter 1999 FACTS]. ONDOP also reported that
state and local governments spent $15.9 billion on drug control in 1991, up 13%
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uneasiness about the policy, 99 including a fear that drug en-
forcement has focused on "low level dealers in minority neigh-
borhoods.""' Are drug crimes candidates for a legislative policy
of mercy? If so, what conclusions can we draw from applying the
hallmarks for a merciful strategy to drug crimes?
A. A Number of Caveats
Drug crimes and drug programs create difficult problems for
those who wish to generalize. Different drugs have distinct ef-
fects and dangers for addiction4' 1 and the current trend appears
to be to polydrug addiction. °2 If one targets drug-use crimes, one
is faced with the reality that many drug users sell relatively
small amounts of drugs, or commit other crimes such as bur-
glary, to support their drug habits. °3 Some drug users are
from similar spending in 1990. See id. For a far-reaching summary of state and
federal resources dedicated to enforcing drug laws, see id.; see also Office of Nat'l
Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, Fiscal Year 1999 Drug Budget
Program Highlights <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/policylbudget99/overview.
html [hereinafter FISCAL YEAR] (recommending a budget of $17.1 billion for drug
control funding for fiscal year 1999).
399. See, e.g., John T. Schuler & Arthur McBride, Notes From the Front: A Dissi-
dent Law-Enforcement Perspective on Drug Prohibition, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 893, 893
(1990) (arguing that the continued policies involved in the "War on Drugs" inevitably
will lead to the death of innocent children, civilians, and law enforcement personnel).
The uneasiness of drug policy does not simply end with the substantive policy is-
sues. Many commentators believe that drug enforcement has resulted in the dim-
inution of federal constitutional guarantees, particularly in the area of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Steven B. Duke, Drug Prohibition: An Unnatural
Disaster, 27 CONN. L. REV. 571, 589-90 (1995); Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty
of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389, 1396 (1993);
Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights,
38 HASTINGS L. REV. 889, 891 (1987).
400. Andr6 Douglas Pond Cummings, Comment, Just Another Gang: 'When the
Cops Are Crooks Who Can You Trust?," 41 HoW. L.J. 383, 408 n.191 (1998) The
arrest rates of African Americans for drugs at the height of the "war on drugs" in
1989 were five times higher than the arrest rates of whites, even though drug use
was at approximately the same level. See id.
401. See ERICH GOODE, BETWEEN POLITICS AND REASON: THE DRUG LEGALIZATION
DEBATE 157-63 (1997).
402. See OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECtTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESI-
DENT, PULSE CHECK: NATIONAL TRENDS IN DRUG ABUSE 7 (Summer 1998).
403. See generally Office of Nat'l Drug Control Policy, Drug Treatment in the Crim-
inal Justice System (visited Mar. 1, 2000) <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
drugfacttreatfact/treatl.html> [hereinafter DRUG TREATMENT] (summarizing drug use
and the way in which it is linked to crime). The reality of the link between drug
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violent.' Others use drugs alone, while still others entice mi-
nors to use drugs.40 5 Drug use for some leads to violations of pro-
bation or parole restrictions.0 6 Some use drugs despite their re-
ceiving intensive and continuing treatment.4 7 Others use drugs,
and by doing so, endanger human life.40 8 If a legislature were to
decide to adopt a merciful strategy toward drug users, it is not
clear how inclusive the definition of "drug user" should be. It is
important to recognize that discretion, in some measure, is con-
stant in any system of mercy, despite very particularized
planning on the part of the legislature. Legislative oversight and
common sense can start and maintain a direction of merciful
treatment.
A policy of drug treatment, rather than one of lengthy incar-
ceration, may be less costly in the long term;4 9 in the short
use and the sale of small amounts of drugs to support the seller's habit has been
noted by many who have been charged with revising criminal codes. See, e.g., MOD-
EL CRIMINAL CODE OFFICERS COM1ITTEE OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF [AUSTRA-
L AN] ATTORNEYS-GENERAL DISCUSSION PAPER: MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, CHAPTER 6
SERIOUS DRUG OFFENSES 7 (1997) [hereinafter CODE COMMITTEE], ("[A] habitual user
who sells a small quantity of a controlled drug to another habitual user for personal
use should escape liability for trafficking."). For a discussion of linkages of changes
in drug policy and patterns of other criminal activity, see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING &
GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 137-57 (1992).
404. See generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACT
SHEET- DRuG-RELATED CRIME 1, 3 (1997) (discussing the link between violence and
drug use).
405. Most jurisdictions use the fact of the sale of drugs to minors to be an aggra-
vating factor in sentencing. See, e.g., CODE COMM1ITTEE, supra note 403, at 3-5. Some
jurisdictions have created a separate crime of selling drugs to a minor. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3409 (West Supp. 1999) (stating that a person who sells
certain drugs to a minor is guilty of a Class 2 felony).
406. See, e.g., DRUG TREATMENT, supra note 403. See generally DOUGLAS S. LIPTON,
U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TREATMENT FOR DRUG ABUSERS UN-
DER CRIMINAL JUSTICE SUPERVISION 51-53 (Nov. 1995) (proposing that treatment of
drug offenders within the criminal justice system is effective in reducing recidivism).
407. Although long-term residential treatment for former prisoners has, in certain
studies, lowered recidivism rates from approximately 80% to approximately 30%, the
30% failure rate is still substantial and creates additional policy problems. See Office
of Nat'l Drug Control Policy, New Studies Find Drug Courts & Drug Treatment of
Prisoners, Parolees & Teens Cut Crime & Drug Use (visited Mar. 1, 2000)
<http'/lenter.butler.brown.edu/plndpNov98-3.html> [hereinafter NEW STUDIES].
408. For a discussion of the governmental interest in protecting persons from the
effect of drug use in certain industries, see Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 606-08 (1989).
409. See, e.g., FISCAL YEAR, supra note 398. "For heavy users of cocaine, treatment
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term, a shift to a policy of treatment will cause costs to spike as
jails, prisons and community treatment systems expand their
staffs to include many more programmatic staff. Clearly, treat-
ment programs will disrupt budgets, particularly when one ag-
gregates both the large number of inmates currently serving
time for drug410 or drug-related crime4 ' and the number of in-
mates for whom illegal drugs were a part of their preincarcera-
tion lives.41 2 Sunk costs for facilities, often financed through
bonds, and recurring expenses for security staff will continue
with the need for supplementary funds for treatment programs.
The specifics of any treatment program will mirror the com-
munity in which it is established.413 Some jurisdictions have
extensive treatment programs, 414 including drug courts,415 al-
interventions would cost one-seventh as much as enforcement to achieve the same
reduction in cocaine use." Id. at 3.
410. In 1997, more than 277,000 offenders were in prison for a drug violation-21%
of all state prisoners and 60% of all federal prisoners. See Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, More Than Three-Quarters of Prisoners Had Abused Drugs
In The Past (visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/satsfp97.pr>.
Of the state prisoners, 70% of drug offenders were serving time for drug trafficking
or possession with intent to distribute, whereas 86% of federal prisoners incarcerated
for drug crimes fell within these categories. See id.
411. In 1997, 33% of state prisoners and 22% of federal prisoners said they had
committed their current offense while under the influence of drugs. See id. About
15% of both state and federal prisoners said they committed their current offense in
order to buy drugs. See id.
412. In 1997, 57% of state prisoners and 45% of federal prisoners said they had
used illegal drugs in the month before their offense, while 83% of state prisoners
and 73% of federal prisoners had used illegal drugs at some point in their lives. See id.
413. In some cities, a high percentage of male arrestees will test positive for any
drug at the time of arrest (82% in Chicago), whereas in other cities the test results
are very different (48% in San Jose). See Office of Natl Drug Control Policy, Fact
Sheet: Drug Use Trends: Criminal Offender Populations (visited Mar. 1, 2000)
<http'//www.whitehousedrugpolcy.gov/drugfacttdrugtrends/criminal.html>; see also 1999
FACTS, supra note 398 (detailing the different statistics of drug use at arrest in
differing cities).
414. For a summary of drug treatment programs in a number of jurisdictions, see
LIPTON, supra note 406, at 18-45; DRUG TREATMENT, supra note 403.
415. Drug courts are an alternative to the courts of general jurisdiction that hear
criminal cases and oversee the processes of drug treatments. The first drug court
was established in Dade County, Florida, in 1989. See William D. Hunter, Drug
Treatment Courts: An Innovative Approach to the Drug Problem in Louisiana, 44 LA.
B.J. 418, 419 (1997). By 1997, there were over 371 drug courts in operation or in
various stages of planning. See DRUG TREATMENT, supra note 403. See generally U.S.
Gen. Accounting Office, Drug Courts: Overview of Growth, Characteristics, and Re-
sults (visited July, 1997) <http:/frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress
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ready in place. Other jurisdictions have very few drug-specific
policies or procedures.416 A strategy for mercy permits the legis-
lature to move beyond the political bias favoring overincarcera-
tion but also to build upon the current efforts of communities.
Finally, the debate on the continued criminalization of drug
use is a long-standing one with strong advocates on both sides.417
Some jurisdictions have effectively decriminalized most drug
use418 whereas some have partially decriminalized the use of
marijuana.4 9 Although the criminalization debate continues,
there seems to be little chance of a broad shift in political atti-
tudes on criminalization;42 ° the political rhetoric remains too
=162.140.64.21&filename=gg97106.pdf&directory--/diskb/wais/data/gao> (citing insuffi-
cient data as the reason for an inconclusive evaluation of drug courts).
416. "While two-thirds of probationers have had serious drug and alcohol problems,
only 17% of these probationers have access to substance abuse treatment once they
leave prison and return to their communities." NEW STUDIES, supra note 407.
417. Often arguments in favor of drug decriminalization center on the ineffectiveness
of current laws to limit use because current laws ignore market forces. George P.
Shultz, former Secretary of the Treasury in the Nixon administration and former Secre-
tary of State in the Reagan administration, remarked in an address after he had
left office:
These efforts [of drug interdiction] wind up creating a market where the
price vastly exceeds the cost. With these incentives, demand creates its
own supply and a criminal network along with it. It seems to me we're
not really going to get anywhere until we can take the criminality out of
the drug business and the incentives for criminality out of it.
George P. Schultz, Schultz on Drug Legalization, WAIL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1990, at A16,
cited in RUSSELL Fox & IAN MATHEWS, DRUGS POLICY: FACT, FICTION AND THE Fu-
TURE 256 (1992); see also THOMAS SZASZ, OUR RIGHT TO DRUGS: THE CASE FOR A
FREE MARKET 95-110 (1992) (illustrating how the current drug debate betrays the
ideals of the market); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 403, at 82-110 (stating that
issues of decriminalization must be made on a drug-specific basis). Opponents of de-
criminalization argue that decriminalization will encourage additional drug use. See, e.g.,
Mathea Falco, Toward a More Effective Drug Policy, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9, 22-24.
418. For a discussion of Dutch drug measures by a member of the Netherlands
Ministry of Health, see Eddy L. Engelsman, Overseas Experience: Netherlands, in
Fox & MATHEWS, supra note 417, at 196, 197-98 (stating that the drug problem is
principally a public health issue).
419. It is reported that nine states-California, Colorado, Maine, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio-have partially decriminalized
possession of small amounts of marijuana. See GOODE, supra note 401, at 48.
420.
Given the dense entanglement of the issue of legalization in ideological
and political considerations, it is unlikely that it will be decided on em-
pirical or consequentialist grounds alone. It is unlikely that any of the
more radical proposals laid out by the legalizers will be adopted any
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heated.42' A strategy for mercy may or may not portend a long-
range, fundamental shift in political attitude toward drug use; a
strategy for mercy must begin with more limited goals and
avoid, if possible, the rancor of the decriminalization debate.
B. Applying the Hallmarks for a Strategy for Mercy to Drug
Crimes
The analysis of retribution and mercy leads to the question
whether current policy choices regarding the use of prohibited
drugs might be candidates for merciful reconsideration. Earlier
analysis suggests examining six related issues.
1. The Nature of the Prohibited Conduct
There is great ambiguity in public opinion as to the moral
culpability of illegal drug users.422 Certainly drug use is wide-
time in the foreseeable future.
Id. at 156.
421. In testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Darryl Gates, former Chief of
the Los Angeles Police Department testified that casual marijuana smokers "ought to
be taken out and shot" because, he said "we're in a war." William Bennett, former
federal drug "czar," speculated on a nationwide radio talk show that perhaps anyone
who sells illegal drugs to a child should be beheaded. "Morally," he said, "I don't
have any problem with that at all." Id. at 50 (citations omitted).
422. Answers to a Gallup poll question as to what is the single most important
problem facing the county have shifted dramatically:
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spread in society.42 Almost forty percent of the American public
admit to experimenting with illegal drugs at least once in their
lifetimes, eleven percent report use of a drug within the past
year, and six percent report use of a drug within the past
month.4 ' Although long prison sentences are authorized for drug
use,421 in the workplace, drug use is often viewed as the personal
problem of the user, which lends itself to medical intervention.
Most social institutions have evolved internal processes to re-
spond to drug use. In private institutions, drug use often results
in mandatory treatment, often at the employer's expense. 6
Drug use by a fellow worker just does not engender the strong,
emotional responses that other crimes (such as theft) with' com-
parative penalties as drug use engender.427 Most workers would
not be scandalized when a co-worker returned to work after
completing a drug rehabilitation program; indeed, completion of
a drug rehabilitation program may create a sense of compassion
for a person attempting to set out on a new path. Even drug use
in public institutions most often does not result in the drug user
entering the criminal justice system. One need only recall that
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 11, at 100 tbl. 2.1.
Few Americans, however, favor decriminalization of drug use. See John C.
Lawn, The Issue of Legalizing Illicit Drugs, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 703, 714 n.75
(1990) (citing Gallup poll). Though not favoring decriminalization, only 32% of Ameri-
cans believe that harsh criminal penalties for drug use are an effective means of
prevention. See The Gallup Organization, Consult With America: A Look at How
Americans View the Country's Drug Problem, 33 (Mar. 1996) <http://www.ncjrs.org
/pdffiles/gallup.pdf> (under contract for the ONDCP, 1996).
423. Contrary to popular opinion, it seems that "[d]rug usage is not significantly
greater in the black community than in the white community, but drug enforcement
is." Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 395, 456 (1997).
424. See 1999 FACTS, supra note 398 (citing the 1997 Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Administration National Household Survey on Drug Abuse). Furthermore,
there has been a marked increase in marijuana use. See id. Between 1992 and 1998,
past-month use of marijuana increased from: 4 to 10% among eighth graders; 8 to
19% among tenth graders; and 12 to 23% among high school seniors. See id.
425. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3410 (West Supp. 1999).
426. Many employers institute employee assistance programs (EAPs) to help em-
ployees conquer addiction. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO
DRUGS IN THE WORKPLACE 1 (Tia Scheider Denenberg & R.V. Denenberg eds., 1997).
427. This may be attributable to the perception that theft is a crime of dishonesty,
while substance abuse is not perceived as such.
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in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,42 the results of man-
dated, random drug tests performed on athletes were not made
available to law enforcement.429 Within the criminal justice sys-
tem itself, drug use by lawyers and judges most often leads to
treatment outside of the criminal justice system.43 ° Moreover,
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)4" gives certain pro-
tections to those who have been drug users. 2 The undeniable
fact, however, is that in the great majority of these cases, the
worker, the student, or the lawyer has committed a drug crime.
If the public's reaction to drug use is one of some degree of
understanding for those who have treatment options outside of
the criminal justice system, it would be tragic to conclude that
the public's attitude was different as to those who had no access
to private treatment. A consistent public opinion would approach
all drug use from the medical model regardless of whether the
drug user was insured or uninsured, rich or poor. 1 3 At the very
least, one would hope that many in society would have a general
sense of compassion for those who enter the criminal justice
system because they may have little or no access to private
treatment due to such factors as poverty, illiteracy, or race dis-
crimination, all of which are obstacles to securing employment
and medical insurance.4"
428. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
429. See id. at 658 ("[TIhe results of the tests are disclosed only to a limited class
of school personnel who have a need to know; and they are not turned over to law
enforcement authorities or used for any internal disciplinary function.").
430. See generally Blane Workie, Note, Chemical Dependency and the Legal Profes-
sion: Should Addiction to Drugs and Alcohol Ward Off Heavy Discipline?, 9 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1357, 1363-64 (1996) (discussing counseling and treatment programs
for lawyers).
431. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
432. See Kenneth J. Vanko, Note, In Search of Common Ground: Leveling the Play-
ing Field for Chemically Dependent Workers Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 1257, 1258.
433. See generally Steven Jonas, Solving the Drug Problem: A Public Health Ap-
proach to the Reduction of the Use and Abuse of Both Legal and Illegal Recreational
Drugs, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 751, 758 (1990) ("[1It is necessary to: Demonstrate that
from the scientific, medical, and epidemiological points of view, the true drug prob-
lem is a singular theme.").
434. Rather recent legislation has complicated this issue. In 1996, President Clinton
signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
21 U.S.C. § 862(a), which denies certain welfare benefits to those convicted under a
state or federal law that "has as an element the possession, use, or distribution of a
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Finally, in choosing an area of criminal law for merciful treat-
ment, one must consider whether utilitarian issues argue for or
against such action. There are serious doubts regarding the
specific' 5 and general deterrent 6 effect of prison sentences
upon subsequent drug use. In fact, drug treatment programs
appear to be much more effective than jail or prison sentences in
reducing recidivism rates."7 Utilitarian concerns, joined with the
public's ambiguous views regarding the moral culpability of drug
use, suggest that a legislature might well reconsider its ap-
proach.to drug use crimes without losing public support.438 The
utilitarian cost of mercy seems low.
2. Victim Impact
When the action of an offender directly implicates the health
and welfare of another, the failure of society to punish the of-
fender may be seen in itself as a further offense against the
controlled substance." Id. If the only drug treatment available to a person is treat-
ment after conviction, the offender may have a difficult time trying to begin a sober
life. See Recent Legislation, 110 HAIV. L. REV. 983, 9,83-88 (1997) (criticizing the
policy choices underlying the act).
435. For the three-year period of 1986-89, among drug violators released from prison,
24.8% were re-arrested for a drug offense. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG AND CRIME FACTS 1994, at 26 (1995).
436. For a discussion of deterrence and drug laws, see BARBARA S. VINCENT &
PAUL J. HOFER, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON TERMS: A
SUMMARY OF RECENT FINDINGS 11 (1994) ("[C]onventional assumptions of deterrence
theory may not apply to drug traffickers . . . ."); Michael Tonry, Mandatory Penal-
ties, in 16 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 243, 244 (Michael Tonry ed.,
1992) ("[Mlandatory penalties [have] either no demonstrable marginal deterrent ef-
fects or short-term effects that rapidly waste away ... ."); Tom R. Tyler, Citizen
Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspective on Civil Procedure
Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 873 (1997) ("[A]t best 5% of the variance in law-
related behavior can be explained by variations in the perceived certainty and sever-
ity of punishment ... ."); David I. Shapiro, Note, Sentencing the Reformed Addict:
Departure Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Problem of Drug Reha-
bilitation, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 2051, 2072 n.144 (1991) (citing studies that conclude
illegal drug use is among the least deterrable crimes).
437. For a summary of the impact of drug courts, see James R. Brown, Note, Drug
Diversion Courts: Are They Needed and Will They Succeed in Breaking the Cycle of
Drug-Related Crime, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 63, 83-98
(1997); see also supra note 415.
438. For a discussion of the utilitarian concerns of incapacitation and drug use, see
ZIRING & HAWKINS, supra note 56, at 162-64.
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victim. A victim also may feel revictimized if the punishment
inflicted upon the offender falls short of punishment inflicted
upon offenders in like situations.43 Drug use by itself has no
typical victim around whom the criminal justice system can
rally.44° Sometimes drug use is accompanied by violence, and the
fact of violence may create a very traditional victim." 1 Certainly,
drug users often commit crimes to support their habits, 2 and
caution should be exercised not to underestimate, for example,
the impact that a burglary can have upon a homeowner's sense
of privacy and security. The nondrug crime committed by the
drug user argues for a retributive response, even when the un-
derlying motive for the crime is also to support a drug habit.
Drug use has collateral effects on family members, 4 3 co-work-
ers, 44" and others." 5 In addition, drug use endangers others; for
instance, the child of the user-parent and the co-workers of the
user-worker certainly are at risk, but usually we do not view the
child or co-worker in the same emotional vein as we view the
victim of an assault. It may be that this belief needs to be
changed, and it may be that this attitude is responsible for de-
cades of the tolerance of family violence, but we rarely turn to
the criminal law to reestablish personal relationships. 446 Argu-
ably, those who are collaterally affected by an offender's drug
use may be better off if the offender successfully completes a
drug rehabilitation program rather than being incarcerated for
439. See supra text accompanying note 374.
440. In his criticism of Hampton, Duff reminds us that some crimes do not demean
anyone. See Duff, supra note 74, at 54-55.
441. See generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACT
SHEET- DRuG-RELATED CRIME 1, 3-4 (1997) (discussing statistics on drug-related
homicide rates and the frequency of specific factors).
442. See supra text accompanying note 403.
443. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A NATIONAL RE-
PORT: DRUGS, CRIME, AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 9 (1992).
444. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 606-08
(1989).
445. For a discussion of crime and its impact upon the structure of individual com-
munities, see Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 194-98 (1998).
446. For a discussion of restorative justice and its attempt to affect relationships,
see Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A Pro-
cedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1251-52 (1994).
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drug use. In any event, a strategy for a merciful approach to
drug-use crimes should not draw the ire of victims' rights sup-
porters as long as treatment for the underlying drug habit is not
seen as immunity for the commission of other nondrug crimes.
3. Impact of the Illegal Conduct upon the Offender
For many crimes, including both violent and economic crimes,
an offender acts on the motive that he will be socially or eco-
nomically advantaged by his conduct. For some drug users, who
are also drug sellers of significant quantities, drug activity al-
lows them to live a more expensive lifestyle than they otherwise
could afford; but for others, drug use becomes a trap that ulti-
mately places the user in a socially and economically disadvan-
taged position, which may include the permanent denial of cer-
tain welfare benefits.447 Through addiction, the user may create
additional burdens for himself; punishing the drug user on the
ground that fairness dictates that an offender disgorge advan-
tages that have been taken by his criminal conduct simply is
inappropriate.44
For some drug users, treatment may-not be a way to regain
his place in society but to gain his place for the first time. The
disproportionate temptation to commit certain crimes by those
seemingly shunned by society led Duff to denounce retribution
as a legitimate justification for punishment.449 If society were to
include within its mercy the poor, who are particularly suscepti-
450ble to drug use, then mercy might be a catalyst for more social
cohesion and not a cause of social disintegration. Mercy indi-
cates that society is concerned with the individual's plight in
life 51 and to show mercy to the drug user does not fail to redress
447. See Recent Legislation, supra note 434, at 983.
448. See supra text accompanying note 207.
449. See DUFF, supra note 139, at 295 (rejecting retribution, albeit reluctantly, in
favor of deterrence because retribution requires societal respect for each individual
and this is not evident in today's society).
450. A great amount of research over the past 40 years indicates that the poor are
the most susceptible to drug use. See ELLIOr CURRIE, RECKONING: DRUGS, THE
CITIES, AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE 75-77 (1993).
451.
It has been argued that when society criminalizes behavior, one of the
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an unearned advantage. Mercy is a recognition of the worth of
the offender and signals society's desire to invest in the offen-
der's future.
There will be persons for whom treatment is either unwanted
or ineffective. Society needs different strategies to overcome
these obstacles, but these inevitable marginal cases call for a
different answer and should not distract attention away from
those cases in which the drug user seeks change or at least
consents to change.452
4. Nature of Society's Response
Despite utilitarian claims that the war on drugs has been a
fiasco,453 claims that the poor are dragged into the criminal jus-
tice system, in part because they do not have access to treat-
ment programs, 45 and claims that drug enforcement has caused
bad law to cascade down throughout the entire criminal justice
system,455 a merciful strategy for drug users must heed Kahan's
messages entailed is that the values and preferences of anyone convicted
of such behavior are not important in the social equation. This view, that
drug offenders are not worthy of being counted as political persons, is
reflected in the typical forfeiture of political rights, particularly voting,
upon conviction of a crime in many jurisdictions.
Dwight L. Greene, Foreword to Symposium, Drug Decriminalization: A Chorus in
Need of Masterrap's Voice, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 457, 479 n.62 (1990) (citations omit-
ted).
452. For a discussion of policy questions regarding compulsory drug programs, see
Franklin E. Zimring, Drug Treatment as a Criminal Sanction, 64 U. COLO. L. REV.
809 (1993).
453. See, e.g., Falco, supra note 417, at 10-14 (arguing that supply side reduction is
an inferior strategy to demand reduction).
454. All facts point to a conclusion that many arrestees who need or want drug
treatment are not in treatment at the time they are arrested. It has been estimated
that the number of arrestees needing drug treatment, relative to those in treatment,
is 16 to 1 for arrestees testing positive for cocaine, 10 to 1 for opiates, and 12 to 1
for injection drugs. See GREGORY P. FALKIN ET AL., DRUG TREATMENT IN THE CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 31, 32 (Nat'l Institute of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice 1994).
Similar problems exist after an offender leaves incarceration. See supra note 416.
The United States Department of Justice reported that although drug and alcohol
counseling was available in nearly 90% of state and federal facilities, only 20% of
prison inmates participated in treatment during their incarceration. See 1999 FACTS,
supra note 398. The majority of jails provide some form of drug treatment or coun-
seling. See id.
455. See Francis A. Allen, The Morality of Means: Three Problems in Criminal
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warning that the public is skeptical that alternatives to incar-
ceration are commensurable to incarceration in expressing moral
condemnation of the underlying act.4  Consequently, legislators
must reject, as a current part of a strategy for mercy, an at-
tempt to decriminalize drug use. First, decriminalization shows
no opprobrium toward the underlying conduct; for a majority of
the public, this is not the message it wishes to send.457 Second,
decriminalization may result in a prosecutor seeking convictions
for more serious crimes than drug use, such as conspiracy to sell
a prohibited substance, if the individual prosecutor believes that
there will continue to be societal condemnation of drug users by
his constituents.418 Finally, decriminalization of an existing act,
such as drug use, sends a different message than the decision
not to criminalize in the first instance-a message of social ap-
proval.45 9
A merciful strategy must convince the public that the drug
user has not violated the law with impunity. In some communi-
ties it may be necessary to maintain a traditional form of incar-
ceration to enforce the message that drug use is wrong despite
the criticism directed toward treatment programs in prison set-
tings.460 In other communities, it may be sufficient to incarcerate
offenders in treatment facilities, whereas in other communities,
drug rehabilitation might be conditioned upon a successful com-
pletion of a jail sentence, particularly in those situations in
which other crimes have been committed in order to support the
offender's drug habit. For others, it may be sufficient that the
offender be sentenced to a rehabilitation program or that drug
treatment be a part of a probation program.46' The goal is not to
Sanctions, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 737, 748-49 (1981) ("Nor can it be doubted that the
practical difficulties encountered by law enforcement in these areas [including drug
offenses] have induced courts to relax constitutional restraints on police powers.").
456, See Kahan, supra note 146, at 693-94,
457. See Falco, supra note 417, at 23. There is a danger that legalization of drugs
would reflect social acceptance. See id.
458. See generally Misner, supra note 25, at 732-36 (describing the office of the
local prosecutor and its role in local politics).
459. See, e.g., Falco, supra note 417, at 22-24 (arguing that legalization conveys a
message of social approval).
460. See generally HAWKINS, supra note 28, at 46-55 (summarizing recent criticisms
of rehabilitation within a prison environment).
461. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3408(H) (West Supp. 1999) (requiring
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determine how each community must respond to the issue of
incarceration, but rather to avoid the tendency to equate mercy
with impunity.
5. Proof of Underlying Conduct
Without the existence of guilt, there is no need for mercy.462 In
the past, rehabilitation as a justification for punishment has
been criticized as a source of more evil than good: Rehabilitation
has been used to justify longer prison sentences and greater
control by administration over the lives of prisoners.463 A similar
problem can exist if the criminal justice system becomes the
gateway for drug treatment in a community. The danger is that
the perceived benefit to the drug user of a rehabilitation pro-
gram may lead to a lessened concern that the prosecution prove
its case beyond a reasonable doubt.' If the criminal law is
society's response to crime, care must be taken to see that the
procedural rights of the offender are scrupulously honored.
Closely related to this fear is the danger that drug treatment
programs will lead to even greater power for the prosecutor in
plea bargaining.465 The tendency of defense counsel, and even
the tendency of the alleged offender, may be to justify a guilty
plea, not because the offender is guilty, but because the long-
term consequences of the treatment program outweigh the im-
mediate harm to the offender.466 But if the justification for the
state's involvement in the lives of its citizens is that the citizen
deserves to be punished, there can be no acceptable shortcuts
drug treatment for certain probationers). It is likely that programs must be tailored
to meet the specific needs of members of specific groups. See, e.g., Kelly S. Croman,
Note, One Size Does Not Fit All: The Failure of Washington's Licensing Standards
for Alcohol and Drug Treatment Programs and Facilities to Meet the Needs of Indi-
ans, 72 WASH. L. REv. 129, 130 (1997).
462. See supra note 27.
463. See supra note 129.
464. The risk might be even greater in jurisdictions that have created drug courts.
The risk is that the court might see itself as a treatment provider and not as a
judicial officer.
465. See Misner, supra note 25, at 741-59 (discussing trends that have enhanced
prosecutorial power).
466. See generally id. at 759-63 (critiquing the role of the prosecutor in plea bar-
gaining).
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permitting the state to intervene on anything less than proof of
the underlying act. A different process for intervention, one that
does not express community disapproval of the conduct but cen-
ters solely on the future of the individual, should be made avail-
able to those not guilty of the charged offenses.
6. Position of the Mercy Giver
Claims of unequal application of the law are potentially explo-
sive and could doom any attempt at a strategy for mercy. Indi-
vidualized sentencing in both federal and state jurisdictions has
been limited severely, sometimes with the participation of the
electorate467 after political campaigns stressing claims of unequal
treatment.46 Therefore, the soft retribution469 needed for mercy
is not to be found in all courts, but in the legislature and in the
office of the prosecutor. In addition, mercy risks future criticisms
that race will become a determining factor in who receives mercy.
To overcome claims of inequality based on race, ethnicity, and
age, a strategy for mercy first should be a strategy for legislative
mercy.' Mercy, when it is prospective in nature, is less likely to
be abused, although the federal experience with crack cocaine
sentencing shows that a degree of vigilance is still necessary. 47'
There still will be actual unfairness if those who are financially
advantaged have access to drug treatment outside of the crimi-
nal justice system while the poor must wait for a conviction in
order to receive treatment; but the nature of the political solu-
467. See, e.g., State v. Sarabia, 875 P.2d 227, 229 (Idaho 1994) (discussing the
process by which the electorate adopted a constitutional provision that permitted the
legislature to provide for mandatory minimum sentences).
468. See supra note 51.
469. See supra text accompanying note 268.
470. The issue of mercy and the office of the prosecutor is for another day. Execu-
tive mercy is not a realistic option, because it is unavailable in all jurisdictions, and
in those jurisdictions with executive power, the power often is limited and rarely
used. See supra note 26.
471. A disproportionate number of African Americans have been convicted and
incarcerated for crack cocaine use. See Meares, supra note 445, at 192. Penalties for
cocaine and crack cocaine were meted out on a 100:1 ratio, that is one must possess
one hundred times as much powder for cocaine to reach an equal penalty level for
crack cocaine. See Andrew N. Sacher, Note, Inequities of the Drug War: Legislative
Discrimination on the Cocaine Battlefield, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 1149, 1149-50 (1997).
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tion often is to reduce unfairness in manageable lots. Because
an individual prosecutor may still defeat almost any legislative
policy by charging crimes more serious than simple drug use,
such as conspiracy to sell prohibited drugs, the legislature must
exercise a degree of oversight to be sure that the legislative
policy has not been undermined.
CONCLUSION
In the political world, where crime is viewed through a moral
prism, those who wish to see a more humane criminal justice
system must come to the debate with insights from moral philos-
ophy. Mercy, carefully used to respect the retributive instincts of
the electorate, will permit legislators to move away from the cur-
rent trend of spiraling incarceration rates with ever-lengthening
sentences toward a system that recaptures a semblance of hu-
maneness.
